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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been explained
routinely in terms of Soviet vital security interests inher-
ent in that region's geopolitical setting. It nevertheless
can be interpreted as the culmination of a trend in Soviet
Third World policy toward the use of direct, unmitigated
force in pursuit of national interests. This study examines
the significance of Moscow's decision to intervene in Afghan-
istan, in the context of overall Soviet policymaking. Addi-
tionally, the impact of recent reverses experienced by the
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I. INTRODUCTION
December 19 84 will mark the fifth anniversary of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Soviet occupational forces
in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) today number
105,000, representing the largest Red Army contingent to
engage in combat since World War II. Consequently, Soviet
military casualties are on a scale unseen since that war;
conservative estimates count 7,500 Soviets dead, and twice
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as many wounded. With the advent of a sixth year of conflict,
the war will become the longest commitment of Soviet ground
forces in four decades, with no end in sight.
The Kremlin has, nevertheless, made clear its resolve
to stay in Afghanistan. Soviet withdrawal has been univer-
sally discounted by the Moscow leadership, "until the reasons
that led to their being stationed there disappear" [Ref 1:
p. 194]. In late 1983, the logistics structure supporting
During the Hungarian invasion of 1956, in which a quar-
ter of a million Soviet troops were involved, the Red Army
reportedly engaged a number of isolated Hungarian units and
suffered some casualties. Nevertheless, the operation is
generally credited with achieving its objectives without
recourse to major combat.
2This figure was provided by Charles W. Nass, a retired
Foreign Service officer and regional analyst, in Proceedings .
Afghan rebel sources predictably have voiced the highest
casualty estimates, speculating that the 40th Army has sus-
tained more than 40,000 killed and wounded by August 1984.
Sources within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have
offered a median figure of 30,000 casualties.
the 40th Armv was expanded to provide for a protracted,
larae-scale conflict. Also that vear, permanent cement
block shelters and housina units were erected for manor
Soviet forces near Kabul. Moscow appears to have accepted
the costs of a auerrilla war of attrition, qivinq evidence
of neither a pullout nor an escalation of the conflict in
an effort to brinq it auicklv to an end.
Tvrus Cobb resounds a popular opinion that the Afghan-
istan episode represents "an aberation, moreover a precedent
in Soviet foreign policy." Richard Pipes and others have
attributed the Soviet action to a new era of Soviet militar-
ism in which Moscow will pursue its policy interests by use
of force. In its immediate contest, the occupation of
Afghanistan heralds the beginning of direct Soviet influence
in South Asia, and unprecedented influence in the volatile
Persian Gulf region.
A more moderate view has been voiced by George Kennan
and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, attributing the Soviet invasion to
traditional Soviet paranoia over shows of instability and
disloyalty along Moscow's borders. The debate has divided
into camps portraying the "Afghanistan solution" as an
offensive or defensive move, with accompanying implications
for future Soviet policy initiatives. The question of
Taken from the personal notes of Tyrus Cobb, Soviet
specialist for the National Security Council, dated 12
October 1980.
whether the Soviet action represents a harbinger of Soviet
expansionism (per Pipes) , or a shunned policy option tied
to vital security interests (per Sonnenfeldt) is of obvious
import to American decisionmakers today.
This thesis explores the significance of Moscow's
Afghanistan policy in the broader context of Soviet inter-
national conduct. Ultimately this study will yield an
appraisal of how the Soviet invasion fits into patterns
of earlier Soviet decisionmaking, and what precedent is con-
veyed in the episode. Analysis is divided into two sections,
addressing separately the motivations and influences involved
in the decision to invade, and the forces impelling Moscow
to weather the continuing conflict. The study of an episode
in which Soviet ambitions have been dealt a major and unex-
pected setback provides insight into the workings of Soviet
policymaking and crisis management.
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II. POLICY FORMULATION
The first section of this thesis will focus on the Soviet
decision to implement a policy of direct military intervention
in Afghanistan. A study of the inputs to the decisionmaking
process, including both the immediate situational factors and
the orientation of the current foreign policy outlook, yields
evidence of Moscow's true intentions and aspirations in the
region.
This section will first provide an historic overview of
Soviet/Afghan relations, identifying the local pressures and
influences leading to the invasion decision. The situation
then will be viewed in the context of concurrent Soviet policy
patterns. Comparisons are drawn with the development of
Soviet Third World policy, and the more timeless attributes
of Soviet peripheral security doctrine. Subsequent analysis
will determine the significance and precedent represented in
the Soviet decision to invade.
A: BACKGROUND/RESUME OF EVENTS
1. Penetration of the Afghan Economy and Military
A significant turning point for foreign policies of
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union occurred in 1954, as well
as becoming a landmark year for relations between these
nations. For its part, Moscow embarked on an unprecedented
campaign to solicit support and allegiance from within the
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emerging Third World, in poignant contrast to the views of
the now deceased Joseph Stalin on the subject. Generous
military and economic aid packages were offered to developing
nations of Africa and Asia under the guise of "decolonization
aid". In April, the policy achieved its first significant
and (by appearances) totally unexpected success. With the
acceptance of a Soviet economic assistance package worth a
modest $12 million, Afghanistan abandoned a 112-year old
policy of meticulous nonalignment among world powers.
Anthony Arnold, and others, portrayed this sudden and
clearly dangerous shift in Kabul's orientation as the product
of an inescapable chain of events following Great Britain's
withdrawal from the region seven years earlier [Ref. 2: pp.
24-27]. At this crucial juncture, the United States proved
unable and unwilling to fill the political void left by Bri-
tain. In response to Kabul's requests for military aid in
1952, Washington stipulated that inclusion in a regional
security pact was first necessary. When subsequently pressed
for an American commitment to the defense of Afghanistan,
Washington declined, stating that the U.S. had neither the
regional presence nor the capability to be a guarantor of
Afghanistan's borders. Despite visible Soviet agitation over
this exchange, Kabul determined to retain an all-the-more
precipitous balance between East and West.
A concise review of early Afghan political trends is
given in William L. Langer, World History (Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin Co., 1972), p. 898.
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American efforts at economic assistance also proved
ill-conceived and ill-fated. The Helmand River Project, begun
in 1946, serves as a graphic illustration. An Idaho-based
construction firm was commissioned to renovate four dams and
build a network of irrigation canals west of Kandahar, in
southwestern Afghanistan. The Afghan treasury was deemed
more than adequate to absorb the $17 million price tag.
Plagued from the onset with logistics problems and
gross mismanagement, the operation quickly overran projected
costs. Construction was delayed for years while Kabul
searched for additional investors to helo finance the project,
now estimated to cost $40 million. Finally, with U.S. fund-
ing obtained through the International Cooperation Adminis-
tration, work was resumed. The project was still underway
when in late 1978 Washington recalled all American workers
from the region. (Soon thereafter, Czech workers resumed the
operation, until they, too, were recalled in 1982.) The
total cost of the project at the time it was abandoned is
estimated at over $74 million. According to official Afghan
sources [Ref . 3] , the work completed to date has been of
"minor benefit to the Afghan economy.
"
In contrast, limited dealings with the Soviets in
the postwar period had shown Moscow to be a generous and
A June 1982 New York Times article claimed that Prague
had ordered the withdrawal of all Czech workers from Afghan-
istan at that time, apparently due to escalated fighting in
the region. Concurrently, Czech domestic press releases ended
coverage of the conflict.
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attentive trading partner. Following a particularly dis-
appointing exchange between Kabul and Washington, the Soviets
pressed through the signing of a trade agreement with Afghan-
istan in July 1950--the first in nearly two decades. The
arrangement reduced trade barriers for Afghan exports, and
provided extremely lenient terms of trade for Afghan agricul-
tural and semifinished products. In the first four years of
trade, Moscow proved conscientious and unquestionably reli-
able in its conduct of business. This limited venture in
Soviet/Afghan ties went far to convince .Kabul that contrary
to traditional fears and prejudices, closer relations with
Moscow was a viable political option.
The Soviets finally secured Afghanistan to the East
through the skillful manipulation of a long-standing terri-
torial dispute along Afghanistan's southeastern border.
Though claimed as part of the traditional Afghan kingdom,
the area had been incorporated into the Northwest Frontier
Province of British India in the late 19th century. Kabul
largely pursued the issue through diplomatic channels, however
minor border disturbances by local tribesmen (only indirectly
linked to the political issue) continued for half a century.
After World War II, London showed a new willingness
to negotiate over the issue, in part as a reward for Kabul's
Langer, op. cit., p. 898 and p. 1031. The establishment
of the arbitrary "Durand Line" in 1893 officially olaced the
area within the British Dominion.
14
"cooperation" during the conflict. Hopes for a diplomatic
solution were nevertheless dispelled with the British with-
drawal from India, and the subsequent annexation of the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) territory by the new
nation of Pakistan. Moreover, by 1953 it became apparent
that the United States was placing its support behind
Pakistan in the region. Kabul's efforts to rally interna-
tional support behind its claims were accordingly handed a
major setback.
Moscow perceived an opportunity here. With essen-
tially no national interests at stake, the Soviets expedi-
tiously offered to back Kabul on the issue. The conflict
over "Pashtunistan" (Kabul's politically expedient name for
the area) would become central to Moscow's policy in the re-
gion. Periodically the Soviets would resurrect the issue
whenever it appeared Kabul was drifting toward the West.
Still the government of Shah Mahmud Khan Ghazi was
reluctant to expand ties with Moscow, which added to popular
disaffection over Kabul's indecisive leadership. The conse-
quent change of government in 1953 did, in fact, prove
decisive, placing the nation firmly on the road to assimi-
lation into the Soviet Sphere.
In September 1953, the reins of power in Kabul were
handed to General Sadar Mohammed Daud Khan, first cousin of
From all available information, the extent of Afghan-
istan's assistance was in refraining from taking advantage
of Britain's war crisis to seize the disputed region.
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the King and Commander of the Afghan Army Central Forces
Garrison. Daud brought with him a resolute determination
to "bring Afghanistan into the 20th century," by means of
large-scale modernization and economic growth programs.
For this monumental task, Kabul would require economic
support as well as a strong military to enforce its severe
policies.
Formerly , Moscow had performed excellently in the
limited capacity outlined in the 1950 trade agreement.
(Daud also intimated a degree of admiration for Soviet-
2financed progress elsewhere in Central Asia. ) There were
few alternatives to Moscow for military aid. Regional
allies were few, and traditional friends such as Turkey
had committed the ultimate sin by establishing cordial
relations with Pakistan. Renewed efforts to obtain Amer-
ican support again made little headway. Discrete ovations
in late 1953 resulted in Daud's humiliation when Washington
felt it necessary to inform Pakistan of the request [Ref 4:
p. 18] . While the West expressed some interest in proposed
This phrase is attributed to Daud by Muhammed Sharza,
Pakistani news correspondent at the time of Daud's ascent
to power.
2 Several sources make this point, among them Ralph H.
Magnus, "The Military and Politics in Afghanistan: Before
and After the Revolution," a paper presented before the
Conference on the Role of the Armed Forces in Contemporary
Asia, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, August
1982, pp. 18-19.
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economic ventures, Daud's professed need for military aid
received little sympathy. Meanwhile on the sidelines waited
a patient and ostensibly munificent Moscow.
Perhaps the crucial input into the decision to ap-
proach the Soviets was Daud's own personality. Those in his
government contend that the Afghan leader recognized well the
dangers of close association with Moscow, but felt that
under his direction, Afghanistan could evade Soviet attempts
at political subversion. The self-confident Daud believed
he could outwit Moscow. He also may have been led to the
assumption that the Soviets intended to use warm but separate
relations with his nation as an example of Moscow's respect
for, and harmony with, the Third World. Daud's estimate of
his own abilities, and Moscow's liberality, soon proved
grossly overrated.
In January 1954, four months after Daud came to power,
Moscow extended $3.5 million in credit to Kabul for the
building of several grain silos and a flour mill. Under
Soviet direction, construction was completed in less than
two years. During July, the Soviets financed a $1.2 million
project to develop gas pipeline and storage equipment, and
the following month, a $2 million plan to pave the streets
of Kabul was approved. (The latter project received special
notice in the Soviet press; the U.S. had flatly turned down
a similar proposal several years earlier [Ref. 5: p. 34].)
Czechoslovakia also was induced to "contribute to the
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the development of the progressive Afghan people," by
sponsoring and directing the construction of three cement
factories near Kabul and Herat [Ref . 6] . Moscow now had
its foot in the door of Afghanistan.
Political ties with the West concurrently deterior-
ated, largely as a result of U.S. initiatives elsewhere in the
region. In 1954, Washington provided Pakistan with $21
million in military aid, spawning official denouncements
and anti-American rioting in Kabul. Soon thereafter, Wash-
ington's tacit support of Pakistan on the Pachtunisian issue
caused new rifts in Afghan/American relations. Following
renewed border hostilities in the spring of 1955, and a
subsequent attack by demonstrators on the Pakistani Embassy
in Kabul, Islamabad formally closed the border with Afghan-
istan. Washington proved instrumental in pressuring its
reopening three months later (allegedly to rescue the hap-
less Helmand project), however, Afghan gratitude was not
forthcoming.
The U.S. may have been accorded one final opportunity
to salvage its influence in Afghanistan with the proposed
building of a thousand-mile highway linking Kabul with pro-
Western Iran. After several months of negotiations, Wash-
ington deemed the project too costly.
Throughout 1955, the Soviets consolidated their econ-
omic foothold in Afghanistan. On 28 June, a new agreement
provided for duty-free transit across the Soviet border.
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An accord was reached on 22 August in which Moscow guaranteed
the sale of the Afghan fruit crop in the Soviet/East European
market. During the fall, talks opened on the upgrading of
the Afghan highway system.
However, the most significant development of the year,
and perhaps of the decade, came in December with the visit
of Premier Bulganin and Party Chairman Khrushchev to Kabul.
During their brief stay, it was announced that Afghanistan
would receive a $100 million long-term loan. The "Afghan-
istan deal" would later be identified as a milestone in Mos-
cow's policies in the Third World. Within the next seven
years, agreements would be extended to Argentina ($60 million),
Cuba, Ethiopia, and Indonesia ($100 million each).
Soon thereafter, the Soviets also made a subtle change
in the orientation of programs provided to Afghanistan and
the Third World. The development of strategically expedient
projects (such as the construction of airports and roads) now
took a clear priority. A prime example is the 1956 Soviet
plan to construct a 67-mile highway north of Kabul, with a
two-mile long tunnel through the Hindu Kush. Fifteen years
after its completion, this route was used by 60,000 invading
2Soviet troops.
One of the best accounts of this apparent shift in Soviet
Third World policy is provided in Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas
W. Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Con-
flicts (Toronto: D.C. Heath & Co., 1984), pp. 11-12
2 Hosmer and Arnold both contend that the number of m-
country Soviet military personnel probably did not exceed 700
until the Glorious April Revolution.
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Soviet assistance in rebuilding the Afghan military
held even graver consequences for the Daud regime and Afghan-
istan. A 1956 agreement to train and equip the Afghan Army
opened the door for Moscow actively to recruit supporters
from all ranks of the military. Understandably, extensive
efforts were made to infiltrate the Afghan officer corps, an
institution which historically has held the key to power in
the nation [Ref. 7: pp. 22-3]. By formal agreement, one-
quarter of all Afghan officers received training within the
U.S.S.R. Allegedly the course of instruction included tac-
tics, organizational theory, and "social development". Offi-
cers showing particular interest and aptitude were taken aside
for personal training.
As a result of the military assistance program, Moscow
established a sizeable presence in the country. Starting in
late 1955, 1,500 instructor and advisor billets were per-
mantly assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Kabul. The covert
work of these personnel would later prove crucial during the
Soviet intervention. Not only were invading forces provided
with detailed intelligence reports, but many advisors also
carried out sabotage missions in preparing for the Soviet
advance [Ref . 8]
.
If Kabul was aware of Moscow's effort to undermine its
control of the military, the Daud regime made no apoarent move
to put a stop to the program. Daud even was given cause to
applaud Moscow's progress in rebuilding the army. In August
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1959, a spontaneous uprising occurred in the capital follow-
ing an official announcement that the veiling of women would
no longer be enforced. Although a similar revolt several
decades earlier had toppled the Afghan leadership, the Soviet-
trained Afghan Army moved quickly and decisively to quell the
disturbance. True to its word, Moscow had provided Daud with
a potent military. Ironically, Daud's creation would later
serve as the instrument of his own ultimate overthrow.
Washington was slow to grasp the developing trends
in Afghanistan. Belatedly recognizing Soviet gains in the
region, the U.S. adopted a damage-limiting strategy in the
late 1950' s. American policy was directed toward checking
Afghanistan's slow absorption into the Soviet sphere of con-
trol. Special Presidential Envoy James P. Richards was dis-
patched to Kabul in 1957 to assure Daud that the U.S. would
support Afghan independence. However, no mention was made
of the Eisenhower Doctrine. In December 1959, Eisenhower him-
self made a brief but highly successful stop at the Afghan
capital. Growing wary of increasing Soviet presence, the
Afghans warmly welcomed this show of American concern and
support.
Ir. turn, Nikita Khrushchev arranged a similar visit
in early 1960 bringing offers to finance Afghanistan's
Second Five-Year, Plan. When told that the program would
entail a significant increase of Soviet advisors in the
country, Daud respectfully declined the proposal.
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This brief foray toward the West ended with the resurrec-
tion of the Pashtunistan issue. Afghan tribal raids into the
region in September 1960 soon escalated into a sporadic border
war, and led to an official break in diplomatic relations in
August 1961. Once again, the Soviet Union alone proved will-
ing and able to answer Daud ' s urgent call for military assis-
tance. With its regional security interests inexorably tied
to Pakistan, the United States could not hope to win at such
a game
.
Daud's resolute position on this most recent crisis inevi-
tably proved his undoing. The closure of the Pakistani border
deprived Kabul of essential customs revenue, and closed a
primary trade route to the Indian subcontinent and the West.
Soviet economic programs offered little immediate relief for
Afghanistan's consumer market, and the nature of the crisis
and the nonavailability of access routes precluded humanitar-
ian aid from the West. Amid a growing public outcry, the
Afghan King asked for Daud's resignation in 1963. Daud obe-
diently handed leadership over to Muhammed Youseph after a
rousing farewell speech to the nation [Ref. 9: p. 3] . Yet
only three groups genuinely were sorry to see his departure:
those "Daud loyalists" among the ruling elite, those loyal
to Afghan claims in Pashtunistan, and those who now found
their loyalty in Moscow.
* * *
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During Daud's first decade in power, the Soviet Union
became a preeminent influence on the Afghan economy. Addi-
tionally, the vital underpinnings of the Kabul government,
the military in particular, had been implanted with Soviet-
loyal cadres. To Kabul and the West, the situation neverthe-
less appeared far from critical. Afghanistan clung to its
illusory contention that it was still a politically neutral
state, and Moscow ostensibly was satisfied to maintain the
nation as a buffer state. However, Daud's approach to Afghan-
istan would change significantly following Daud's removal.
His staunch authoritarian rule and independent-minded policies
had prescribed limits to Soviet designs—short of political
penetration. With his resignation, and the installation of
a more moderate government, Moscow now sought to followup
economic gains with political advances.
2 . Political Penetration
Following the removal of Daud, Afghanistan embarked
on a decade-long experiment with democracy. A new liberal
constitution was adopted the following year, establishing
the political framework for a parliamentary monarchy, and
incorporating a number of Western ideals and institutions
[Ref. 9 ]. Even without a strong Soviet influence, the
success of such reforms would have nevertheless been dubious.
The illiteracy rate in Afghanistan then exceeded 90 percent,
and no comprehensive political structure as yet linked the
large rural population with the government in Kabul.
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Despite the adoption of unprecedented political changes
,
life continued on without pause for the great majority of
the populace.
The venture into democracy under Youseph did engender
one far-reaching change in Afghan society. The easing of
domestic repression allowed the coalescing of dispersed
liberal factions in Kabul and Herat. Typical of such was
the convening of a small group of pro-Soviet leftists under
Nur Muhammed Teraki in September 196 3. Although the movement
gained little popular support or notoriety over the next 15
months, the decision was made to form a political party. On
1 January 1965, at Teraki ' s home in the comfortable Shah Mina
district of Kabul, 30 members founded the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan. This body voted their host of the
evening Secretary General. The party's allegiance was made
clear from the onset. The official party organ Khalq (liter-
ally, the "masses") cited a goal to "further the development
of the Great October Revolution in Afghanistan" [Ref. 10:
p. 22] .
In following years, the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) successfully achieved representation in
the Wulesi Jirgah, the Afghan lower parliament; however, its
influence remained small. At the same time, the party
directed its main efforts toward undermining the work of the
democratic government. The PDPA's ability to mobilize massive
student and worker demonstrations in opposition to government
24
policy proved a major asset in its climb to national power.
A PDPA-instigated riot in Kabul was credited with forcing
the resignation of Youseph in October 1965, and in general,
with ensuring that the experiment in democracy inevitably
failed.
Moscow's complicity in these activities is suspect.
Although the PDPA leadership surely received ideological
direction and advice from in-country Soviets, Moscow appeared
a degree embarrassed over the party's violence-ridden methods.
PDPA activities rarely received attention in the Moscow media.
A 1966 publication conspicuously downplayed party efforts,
giving passing reference to events as only "actions of an
oppositionist nature" [Ref. 11: p. 183].
The new Prime Minister, Mohammed Mainwandwal , immedi-
ately embarked on a well-intentioned campaign to root out
trouble-making elements in the streets and universities. This
policy only added substance to PDPA claims of government re-
pression, and rekindled unrest in the capital. In the spring
of 1966, six opposition newspapers came to life, decrying the
new crackdown. (Only one of these, the Khalq , voiced the PDPA
position.) Maiwandwal ' s subsequent closing of four of these
papers (including Khalq ) sparked widespread protests and the
establishment of a prolific underground press.
Harder times were ahead for democratic Afghanistan.
As a result of its increasing commitment to the Vietnam con-
flict, Moscow reduced economic aid to Afghanistan, from
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$44.7 million in 1967, to $28.4 million in 1970 [Ref. 12:
p. 144]. (For the same reason, Washington also decreased
aid to Kabul, from $12.7 million to $1.4 million.) The
resulting unemployment created yet another round of violent
demonstrations , bringing the Maiwandwal government to the
brink of collapse. Yet the Communists failed to capitalize
on this prime opportunity, largely due to a crisis within
its own ranks.
In June 1967, the PDPA divided into two nearly equal
rival factions, the "Khalq" under party figurehead Teraki
,
and the "Parcham" under Babrak Karmal. Apparently there was
no insuperable ideological feud between these groups; the pub-
licized disagreement was over tactics— the Khalqis' support
of class warfare as opposed to the "united democratic front"
of the Parcham [Ref. 13: pp. 51-52] was little more than the
pretense for deeper traditional and personal divisions. The
Khalqis' are largely Pashtuns, comprising over half the popu-
lation of Afghanistan, and traditionally controlling key govern-
ment posts and institutions (including the army officer corps).
The Parcham comprises a mix of urban-dwelling tribes, and is
identified more closely with Kabul's intellectual stratum. The
neat division of party members down these lines soon after the
schism underscores the contention that the rift was largely a
product of traditional prejudices.
The split also reflected the intense ongoing rivalry
between Teraki and Babrak. Tensions within the top party
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leadership were visible as early as 1965, however, only after
the schism would this confrontation become apparent. By Aug-
ust 196 7, both Teraki and Babrak espoused loyalty to Moscow,
while publically ridiculing one another for "deviations from
the true path of socialism" [Ref . 14]
.
Engrossed in such petty infighting, both factions
lost sight of their common objective, and by dividing forces,
the movement diluted its effectiveness in pursuing this goal.
Alone each group was too weak to instigate political change
in Kabul, as poignantly demonstrated during the crises of the
late 1960's. When the capable forces of change did arrive in
1973, neither could offer resistance to the reimposition of
authoritarian rule.
On 17 July 1973, Muhammed Daud again came to power—
this time in an unopposed and nearly bloodless coup. Within
hours, legislation was signed abrogating the constitution,
civil rights, and all democratic gains of the previous govern-
ment. Shortly after his takeover, Daud had erased all trace
of Afghanistan's grand, but ill-starred experiment.
Daud began efforts to aggrandize even greater power
and control than had his earlier regime. Key to this was the
expulsion of the royal family and banishment of the King,
then visiting Europe. Dr. Ralph Magnus [Ref. 15] points to
Arnold recounts that the only casualties in the operation
were a tank commander (who drowned after his vehicle was driven
into the Kabul River) and seven policemen who mistakenly
attacked loyal forces, p. 55.
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this action as a fatal faux pas in Daud's plans. Although
Daud commanded the loyalty of much of the officer corps
(invariably it was the military that now brought him to power)
,
the King retained significant support as historical figurehead
of the nation. Daud's irreverent disregard for such tradition
undercut his popularity in the ranks. Adding to Moscow's
progress in penetrating the Afghan military establishment,
this disaffection would prove crucial during the Communist
coup six years later.
Afghan Communists, in fact, played a limited role in
the Daud coup. Both the Khalq and Parcham had been approached
months before by a Daud confidant, in hope of soliciting their
support. The Kalqis' predictably balked at the idea, claim-
ing that the coup was not a genuine revolution; however, the
Parchamis placed their allegiance with Daud. The Parcham like-
wise recognized its own impotency at the time, as well as the
practical advantages of allying with the Daud forces. Surely
the Parcham leadership was promised a place in the new govern-
ment? Participation could thus be justified as proffering the
party a more strategic position from which it could vie for
power as Daud's successor.
It is evident that Moscow encouraged this alliance,
seeing an opportunity to gain influence within the framework
of the Kabul government, and to apply direct pressure on
Pakistan. The Soviets were well-aware that what progress
had been made in infiltrating Afghanistan had been accomplished
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when Daud was last in power. Among his attributes, Daud also
was ardently dedicated to the dispute over Pashtunistan— an
issue over which Moscow cleaved the influences of the U.S.
and Red China from the region.
The Soviets had been far from satisfied with the poli-
tics of democratic Afghanistan. Since 1963, the Pastunistan
issue had been essentially ignored by Kabul in an effort to
normalize relations in the region. Additionally, Kabul recent-
ly began to take an interest in establishing closer economic
ties with the West. In March 1973, the Industrial Development
Bank of Afghanistan was founded, in which Britain, France, and
the U.S. took a 40 percent interest in the development of the
country, with Kapul holding the remaining shares.
Even more foreboding was the recent formation of the
Progressive Democratic Party under former Prime Minister Mia-
wandwal . This ardently Islamic faction, it was rumored, was
planning its own coup in the near future. In this light,
Daud ' s sudden seizure of power may well have been an act of
preemption, salvaging the interests of Moscow and, for the
moment, Daud. The Daud takeover was exceptionally well-timed
in this regard. Maiwandwal and his staff currently were
rallying Muslem support abroad. Upon his return, Maiwandwal
immediately was arrested and imprisoned. Amid rumors that his
followers were organizing, he was strangled in his cell on' 20
October [Ref. 16: p. 60-61].
..Regardless, the Soviets were soon to become disenchanted
with the new regime. Between 1973 and 1976, Daud meticulously
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pulled all Parchamis from strategic positions within the
regime, most often reassigning them to politically-mute
administrative roles. Daud also continued his predecessors'
policies of creating stronger ties within the regional com-
munity, and with the West. In particular, Kabul began nego-
tiations to acquire Persian Gulf oil— a commodity central to
Soviet/Afghan relations for the past 14 years. This proposed
deal also presaged warmer relations with pro-Western Iran, as
manifested in Teheran's July 1974 offer to finance $1 billion
in commercial and industrial development.
The last straw for the Soviets was perhaps Daud's com-
plete reversal on the issue of Pashtunistan. During 1975-1976,
the government embarked on a propaganda campaign to soften
public opinion on the subject. Kabul subsequently announced
its willingness to move toward diffusing the confrontation,
and to create a more harmonious basis for relations. Pakistan
reciprocated positively, and offered to host negotiations for
a political settlement. This spirit of detente and good-will
was demonstrated following a series of earthquakes and flood-
ing in Afghanistan in the spring of 1976, when Pakistan pro-
vided desperately needed humanitarian aid and relief.
Afghanistan's new rapproachment with the non-
Communist world failed to receive notice in the Soviet press,
lln 1960, Afghanistan depended on the Soviet Union for 90
percent of its oil imports, as stated in Dupree , Afghanistan '
s
'Big Gamble' Part II , AUFS, LD-4-60, p. 3. By 1973, the Soviet
monopoly was undoubtedly greater.
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nevertheless, the subject was pursued at discreet levels.
Allegedly, during a visit by Daud to Moscow in 1977, General
Secretary Brezhnev ordered the Afghan leader to get rid of
those imperialist advisors in his country. Daud indignantly
retorted that when Afghanistan no longer required the presence
of advisors, they all would leave. [Ref. 17: p. 65]
It was during the summer of that year that prepara-
tions for Daud's overthrow were begun. A major step was taken
with the political fusion of Khalq and Parcham parties into a
rejuvenated PDPA. In view of the bitter rivalry between these
factions, poignantly demonstrated only a year before, Soviet
complicity is a certainty.
Concurrently, Moscow continued to make preparations
within the Afghan military. It is generallv agreed that the
Soviets' efforts in organizing allied military cadres in the
capital were integral to the success of the subsequent coup.
At the time of the takeover, the military apoeared far more
prepared than even the PDPA leadership. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that Moscow clayed any part in the spontaneous turn of
events that spawned the Glorious April Revolution.
3 . The Communist Takeover
A symptom of the turbulent domestic climate of the
time, Kabul fell victim to a rash of politically-connected
The year 1976 is identified as the apex of the Khalq-
Parcham animosity. During the year, Teraki allegedly accord-
ed Karmal the ultimate insult to a fellow Communist in
speculating that the latter had CIA connections.
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assassinations beginning in mid-1977. Two sensational murders
in the fall of that year involved a leftist-leaning strike
organizer, and the Afghan Minister of Planning, Ahmad Ali
Khoram. Yet neither of these actions evidently was aimed at
the regime's top leadership, or leading PDPA figures. Conse-
quently, the direct involvement of either of these factions
was generally discounted.
Out of step with these events was the 17 April 1978
murder of Parcham ideologue Mir Akbar Khyber. The reaction
within the PDPA was immediate and scornful, alternately
accusing Daud's secret police and the American Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) of the killing. At Khyber' s funeral
two days later, Afghan Communists mobilized 15,000 demon-
strators. True to form, the orderly march soon turned into
violent rioting, requiring the callup of regular army units
to augment the beleaguered police force.
Fearing beginnings of a popular revolt, Daud moved
quickly to arrest the top PDPA leadership. Here the Afghan
leader repeated a timeless error in dealing with insurgency,
clearly analogous to Paris of 1789, and Petrograd of 1917.
In the maelstrom of the day, he sought neither to reach
accord with the rebels, nor decisively defeat them. Daud
inevitably chose a policy between the two. Preventive
measures were potent enough to provide the rebels with suf-
ficient pretext for revolution, yet were grossly inadequate
in forestalling actions against the government.
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Only the top echelon of the PDPA was taken into cus-
tody, Teraki among them. At midnight on 26 April, Hafizullah
Amin, the Khalqi liaison with the pro-Soviet elements in the
military, was placed under loose house arrest. Most of the
party substructure remained free, and the military cadre was
not approached. This tactical error would soon cost Daud his
life.
To the detained PDPA leadership, the government crack-
down surely appeared to be the leading edge of a new campaign
of repression. Believing that a purge of pro-Soviet factions
within the army was immiment, Amin determined that the revolu-
tion must begin at once. Throughout the night his sons carried
messages to key party and military figures, apparently with no
interference by his guards. When Amin was taken to jail at
10:45 the next morning, the overthrow was underway.
As a result of 22 years of Soviet preparations, the
majority of the Afghan Army was either incapacitated or fought
alongside the rebels. By all indications, only the 7th Divi-
sion, the 15th Armored Division, and the Republican Guard
remained loyal to the regime and fought into the early morn-
ing hours of the 28th. At that point, the 2,000-man Republi-
can Guard alone held the grounds of Duralaman Palace, where
Daud and his family had taken refuge. Accounts of the final
coup de grace appear more sensationalized fiction than fact;
what is certain is that 24 hours later, Daud, his family, and
the entire Republican Guard were dead.
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Several Western correspondents that published accounts
of the revolution speculated that the Soviets played an active
role in the overthrow. Soviet pilots were alleged to have
flown sorties against the royal palace, apparently based on
the uncharacteristically effective performance of the Afghan
Air Force [Ref. 18: p. 110] . Soviet personnel were seen in
the area of the International Airport, however, what--if any
—
connection this had to the takeover is uncertain.
A better case is made for administrative and politi-
cal support provided by in-country Soviets. It is known, for
instance, that Amin's instructions of early 26 April were
received in photocopy form. The only conceivable means by
which this could have been accomplished in pre-dawn Kabul was
via equipment available in the Soviet Embassy. The Embassy
also seemed keenly aware of the course of events, and well-
prepared for the outcome. Although the coup was ostensibly
"improvised" on short notice, Moscow was first to recognize
the new regime (as in 1973) a matter of hours after the fall
of Duralaman Palace. Interestingly, the announcement came
on a Sunday, amid Soviet celebrations during the May Day
weekend. It later became known that the initial Soviet
declaration had originated in Kabul, yet remained unconfirmed
by Moscow on 1 May [Ref. 19: p. 58]
.
4 . Founding of the DRA/Prelude to Invasion
The new Communist regime was founded with the inten-
tion of perpetuating the uneasy alliance between Khalq and
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Parcham, nevertheless, power asymmetries were evident from
the beginning. Teraki , PDPA leader since the party's mir-
aculous reunion in 1977, became prime minister. The posts
of deputy prime minister and foreign minister were given to
Amin
,
the Khalq party strongman, who by virture of his strong
ties with the military, held perhaps the most personal power
in the new regime. Teraki' s nemisis, Babrak Karmal, also
was made a deputy prime minister, however the responsibili-
ties and duties of his office were never oublically articulated
Of the top governmental seats, the Khalq held a clear advantage
Below this stratum the Parchamis held three key cab-
inet positions: the ministers of defense (traditionally the
strongest office below prime minister), communications, and
the interior. However, on the next lower level the Khalqis
predominated. The final product was a coalition government
structured with sequential layers of Khalq control, then
Parcham control. The advantage was ultimately with the Khalq.
The highest level of Parcham dominance, the ministries, was
insulated between Khalqi control of the top national leader-
ship and the top departmental functionaries.
Within the Soviet and Kabul media, obvious efforts
were made to portray the revolutionary changes in Afghanistan
as involving only domestic politics; allegedly no shift in
the nation's foreign policy orientation had taken olace.
Kabul Radio described the new regime as "democratic, Islamic,
reformist, and nonaligned" [Ref. 20 ]. Moscow paid tribute
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to the "patriotic forces (representing) true nonalignment .
"
Paradoxically, a TASS broadcast the same day espoused
"fraternal ties with the newest member of the socialist
family" [Ref . 21] .
Closer ties with Moscow were immediately in evidence,
however. Within the next month, hundreds of additional Soviet
advisors arrived in Kabul. By June, Soviet military personnel
assigned to Afghan Army units doubled, to approximately 700
[Ref. 22: p. Ill] . The Soviet Embassy subsequently was expand-
ed to accomodate a significantly larger staff, and a direct
communications link between the Embassy and the Kremlin was
established. Afghanistan's indisputable shift to a closer
Soviet orbit was made manifest by the signing of a 20-year
treaty of friendship and cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in
December 1978.
As predicted by many Western analysts, the new Commu-
nist regime was almost immediately beset with dissonance,
within the country and within its own ranks. In power was
a small revolutionary cell composed of rival factions with
little popular support outside of Kabul. The regime's power
base was drawn almost totally from the allegiance of a
limited number of key military personnel, while Daud-loyal
and "royalist" factions were still clearly present. In its
hour of weakness, it is ironic (though palatable, in terms
of the Afghan political culture) that the new regime should
first engage in party purges and factional infighting that
would inevitably cut its meager popular support in half.
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Had Moscow expected the coalition of Khalq and Par-
cham to be held together by Soviet inspiration and a govern-
mental structure intermeshing party loyalties, it sorely
underestimated the weight of social and racial prejudices
within the PDPA. Moreover, Soviet policy only added to the
party's decay. Some time before the coup, Moscow had shown
a clear but discrete preference for the Parcham, the least
radical of the factions and the more receptive to Soviet
interests
.
It was soon apparent that Moscow had bet on the wrong
horse. The Khalq, counterposed in theory by equal represen-
tation in the regime, yet bearing stronger military ties,
began to consolidate its advantage by June. In typical Afghan
fashion, the top Parcham leadership was gradually placed in
"diplomatic exile" , assigning them to honorable posts abroad
in Afghan Embassies. In July it was announced that Babrak
Karmal had stepped down from his position as deputy premier
and had accepted an appointment as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia
The Khalqi climb to power also was aided greatly by the
discovery of an apparently genuine Parchami plot to overthrow
the regime, made public on 17 August [Ref. 23: p. 79]. In the
resulting purge, the capable Minister of Defense, General
Abdul Qadar, was arrested, along with the Parchami ministers
^The Khalq was composed predominantly with Pashtuns , a
tribe that also monopolizes the Afghan officer corps. Addi-
tionally, Amin (Khalq party strongman) closely associated with
high elements of the military command.
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of planning and public works. (Interestingly, no indications
have come to light suggesting any outside complicity [Ref.
24].) The vacated positions subsequently were filled with
figures of proven loyalty to the government.
At the time of the Communist takeover, the PDPA mem-
bership numbered a few thousand in a nation of 15 million;
allegedly the summer purges had reduced the party roster to
probably no more than 1,200. In view of the regime's new
frailty, a moderate domestic policy, prudently avoiding the
further alienation of the populace, would appear to be in




In a country with an 85 percent rural population,
the Khalq filled its ranks with urban activists. The party's
"urban mindset" showed little appreciation for, or sensiti-
vity to the traditions and values of the great majority of
Afghans. Allegedly as a result of pressure by the hard-line
Amin , Teraki initiated vast land reform measures and radical
policies obtrusively challenging Islamic doctrine. A poig-
nant illustration was the unveiling of a new national flag,
replacing Islamic green with a blood-red derivative of the
Soviet banner. The action was roundly condemned by the church,
and resulted in flag-burning throughout Kabul and Herat. The
From the personal notes of Tyrus Cobb, Soviet area spec-
ialist for the National Security Council.
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issue remained a source of open enmity toward the regime
until Babrak Karmal reinstated the old flag in 1980.
Violent opposition to Teraki's reforms surfaced in
the early fall of 1978, with spontaneous and largely unco-
ordinated revolts nation-wide. Reflective of the Afghan
culture in general, the rebellion apparently was not so much
a reaction to the drastic social and land reform measures,
as a violent rejection of the Khalq's anti-Islamic rhetoric.
The last such revolt, in 1973, protested Daud's relaxation
of government-enforced rules of Islam; his extensive modern-
ization programs engendered no such reaction.
Desperate times necessitated desperate methods. In
the face of growing popular unrest, the government resorted
to rule by terrorism. In-country sources contended that by
mid-September, 8,000-10,000 Afghans had been executed by the
regime, and over 30,000 were being held as political prison-
ers [Ref. 25: p. 272] . The regime proved undiscriminating
in such purges; ex-Daud elements, Parchamis , Islamic Tradi-
tionalists—all factions not ardently pro-Khalq—were elim-
inated. Moscow allegedly abhorred these measures, and in
fact attempted to intervene politically when Kabul began
arresting the Islamic clergy in late 1978. The Soviets
concurrently began belated efforts to reinstate Parchami
leaders to the PDPA, seeing now an increasing need for that
party's moderating influence.
The most dangerous shortcoming of the regime's new
policy of repression was the undercutting of its own support
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within the military. Ostensibly preempting "nationalist
elements" within the army, the officer corps was decimated
by government arrests. Disaffection spread rapidly through
the ranks, encouraging mutiny and desertion to insurgent
forces ruling the countryside. As a direct consequence, a
Soviet military presence became all the more necessary. The
number of Soviet personnel continued to rise, and beginning
in early 1979, selected Soviet advisors assumed direct combat
and leadership roles in the DRA army, causing even greater
discord within the ranks.
A dramatic display of the regime's inability to main-
tain domestic stability was shown to the world following the
kidnapping of American Ambassador Adolph Dubs in February
1979. In an incident still extremely vague, Dubs and four
gunmen were surrounded by the Afghan police in downtown Kabul.
Despite the vehement protests of U.S. diplomats on the scene,
Soviet-directed security units engaged in a gunfight with
Dubs' captors that resulted in the death of the Ambassador.
Two gunmen evidently survived the barrage and were seen being
led away from the scene. Later that day, however, they were
displayed before the press, quite dead.
The involvement of either Moscow or the Teraki regime
is deemed unlikely today in view of the obvious embarrassment
of both governments over the episode. Kabul Radio initially
condemned the action, while Moscow, hyper- typically , refused
comment. When the international fervor over the matter began
40
to subside, the Soviets "unofficially" offered the ludicrous
conclusion that the kidnapping was, in fact, an obscure CIA
plot, intent on rupturing Afghan/American relations [Ref. 26:
p. 42]. Spaced over the next several years, Moscow published
the somewhat contradictory findings of an "investigation by
impartial authorities" looking into the murder. The current
consensus within the West holds that the act was committed
by an independent radical traditionalist faction, determining
that an American target would yield the most publicity with
the least chance of provoking substantive retaliation.
In March 1979, the outlying provinces of Afghanistan
erupted in a major revolt against the Teraki regime. The
rebellion soon spread over two-thirds of the country's 28
provinces, decisively defeating DRA forces in several.
Undaunted by public condemnation from Washington, direct
Soviet involvement increased with every DRA setback. During
March and April, Moscow accelerated armament deliveries, and
expanded the program to include updated offensive weapons
systems
.
The Soviets also began to assume a role reminiscent
of Moscow's involvement in Ethiopia in providing direct troop
mobility and artillery support. Soviet-piloted air support
sorties became more the rule than the exception, and Red Army
On 28 March 1979, the State Department publically warned
Moscow against further involvement; allegedly a personal note
to the Kremlin had been delivered several days earlier. Re-
counted in Hosmer, p. 238.
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advisors (numbering about 1,000 in May) now were assigned
down to the battalion level. Consequently, Soviet casual-
ties began to increase significantly, resulting not only from
rebel resistance, but also from an increasing number of DRA
army mutinies. During the spring it is estimated that several
hundred Soviet personnel lost their lives in the Afghanistan
conflict.
In view of the deteriorating situation, Teraki abdi-
cated the office of Prime Minister on 27 March. It was deter-
mined that Amin , the leader most closely identified with the
military, could better lead the nation from under the current
crisis. Supposedly, at Moscow's insistence, Teraki maintained
the key posts of Secretary of State and Defense Minister.
Acceptance of the top post in the nation nevertheless gave
Amin the political boost to aggrandize his personal power in
the regime, and to challenge Teraki for overall leadership of
the PDPA.
It is believed at this time, Moscow first took seri-
ously the option of military intervention. Perhaps in response
to the recent massacre of Soviet personnel in Herat, Soviet
General A. A. Yepishev was dispatched to Kabul. Coming with
him was the largest and highest ranking military delegation to
visit the country to date. The Yepishev mission was undoubtedly
-'-Various sources report that between 30 and 100 Soviet
advisors and their families lost their lives in a spontaneous
rebellion in the old quarter of Herat.
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tasked with making a complete analysis of the current military
situation, however, no indication was given that its findings
were particularly distressing [Ref. 27: p. 113].
Possibly connected with this visit was the massacre
of the entire male population (estimated at 1,100) of the pro-
rebel town of Kerala. The operation was conducted apparently
without Soviet complicity, and perhaps without their prior
knowledge. It has been offered that this action was intended
as a show-of-force by Amin to impress his Soviet guests.
Moscow's receptiveness to such methods is debatable, however
it did serve to rally even greater support for anti-government
forces.
Also visiting Kabul in April was Soviet diplomat
Vasiliy S. Safronchuk, allegedly to induce Amin to pursue a
political solution to the conflict [Ref. 28] . Safronchuk
resounded Moscow's opinion that Kabul's radical policies
should be temporarily suspended in an attempt to regain a
measure of stability in the country. In view of subsequent
DRA actions, Moscow's advice was totally ignored. Safron-
chuk ' s failure fueled the Kremlin's growing impatience with
the leadership of Amin, and may have marked the beginning of
the conspiracy against him.
In the early fall, the growing conflict assumed a
more ominous dimension. In August a mutiny took place inside
Kabul's strategic Bula Hissar Fortress. The rebellion was
finally quelled after a four-hour battle in which Soviet
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units and helicopter gunships found extensive use [Ref. 29].
The next week, an entire Afghan armored brigade killed its
Soviet staff and went over to the rebels taking its Soviet
equipment with it. By September, desertion had brought the
Afghan force level down to less than 30 percent; units still
loyal to the regime refused to venture into the countryside,
then uncontestably in the hands of insurgents. Even worse,
the loss of control of the rural areas deprived Kabul of
its major source of army recruitment. With two-year conscrip-
tions due to run out shortly, Kabul faced the total dissolution
of its power base.
Moscow's answer to these developments was twofold.
Advisory staff again was increased significantly, to peak at
4,000 military and 3,000 civilian personnel in October. Also
the Bagram Air Base, 11 miles north of the capital, was taken
over from the Afghan Air Force (supposedly without Amin's
initial consent) . Soon squadrons of fire support aircraft
began to arrive, including a wing of 30-40 of the new MI-24
helicopter gunships. In contrast to earlier operations,
Soviet support and small combat units now began to work
independently, with little or no direct contact with corres-
ponding DRA commands.
Concurrently, General Ivan G. Pavlovskii, commander
of all Soviet ground forces, quietly arrived in Kabul with
a staff of 50 officers. In contrast to Yepishev's earlier
trip, this visit escaped all notice in the Kabul and Moscow
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media. The Pavlovskii group also showed little interest in
the pretentious socializing that characterized the Yepishev
visit, but met with DRA leaders behind closed doors.
During the late summer the Soviets apparently devised
their own political solution to the deepening morass in Afghan-
istan. On 10 September, Teraki made a brief stop in Moscow
(probably at Moscow's beckoning) during his return from a
meeting of nonaligned nations in Havana. No less a personage
than Leoned Brezhnev met his arrival, and the Soviet domestic
and international services carried detailed reports of his
visit. In a series of private meetings, Teraki was said to
have talked with Babrak Karmal, then maintaining a portfolio
in Czechoslovakia, but also evidently spending time in the
Soviet Union and East Germany. It has been suggested that
Teraki' s approval of a plan to reinstitute a Khalq-Parcham
coalition government was obtained at this time. An answer
to the problem of Amin was also in the making.
Four days after Teraki ' s return to Kabul, the party
leader was severely wounded in a gun battle with Amin, and
arrested. By one unverified account, Teraki and the Soviet
Ambassador A. M. Pusanov had summoned Amin to the royal palace,
implementing an assassination plan conceived during Teraki '
s
This author found references to three visits by Karmal
to Moscow, and two to East Germany. Apparently three of these
junkets were several weeks long. This information was taken
from FBIS reports on Soviet/East European news releases dur-
ing this timeframe.
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Moscow visit. The wary Amin escaped the initial attempt,
and returned with loyal forces to overthrow Teraki.
The Kabul media was silent to these events for more
than 24 hours; the first indication that major changes were
afoot came with a 15 September report that three key minis-
terial positions were to be filled by Amin loyalists. A
surprisingly brief announcement in the Kabul Times the next
day stated that Amin had assumed all of Teraki* s posts,
following the latter 's "retirement". On 9 October, Kabul
Radio reported the untimely death of Teraki "after a long,
serious illness" [Ref . 30]
.
Whatever the true circumstances, Moscow found itself
in jeopardy of fumbling away its hold on Afghanistan. The
Kremlin would approach this unsettling development with
characteristic caution, and characteristic cynicism.
By 18 September Moscow felt the situation in Kabul
sufficiently stabilized to issue an official statement. That
day Brezhnev and Kosygin dispatched a congratulatory tele-
gram to Amin, wishing him the best on his recent "election
as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the DRA"
[Ref. 31]. An announcement of solidarity with the new regime
was carried by domestic and all international services,
clearly intended to disguise Moscow's perilous position from
the rest of the world. A more definitive policy was already
being formulated, however. Planning for military interven-




Preparations for Military Intervention
In the final months before the invasion, the Soviet
press understandably avoided any mention of Teraki save a
two-line obituary in Pravda on 10 October. Additionally,
with the mechanism of his ultimate overthrow in motion, Amin
was treated far more cautiously than was his predecessor.
In the 98 days between Moscow's recognition of the new regime
and the beginning of the invasion, Pravda reported on the
Amin government a mere dozen times. Of these articles, only
four mentioned Amin by name, and each of these scrupulously
avoided any objective appraisal of the leader, but covered
Amin's praises of his nation's "fraternal brotherhood with
the U.S.S.R." [Ref. 32: p. 5] Amin's expulsion of Teraki's
ally, Ambassador Pusanov, on 8 November was covered on the
last page of Pravda that day. The three-line statement an-
nounced that Pusanov "has been relieved of his duties... in
connection with his transfer to other work" [Ref. 33: p. 6] .
The last reference to Amin prior to the invasion came
on the anniversary of the Afghan/Soviet Friendship Treaty on
6 December. Typically no reference to Soviet support of the
Amin government was made. In dark irony, it quoted Amin's
speculation that "relations between Afghanistan and... the
Soviet Union will rise to a qualitatively new level" [Ref.
34: p. 4]. It is relevant to note that this broadcast was
made to the southern Soviet provinces, and to the Russian-
speaking Asian audience, but not repeated in the central
domestic media.
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The Soviet press also took advantage of extra-
regional events to draw international attention away from
Afghanistan. In this regard, the developing American crisis
in Iran proved a windfall. Initial Soviet reports covering
the seizure of the U.S. Embassy were, at worst, noncommital.
However, in late November, the Moscow media embarked on an
unmistakably pro-Khomeini campaign. Additionally, the Krem-
lin kept Teheran informed of U.S. force buildups in the
Persian Gulf, and publically threatened Washington with
"grave consequences" should the U.S. take military action
against Iran. Moscow inevitably had a large stake in ensur-
ing that the crisis continued. In part, it provided a focus
for American decisionmakers to keep from noticing the exten-
sive Soviet preparations for invasion which were then coming
into view.
Western analysts first noted unusual Soviet activity
in Central Asia soon after the announcement of Teraki's death
It was reported in October that Red Army troops were replac-
ing Afghan units in the capital, ostensibly to free national
forces for operations in the country. Intelligence sources
also estimated that Soviet military personnel in-country now
numbered 5,000, "including well over 1,000 in Soviet combat
units" [Ref . 35]
.
Washington's first show of concern followed a report
that Soviet troops in Turkmenistan had been put on a condi-
tion of "limited readiness", with reserves mobilized in the
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Central Asian Military District. The Carter Administration
issued the first of four private warnings to Moscow, with
little apparent deterrent effect on the Kremlin's plans.
In early December, U.S. intelligence noted a signi-
ficant shift in the deployment of Soviet Central Asian forces.
Troops and tactical aircraft in place along the border with
Iran now began to appear east of the Amu Darya, north of
Afghanistan. At the same time, Western attaches and diplo-
mats in the Soviet Union were denied permission to travel in
the Central Asian Union Republics.
Renewed concern in Washington followed a 9 December
intelligence report announcing the arrival of 1,000 combat-
outfitted soldiers at Bagram. This action constituted the
largest transfer of Soviet troops to Afghanistan since Septem-
ber. Ten days later, a large portion of this force was in
place at the Salang Pass along the Kabul-Qonduz highway. The
unit would hold this strategic point until 28 December when
it would link with the 357th Mechanized Rifle Division, the
lead element of the invading Soviet 40th Army.
A Canadian military attache recounts how on a flight in
mid-December from India to the Soviet Union his aircraft was
diverted to Tashkent due to weather. He noted from his cabin
window "about 40" AN-22 aircraft parked along the apron of
Tashkent airport. In view of the fact that the entire Soviet
inventory of such aircraft was then little more than 60, it
was concluded that a major evolution was planned for the
near future.
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6 . The Soviet Invasion Operation
The first elements of the invasion force landed at
Bagram on 22 December. The sudden arrival of 1,500 paratroops
with heavy weaponry apparently raised no eyebrows in Kabul;
the move was no doubt interpreted as an effort to bolster
DRA forces around the capital. Shortly thereafter, the U.S.
government issued its only public warning to Moscow prior to
the invasion, citing the troop buildup at Bagram and the
recently disclosed presence of 30,000 Soviet troops in a
state of high readiness south of Tashkent. Had Moscow felt
compelled to reconsider its plans in light of new internation-
al attention, it is doubtful the massive operation already
underway could have been brought to a grinding halt. In any
event, the plan continued without pause.
On 24 December the first of 200 flights by AN-12,
AN-22, and IL-76 aircraft began arriving at Bagram and the
Kabul International Airport. By 27 December, 6,500 men of
the 106th Airborne Guards Division were in place to seize
strategic objectives in and around the Afghan capital.
Covert operations for the coup began that day. By
one account, all batteries in DRA military vehicles were
surrendered to Soviet maintenance personnel for "winteriz-
ing" . Later a commando team led by Soviet Minister of Com-
munications N. V. Talyzin appeared to relieve Afghan Air
Force personnel manning the Afghan Central Communications
System.
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That afternoon Talyzin hosted a reception for Afghan
dignitaries at the International Hotel at the conclusion of
which all present were promptly arrested. At the same time,
Afghan Army officers were attending a cocktail party in the
Soviet Kabul barracks. About 1830, the Soviet hosts discreet-
ly disappeared leaving behind a generous supply of liquor.
With sounds of gunfire in the direction of the royal palace,
the Afghan guests attempted to leave, only to find they had
been locked in.
H-Hour had, in fact, begun at 715 that morning. Two
motorized rifle divisions entered the Afghan frontier in
three spearheads, fanning out toward Herat, the Pakistani
border, and Kabul. An additional four divisions initially
were held in reserve, however, in view of the sparse resis-
tance encountered by the lead elements, this force too headed
south by the end of the year. By 1 January, 50,000 Soviet
troops had crossed into Afghanistan [Ref. 36: p. 96].
Typically, events surrounding Amin's ouster from
power and his subsequent death are (and probably forever
will be) exceedingly obscure. One story tells of a final
attempt by Moscow to persuade Amin to "invite" Soviet troops
to Afghanistan, thereby establishing a legal justification
for an action already underway. A Lieutenant General Victor
S. Paputin of the Internal Security Forces (MVD) met with
Amin shortly before the invasion and coup, and may have
carried such a mission. Somewhere in the maelstrom of
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events that followed, Paputin died. (A Pravda obituary
later claimed that his death had occurred on 28 December,
the day after the coup.) Moscow sent rumors afloat that
upon his return to Moscow, Paputin had committed suicide
over the failure of his "peace mission".
A defecting KGB agent, A. Kuzichkin, gives a color-
ful account of what had followed Paputin' s meeting with
Amin. A specially-trained KGB death squad entered the palace
grounds early on the 27th with orders to leave no witnesses
alive. According to his account, the unit proved too thorough;
its leader, Colonel A. Bayerenov, was mistakenly killed in the
fracas [Ref. 37: p. 16].
What is known is that apparently Amin and his whole
household were dead by late that day. Moscow's domestic and
international services carried a 1,500 word release announc-
ing the overthrow of the "bloody apparatus of Hafizollah
Amin and his minions ... agents of American imperialism" [Ref.
30]. Less than ten hours later, the domestic service submitted
a brief followup:
DRA and UPI news agencies, quoting Kabul Radio,
have reported that Hafizollah Amin has been brought
before a revolutionary tribunal. He was found guilty
of crimes against the Afghan people and sentenced to
death. The sentence has been carried out [Ref. 39]
.
Early on the 2 8th, the new government under Babrak
Karmal (reportedly flown in that day) received a congratu-
latory telegram from Brezhnev and Kosygin, strikingly similar
to the one sent to Amin 102 days earlier.
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This news coverage marked the first step in construct-
ing Moscow's official interpretation of events. The Soviet
Union desired to divorce itself from any involvement in the
palace coup, as blatantly demonstrated by the referencing of
other news sources in the above release. Another 12 hours
would pass before the invasion was to be announced in an
effort to further isolate the two incidents.
At midday on 2 8 December, a full 2 8 hours after Soviet
tanks rolled into Afghanistan, the operation was reported in
a remarkably short and vague release. A domestic broadcast
stated that the government of the DRA had appealed for "poli-
tical, moral, and economic aid, including military aid... in
accordance to the 5 December 1978 Soviet-Afghan Treaty" [Ref.
40]. Shortly after, the announcement was repeated, this time
adding to the last line "including military aid that the govern-
ment of the DRA repeatedly requested of the U.S.S.R." This
surely was meant to invoke a perception of earnestness and
legitimacy to the Afghan request, and possibly a sense of
Soviet hesitancy to infringe on the sovereignty of another
nation.
The ensuing tide of international scorn necessitated
an immediate and equally scornful rebuttal. A 30 December
Pravda article spelled out Moscow's interpretation of the
situation, as devised no doubt months before. The recent
coup was a matter wholly internal to the Afghan Government:
"the working people of the country took their destiny into
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their own hands." A Soviet presence was needed to counter
"outside influences" wishing to reverse the gains of the
April Revolution. It was repeatedly stressed that Moscow
was "legally" fulfilling its treaty commitments.
Still Moscow was acutely aware of some rather blatant
flaws in its initial account. Foremost was the original
Soviet contention that Amin had requested intervention (thus
lending support to the Paputin peace mission theory) . This
later was revised to claim that Babrak had, in fact, requested
assistance upon his assumption of office on the 28th. Avoided
was the fact that some 30,000 Soviet troops were well on their
way to lending "fraternal assistance" by then.
Moscow's explanation for Amin's overthrow was equally
mishandled. Struggling for a convincing account, an unofficial
Soviet release (put afloat, no doubt, to guage world reaction)
offered the absurd contention that Amin was actually a CIA
agent. Several Soviet allies, Bulgaria and the new DRA regime
in particular, blindly reverberated this theme in official
releases. A Kabul Radio report professed to have proof that
Amin had received several years of CIA training in the U.S.
(This probably refers to Amin's three semesters at the Univ-
ersity of Wisconsin, an institution not widely known as a
hotbed of CIA operatives.) Sofia followed suit by describ-
ing a tenuous CIA connection in several government releases.
The incredulous reaction of the West, and even of some Soviet
friends (such as Rumania and East Germany) ended Soviet mention
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of the claim, official or not. Soon thereafter, the subject
quickly disappeared from other Communist presses.
* * *
Relations between Russia/U. S . S . R. and Afghanistan span
over three centuries, however direct Soviet involvement in
the country essentially began only 25 years before the inva-
sion. Moreover, the establishment of a significant presence
preceded the invasion by only 20 months. The significance
of this sudden and historic expansion of the Soviet sphere
has not escaped the West; it has, in the words of Jack Mat-
lock, "provided an awesome display of Soviet capabilities and
intent.
"
Nevertheless, the events of 1979 cannot readily be por-
trayed as the product of a Soviet blueprint for establishing
control over the region. As illustrated in this study, Mos-
cow's policy in Afghanistan ultimately pursues such a result,
however specific doctrine has been shaped largely by the
course of events in the region. Indicative of the Kremlin's
approach to the Third World in general, Soviet involvement in
Afghanistan can be characterized as pragmatic, reactionary,
and highly opportunistic.
Interview with Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, National
Security Advisor to the President, at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, on 20 August 1981.
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B. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOVIET POLICY PATTERNS
The political implications of the Soviet decision to
invade, added to the pure physical magnitude of the opera-
tion, demands a reassessment of Soviet policy patterns. The
fact that direct, large-scale Soviet intervention in the re-
gion defied prediction in the West throws to question our
grasp of current Soviet policy interests and priorities.
The implications for future Soviet policy initiatives have
justifiably become an urgent issue.
Conclusions published to date have been fairly evenly
distributed along the spectrum of possibilities. Interest-
ingly enough, the extremes in the debate have been provided
by the most respected authorities on the subject of Soviet
political behavior, proceeding from essentially the same base
of information. George Kennan has been outspoken in portray-
ing the invasion as a defensive move--an action impelled by
the Russians' much-written sensitivity to border seucrity,
and intended only as a temporary action to restore stability
to the region. Richard Pipes ascribes a more offensive into-
nation to Soviet designs in Afghanistan. He has labeled the
episode "the first, premeditated step... to acquiring unpre-
cedented influence in South Asia and the Persian Gulf region."
Other noted sources on the subject, including Dr. 's Jiri
Interview with Richard Pipes, Professor of History and
director of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University,
at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, on
17 August 1984.
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Valenta and Vernon Aspaturian find merit in both arguments,
and suggest the presence of a scheme complementing vital
national interests with power-building ambitions in the
Soviet decisionmaking process.
Debate over the true significance of the invasion decision
stems from the inability to correlate easily the Afghanistan
case to any single pattern in Soviet foreign policy develop-
ment. As a product of its geopolitical setting and socio-
political condition, Afghanistan is, in fact, fairly unique.
It unquestionably has been viewed by Moscow as a Third World
actor. For a quarter of a century prior to the Glorious
April Revolution, the course of Soviet/Afghan relations has
closely paralleled the development of Soviet Third World
policy in general, rarely exhibiting what could be construed
as evidence of a special relationship. For the great major-
ity of the post-World War II period, Afghanistan's Third
World status apparently was central to its interaction with
the Soviets. It clayed a remote and unexceptional role in
Moscow's international enterprises.
Most Soviet initiatives leading to, and culminating in
the invasion have been widely interpreted as a product of
"periphery politics." Helmut Sonnenfeldt has been a major
voice in this argument. The invasion decision is offered
"'"This term is attributable to Dr. Pipes, in the afore-
mentioned interview.
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as clear evidence that Soviet interests in the region trans-
cend the temperate political "gamesmanship" characterizing
Moscow's Third World policy in general. Afghanistan's status
as a Third World actor is negated accordingly by the fact
that it shares a 1,500-mile border with the Soviet Union.
This study proceeds down these lines, with the purpose
of assessing the decision's applicability to established
patterns in Soviet foreign policy. First, events leading
to the invasion will be viewed in the context of Soviet Third
World politics. As suggested by Stephen Hosmer and Thomas
Wolfe, the Afghanistan episode can be offered as a logical
extension of a trend toward militarism in Soviet foreign
policy [Ref . 41: pp. 157-161] ; such a conclusion would
clearly portend a new, more ominous demeanor for Soviet policy-
making. The more conventional perspective stressing the prox-
imity factor then will be considered. While not disputing an
apparent trend toward freer use of direct, uncollaborated
Soviet power, categorizing the decision as the product of
traditional security concerns, analogous to Soviet interests
and policies in 1956 Hungary, and 1968 Czechoslovakia, holds
less of an immediate threat to the West.
1 . Afghanistan and Soviet Third World Policy
The Sonnenfeldt argument can be accepted readily when
applied to Soviet/Afghan relations during the Stalinist era.
This general argument is voiced in Helmut Sonnenfeldt and
William G. Hyland, Soviet Perspectives on Security , Adelphi Paper
150, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979.
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Joseph Stalin's preoccupation with periphery politics, focus-
ing Soviet interests and initiatives on East Europe, Red China
and North Korea, did bequeath a small but politically signifi-
cant place for Afghanistan in Soviet foreign policy. Soviet
interest was made manifest in the signing of the 1950 Soviet/
Afghan trade agreement, an accord which at the time was unique
among Moscow's Third World relations [Ref. 42: p. 30].
Yet Stalin's rigid ideological standards Drescribed
limits to Soviet dealings with Afghanistan, and the Third World
as a whole. An approach allowing cooperation with various
"nationalist-bourgeoisie" elements during the war and the
immediate postwar years was abandoned with the pronouncement
of Andrey Zhdanov's two-camp thesis in 1947. The policy inevi-
tably yielded a net decline in Soviet influence abroad. Conse-
quently, in the first surge of newly decolonized Third World
nations, nationalist factions generally predominated over
Soviet-backed Communist cadres. COMINFORM-supported bids for
power were hamstrung by the secondary priority Stalin attached
to such efforts. The few Communist uprisings of the era were
(as a whole) badly organized, poorly funded, and destined for
failure
.
Moscow's adherence to strict party dogma probably did
not erode Soviet influence in Afghanistan, however, here too
opportunities may have been missed. For over a century, Af-
ghanistan had been accorded its independence via its status as
a buffer state between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. The
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withdrawal of Britain from the region in 1947 initiated Afghan
attempts to draw an American presence to regain this equili-
brium. As mentioned earlier, regional alignments and issues
precluded Washington's compliance. It is conceivable that
the more aggressive use of Soviet pressure and inducements
may have achieved significant gains in Afghanistan years
prior to the landmark 1954 economic agreement.
One of many policy innovations to spring from a
comprehensive doctrinal review in the aftermath of Stalin,
Moscow in 1954 identified a new purpose and interest in deal-
ing with the Third World. Against the views of Vyacheslav
Molotov and others, a leadership coalition in Moscow slack-
ened ideological bonds to allow that nationalist independence
movements could play a pivotal role in the world revolutionary
process. Beginning in late 1955, Nikita Khurshchev spear-
headed efforts to court the developing nations of Asia and
Africa, and soon after, the Middle East. These early initia-
tives were essentially reactive and defensive in nature,
intended to check Washington's progress in building a pro-
Western consensus in the emerging Third World, and in con-
structing a wall of containment around the Soviet Union.
a. The Tools of Soviet Third World Policy
For nearly two decades to follow, Soviet efforts
to compete with the U.S. in the Third World took the form of
Hosmer, pp. 3-6, provides a detailed account of the ideo-
logical restrictions placed on Moscow's Third World policy, and
speculation on political ooportunities consequently missed dur-
ing this period.
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economic and military aid packages. Axiomatic of Moscow's
approach to the Third World, the new urogram was entered
carefully and incrementally, testing the response of America
and the West prior to a major Soviet commitment. Economic
aid proposals were offered to a select few, in regions where
an American presence was small. Afghanistan was the first
recipient in 1954, followed by India a year later. Military
aid packages were understandably handled with even greater
care. Such programs were bequeathed to Third World leaders
only after numerous requests and careful Soviet consideration
Gamal Nasser lobbied for 14 months prior to the signing of
the September 1955 Soviet/Egyptian arms deal; Afghanistan's
Daud had to petition for military aid for nearly two years.
Indicative of efforts to maintain a low Soviet profile, Czech-
oslovakia was initially used to front all Soviet military pro-
grams until Moscow dropped the facade in the wake of the Suez
Canal crisis [Ref. 43: p. 59].
Afghanistan rode the crest of this new wave of
Third World initiatives. Here Soviet purposes were clearly
defensive; the U.S. had achieved a succession of victories in
forming an anti-Soviet alliance network in the region, includ-
ing now Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in the containment wall.
By choice, Afghanistan stood away from such arrangements,
largely as a result of traditional animosities and feuds. As
Nilolay Bulganin later confided, passing by the opportunity
in Afghanistan would make inevitable Kabul's coming to
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accord with Washington, and Afghanistan's eventual inclusion
in the anti-Soviet Western alliance.
That Moscow recognized the potential to pursue
actively the Soviet interests in Afghanistan and the Third
World is apparent in the 1956 shift in the orientation of
Soviet aid programs to strategically important projects.
Soviet plans to upgrade Afghanistan's road system paralleled
the initiation of programs to build harbors and airfields for
its Third World clientele.
Although Afghanistan was the first Third World
benefactor of Soviet economic aid, the opportunity to receive
military assistance brought Kabul to Moscow's doorstep. Like
virtually every other recipient of Soviet arms aid of the per-
iod, Daud had been rebuffed by Washington on several occasions
over similar requests. As seen in later trends in Soviet aid
programs, Moscow soon recognized that it held a marked advan-
tage in competing with the U.S. in this area. American inhi-
bitions concerning what Harold Wilson termed "arming the
world for World War III," and Washington's restriction of
arms aid to avowed allies were seen as the Achilles' heel of
American Third World initiatives. Early Soviet arms programs
held few such requirements. To exploit this advantage, Soviet
Third World aid made a significant shift toward military-
intensive programs beginning in 1961.
Hosmer credits this Soviet conclusion with the eventual
emphasis on military assistance in Moscow's Third World aid
programs. Compare, for example, Hosmer p. 74 and p. 76.
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Growing national confidence engendered by
Soviet technological advances can be seen in Moscow's Third
World policy in the late 1950' s. The last ideological
restrictions were dropped with the acceptance of a doctrine
supporting "national democracy"; nationalist-bourgeoisie
leaders now could be bargained with on the basis of their
anti-Western, and not necessarily pro-Soviet orientation.
This consequently led to the geographic expansion of the
program, to now include Iraq, Ghana, and Congolese and Aler-
ian freedom fighters. The doctrinal change opened wide
Moscow's doors to the Third World (though caution remained
the primal tenet of Soviet policy) and, as Tyrus Cobb said,
introduced a good measure of pragmatism into its Third World
relationships.
Khrushchev's last years in office witnessed a
significant expansion of Moscow's Third World aid program, to
focus now on the continent of Africa. To a large degree,
this was in response to initiatives in the area by the new
Soviet rival, Communist China. The Soviets actively pursued
closer ties with the Casablanca Bloc, and later the OAU , and
competed with the People's Republic of China (PRC) over aid
to Algeria. Epitomizing Moscow's liberalized standards in
approaching the Third World, Khrushchev be\stowed Algeria's Ben
Bella and Egypt's Nasser with the title "Hero of the Soviet
Union" although neither subscribed to Marxist dogma.
Hosmer, p. 25, describes Soviet initiatives in the
Middle East and Africa during this period.
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The extension of the Soviet military aid pro-
gram to new African clients increased total Third World
recipients by 45 percent. Although this growth boosted
the Soviet military aid budget to a record $2.5 billion
[Ref. 44: p. 345] , it produced a net decrease in deliveries
to individual clients—especially in quiet, uncontested
regions of the globe.
Afghanistan is a case in point. Red China as
yet showed only mild interest in associating with Kabul, and
American aid to the nation posted a general decline during
the period. As the consequence of more pressing needs else-
where, Moscow cut back on the Afghan aid program from $200 in
1955-60, to $100 million during 1960-64 [Ref. 45: p. 343-
347]. A notable drop in the program in Khrushchev's last
year may have been in reaction to Daud's removal and the
establishment of a more Western-leaning democratic government
In the second half of the decade, the Soviets
suffered a number of setbacks in the Third World. In 1965
Ben Bella was overthrown, and Communist designs in Indonesia
were ended with a brutal counter-coup by the military. The
following year a coup in Ghana ousted the pro-Soviet regime
there, and in 196 8 Soviet influence in Mali similarly came
to an end.
Kanet illustrates that the Indonesian coup was an espe-
cially costly blow to Soviet Third World policy; reportedly,
Moscow had invested $1 billion in military, and $600 million
in economic aid by 1965.
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Moscow identified the "ideological excesses"
of Khrushchev as the source of these distressing developments
It was concluded that earlier policies had skipped necessary
stages in the world's procession toward communism, by en-
trusting revolution to non-Communist elements. Consequently,
Soviet Third World policy began to shift away from dealings
with nationalist-bourgeoisie leaders. Now stressed was the
organizing and support of Communist vanguard parties, which
conceivably could carry on the revolution process even with
the loss of the top party leadership.
This policy change coincided closely with the
development of the PDPA in Afghanistan. Although Teraki had
organized the Communist faction in 196 3, Soviet interest and
support essentially began with this reorientation around
1966. Moscow nevertheless placed limits on the extent of
its political and financial support, apparently as a result
of its inability to control radical elements high within the
2PDPA ranks. Conceivably the 1967 splitup of the PDPA into
the independent-minded Khalqis and the more pro-Soviet Par-
chamis benefitted Moscow. Although the development cut the
Communists meager popular support in half, the formation of
Arnold, op. cit. , 46-50, illustrates.
2Hosmer nevertheless takes the view that Soviet matten-




a political cadre more pure to Soviet interests provided
Moscow with a more efficient "tool of revolution."
Late in the decade, Soviet military and
economic aid to Afghanistan again became the victim of more
pressing needs elsewhere. Increasing Soviet commitment to
the conflict in Vietnam, and the need to rearm Moscow's
Middle Eastern clients in the wake of the Six Day War took
a clear priority. Additionally, the Soviet military aid
program to the Third World continued to expand, now including
21 recipients. As an aggregate result, Afghan military aid
dropped to $80 million during 1967-70 [Ref . 46]
.
During this period Moscow also attempted to
reorient its economic assistance programs to orojects that
ultimately would lessen the resource burden of Moscow's grow-
ing Third World commitments. Pure economic inducements posted
a significant decline, and programs for the development of
local raw material resources were emphasized. The fruits
of such efforts were used to Moscow's benefit in a CMEA barter
scheme [Ref. 47: pp. 30-33].
Afghanistan had little to offer this new
arrangement. Since the rapid expansion of Soviet/Afghan
ties in 1954 trade relations had been assymetrical , the
Soviets drew political advantages while Afghanistan reaped
The fact that Moscow needed to join both factions prior
to the coup can be justified in the fact that Parchami mem-
bership was at the time less than 1,000. Arnold offers that
Moscow had believed that the Parcham would grow significantly
larger after the initial PDPA split.
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economic benefits. At the time, the Soviets exploited only
Afghanistan's modest supply of natural gas and coal to their
financial advantage. As a whole, Moscow saw little reason
not to channel Afghan funds to more volatile and promising
regions of the globe.
In 1968 the foundation for a more aggressive
Soviet Third World policy was established. That year a
revised edition of Marshal Sokolovskiy ' s Military Strategy
stipulated that "the U.S.S.R. will, when necessary, also
render military support to people subjected to imperialist
aggression" [Ref. 48: p. 222]. Concurrently, the Soviets'
power projection capabilities dramatically increased, sur-
passing the U.S.- inventory of airlift and sealift assets.
This growth was by no means the product of a recent revolu-
tion in Soviet political doctrine, but a continuum of earlier
efforts to rectify the U.S. /Soviet strategic imbalance begun
early in the Khrushchev years. Moreover, the display of a
more offensive modus operandi can be portrayed as a steo,
albeit a small one, toward realizing this new ootential.
Indicative of Soviet Third World initiatives in general,
Moscow's policies in practice lagged far behind Soviet capa-
bilities .
Supportive of this is Moscow's early reluctance to
implement its new aggressive policy outlook. During both
instances the commitment never materialized. Also during
this period Moscow provided Hanoi with 3,000 advisors engaged
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in "various fields of the national economy and the defense
of North Vietnam," [Ref. 49: pp. 35-36], and direct military
assistance during the civil wars in Yemen in 1967 and the
Sudan in 1969. Direct Soviet involvement played a minor role
in these conflicts, with limited contingents of Soviet per-
sonnel staying well away from combat areas. The Soviets' new-
found zeal apparently was tempered with practical caution.
However, coincident with the continued growth of Soviet power
projection capabilities, inhibitions to pursuing national
interests by means of force would gradually fall away.
b. The Precedent for Military Intervention in the
Third World.
The 1970 Canal War represents a milestone in the
development of Soviet Third World policy. Between March and
June of that year, the Soviet Union deployed 10,000 military
personnel within Egypt to counter Israeli deep penetration
air raids. Soviet forces consisted primarily of surface-to-
air missile crews, and a limited number of "volunteer" pilots.
As with earlier Soviet involvements in Third World conflicts,
the move was intended as a temporary fix until local forces
could regain a measure of stability and fighting competence.
Axiomatic of such policies, direct Soviet military assistance
was loaned only when it appeared that negative developments
in the war had placed the safety of its client— in this case
the Nasser regime— in jeopardy.
The 1973 Yom Kipour War witnessed a less obtrusive
but more common role for Moscow. For the first time, the
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Soviets made extensive use of their growing logistics and
transportation capability. In the period of just under
three months, 6 3,0 00 tons of equipment and supplies were
provided to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq to rebuild the defeated
Arab armies. The successful operation went far in building
Soviet confidence in its power projection potential; the
plan would be repeated with few variations in Angola and
Ethiopia.
More foreboding for the West, Moscow's threat to
intervene militarily in the October War (once again, only
when the defeat of its Arab clients appeared likely,) was
given credibility by vigorous sword-rattling. During the
conflict, the Fifth Eskadra in the eastern Mediterranean was
increased from 60 to 96 ships, with anti-carrier groups
closely shadowing the U.S. Sixth Fleet Task Force off the
coast of Cyprus. Additionally, seven Soviet airborne divi-
sions were placed in a condition of increased readiness,
and an airborne command-and-control post was put into opera-
tion. Still there is a measure of caution in evidence here.
The upgrading of U.S. Forces to Condition III in reaction to
Soviet preparations is widely credited with encouraging
Moscow to channel efforts to reaching a political solution.
This Soviet victory came only a year after one
of the greatest defeats for Moscow's Third World policy.
During 1972, Anwar el-Sadat expelled over 5,000 Soviet
advisors and diplomatic personnel, reportedly over Moscow's
attitude that it "enjoyed a privileged position in
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Egypt" [Ref. 50: p. 230] . Soviet involvement there had
been the cornerstone of Moscow's approach to the Third World
for 15 years. Since the 1955 Czech arms deal, Moscow had
invested more in Egypt in aid and assistance programs than
in any other non-Communist country to date.
The release of this economic burden found ramifi-
cations throughout the Soviets' Third World clientele, includ-
ing Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, Kabul's military assis-
tance program was increased to aggregate $150 million during
1970-74 [Ref. 51] . A late surge in aid may also have indicated
Moscow's positive reaction to Daud's return to power, an event
in which the Soviets played an indirect part. However, as a
result of Afghanistan's rather unsensational role in interna-
tional events, the country dropped from seventh to eleventh
in Moscow's priority list for economic aid.
Another milestone for Moscow's Third World policy
was reached in 1976 with the Soviet-orchestrated intervention
into Angola by Cuban forces. Beseiged MPLA forces were said
to have requested the presence of Soviet troops as early as
the spring of 1975. Fearing a hostile American reaction,
Moscow deferred the appeal, but recommended that Fidel Castro
be approached [Ref. 52]. About mid-September, U.S. intelli-
gence reported the arrival of approximately 1,500 Cuban
combat troops at Luanda in Cuban merchant ships. It has
been suggested that this contingent was intended to be used
only in an adivosry and support capacity, but subsequent devel-
opments precluded Cuban plans for a limited commitment.
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A month later, the conflict threatened to escalate
into a regional war with the intervention of Zairian forces
from the north, and a South African spearhead from the south.
Havana and Moscow were faced with the inevitable options of
pulling support from the MPLA, or significantly increasing
their commitment to the conflict. Rather than accept a very
visible defeat for Soviet Third World policy, the latter was
chosen. This first Soviet venture into direct intervention,
albeit cooperative intervention, ironically appears to be a
reluctant response to unforseen events. That the choice of
greater commitment was made is highly significant. It indi-
cates the high risks and costs Moscow is willing to accept
in the interest of salvaging prestige and interests in the
Third World.
In view of earlier trends, the Soviet decision to
intervene in the Angolan crisis is understandable, and perhaps
predictable. Although conducted on a smaller scale, the
Soviet logistics and transport operation mirrored Moscow's
actions during the Yom Kippur War. Moreover, the policy con-
curred with a decade-old principle that the endangerment of
a client warrants direct Soviet involvement. Soviet actions
during the Canal War offer a ready example. The undeniably
offensive character of the policy must, nevertheless, be
provisioned with the fact that the alternatives were few.
Cooperative intervention was, in fact, the least drastic
solution that would assure the survival of the MPLA and save
face among other Third World clients.
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Consistent with earlier Soviet decisionmaking
patterns, the operation was also a fairly safe move. The
ever-present concern for the American reaction was dispelled
by Washington's clarification of its position on the crisis.
The U.S. Government issued its first warning on 24 November
1975, three weeks after the beginning of the Cuban invasion
(although Cuban force levels in Angola were less than 5,000).
The warning made apparent Washington's intention to retaliate
politically against Soviet adventurism. Any remaining worries
disappeared with the December 1975 Senate vote prohibiting aid
to UNITA/FNLA forces, and President Ford's subsequent promise
to stay out of the conflict. After a careful weighing of
these inputs, Moscow correctly determined that the policy
decision was, in the words of Jack Matlock, the safest of bets
The 1977 decision to intervene in Ethiopia, this
time employing Soviet ground troops in a direct support mis-
sion, was perhaps even less of a risk. The action was neces-
sitated by the fairly successful Somali invasion of the Ogaden
region in October 1977, and the failure of Soviet engineered
diplomatic solutions to the crisis. A month earlier the
Carter Administration had curtailed arms shipments to Somalia
in protest of obvious Somali designs in the Ogaden. Addition-
ally, in October Washington assured the world audience that
the U.S. would exercise restraint in the growing crisis, and
would support political efforts to end the fighting. Presi-
dent Carter openly rejected Zbignew Brzezinski's advice to
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send an aircraft carrier task force to the area, apparently
to demonstrate that a military option was not a consideration.
This policy emanated from the current American outlook intent
on "not dramatizing the East-West factor in Africa... A nega-
tive, reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose
Soviet or Cuban involvement would be dangerous and futile."
Once again, Washington's efforts to belay American and Soviet
fears of a superpower confrontation in the Third World proved
central to Moscow's decision to embark on a bold new policy.
The character of Soviet involvement in the Ethio-
pian crisis appears a logical projection of earlier policy
trends, taking Soviet forces one step closer to direct combat
roles. Whereas in Angola Soviet transport assets were used
to supplement Cuban airlift and sealift capabilities, the
Soviets now monopolized and controlled such operations.
Between late 1977 and the spring of 1978, 17,000 Cuban troops
and $850 million worth of Soviet military hardware had been
transferred to Ethiopia [Ref. 55: p. 1]
.
As in Angola, Cuban units shouldered the majority
of ground operations with the assistance of local forces in
"supporting actions". However, the battle for the Ogaden
now found Soviet forces near the war zone, contributing with
air defense and artillery support. It was reported that Soviet
pilots were alleged to have provided close air support for
Hosmer, p. 93, quotes Anthony Lake, State Department
director.
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Cuban operations. The move toward more direct Soviet involve-
ment was done cautiously and carefully; it appears that Soviet
casualties in Ethiopia were no more than the number sustained
during the Angolan crisis.
The Somali army withdrew from the Ogaden in March
1978 following a successful flanking operation by Cuban forces
a month earlier. Amid rumors that the Communist counter-
offensive intended to continue into Somalia, Washington inform-
ed Moscow that it considered resuming military assistance to
Mogadishu. Cuban operations in the Ogaden immediately slack-
ened, and Moscow publically assured the U.S. that no such action
was planned.
Just prior to the Afghanistan invasion, Soviet
participation in Third World conflicts assumed a more porten-
tous dimension. Following the signing of a 20-year treaty of
friendship and cooperation with Hanoi, the Soviets assisted
in the December 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea with
its airlift/sealift might. A portion of the 5,000 Soviet
"advisors" then in Vietnam are known to have accompanied the
invasion force, and to have lent direct assistance in subse-
quent operations to suppress Khmer Rouge insurgents. Follow-
ing the punitive attack on Vietnam by PRC forces in February
1979, Soviet airlift assets ferried Vietnamese forces near
On 21 March 1980 the Reagan Administration published a
detailed report on Soviet activities in the Third World, speci-
fically concerned with the Soviet use of chemical warfare. Red
Army troops from the Chemical Service were alleged to have been
used against Khmer Rouge guerrillas following the invasion.
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Saigon to the new front. China's early articulation of the
action as a "limited measure" may have convinced Moscow that
no greater Soviet response was needed beyond very vocal
threats and warnings.
Close Soviet complicity is also accepted in the
invasion of North Yemen by PDRY forces in late February 1979.
The operation was limited in both scope and depth (the 3,000
South Yemeni troops ventured little farther than the immediate
border area [Ref. 56: p. 33]); however, Soviet and Cuban
personnel are alleged to have provided direct artillery and
close air support. The subsequent mobilization of Saudi forces
and Washington's announcement of support for North Yemen, to
include the presence of an American carrier task force in the
area conceivably persuaded the Soviets and the PDRY to accept
a political solution well short of a substantive victory.
Soviet Third World policy exhibited a new facet
in the actions in Southeast Asia and North Yemen. Without a
doubt, neither operation was planned by Moscow, and evidence
suggests that the Soviets may have even attempted to moderate
Vietnamese and PDRY designs. However, both eoisodes witnessed
active Soviet support of purely offensive operations, at a
time when neither client state was in danger of defeat or
collapse. Moreover, Moscow was not entrapped in an Angola-
like dilemma, and presented with a do-or-die policy decision.
Although in both Vietnam and Yemen Moscow recognized that the
possibility of a superpower confrontation was remote, in
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evidence is a new Soviet willingness to use force to oursue
direct or indirect national interests.
c. Reflections on the Evolution of Soviet Decision-
Making
The dramatic evolution of Soviet Third World
policy within the last decade can be explained readily in
terms of Moscow's often-espoused "correlation of forces".
The Soviets' power projection capabilitv in the Third World
had reached formidable dimensions by the late 1960's, as the
eventual product of a building program christened two years
after Stalin's death. By 1969 the Soviet airlift arm counted
nearly 200 aircraft; the merchant marine fleet grew during
the second half of the decade by more than 50 percent, to a
total of 1,395 ships.
As this trend continued into the 1970 's, American
projection potential, both materially and spiritually, was on
the wane. The commitment of much of America's airlift, sealift,
and naval strength to the Vietnam conflict, and the subsequent
reduction of such forces in the aftermath of that war, degraded
Washington's physical ability to contest Soviet initiatives in
the Third World. Moreover, America was drained of its willing-
ness to challenge Soviet moves as a direct result of the fail-
ure of Washington's Vietnam policy.
The Yom Kippur War served as a confidence-building
experience for Soviet power projection capabilities, and soon
thereafter the gap between policy and potential began to close.
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Soviet actions in Angola, Ethiopia, and Kampuchea and North
Yemen can be seen as an incremental growth of Soviet partici-
pation in Third World conflicts: from proxy supply to direct
proxy support in the defense of clients, to direct support
of offensive initiatives by client states. Third World
policy ambitions have grown correspondingly, from efforts to
deprive the Third World from the Western alliance, to active
support and guarantee of vanguard parties. Donald Zagora
identifies current Soviet objectives in the Third World as
the construction "in Africa and Asia [of] a looser version
of the Warsaw Pact" [Ref . 59]
.
Stephen Hosmer cites a number of interrelated
"constants" apparent in the Third World. The first ascribes
attributes of adroitness and caution to Soviet policymaking.
As illustrated throughout this study, the evolution of Soviet
Third World policy has occurred in carefully calculated,
incremental steps; incidents portraying rashness in Soviet
initiatives are rare, and most often are attributable to
Soviet miscalculation [Ref. 58: pp. 135-154].
A prime example of Moscow's "testing of the waters"
prior to implementing a decisive policy was given during the
1970 Canal War. The introduction of a 50-man Soviet military
contingent in Egypt to man surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites
was, in fact, a test of U.S. and world reaction. When none
was forthcoming, the size of the force was increased signifi-
cantly, and Soviet personnel were moved steadily toward the
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war front. Had a substantive Western response taken place
initially, Moscow likely would have withdrawn its small lead
element without loss to Soviet prestige or credibility. Once
the primary initiative was begun, however, the Soviet policy
proceeded unalterably. It appears to be a formidable chal-
lenge for American decisionmakers to be able to detect and
counter Soviet test initiatives prior to such policies
becoming irreversible.
Adding to this theme, Moscow consistently has
pursured the lowest-cost solution to crises in the Third World.
Perhaps with the exception of Soviet Darticioation in Indo-
china in 1978-79, and North Yemen in 1979, policies pre-
scribing direct Soviet support have been addressed as a last
resort. In Angola and Ethiopia, pro-Soviet regimes were
clearly on the brink of collapse, requiring nothing short
of direct intervention. Still, the use of proxy forces was
preferred to direct Soviet assistance, inferring less of a
material and political risk to the U.S.S.R.
The Soviets also have shown a proclivity for
"sure bets", as insurance against the escalation of the con-
flict out of Moscow's total control. In the past decade,
Soviet and Cuban forces have fought against insurgents and
minor Third World powers, but never against a modern army.
The performance of a Cuban force against a South African
unit in Angola in 1976 indicates that Communist forces
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of intervention are not always quite as awesome as they seemed
to have been portrayed.
Furthermore, every scene of Soviet intervention
in the past had been thoroughly researched and reconnoitered
prior to the operation. Cuban military advisors were seen
in Luanda six months before Castro's commitment of ground
forces to Angola. Moscow had sent a military delegation to
Addis Ababa prior to the intervention in Ethiopia. (The
Soviets also had a firm grasp on the organization and perform-
ance of the Somali Army--a force Moscow essentially had
equipped and trained.)
Yet Soviet calculations have proven deficient on
occasion, especially in estimating crises involving popular-
based insurgency movements. Evidence exists that operations
in Angola and Ethiopia were intended as decisive, temporary
moves to reestablish client control. The continuing conflicts
in both these countries have necessitated the continued pre-
sence of major Cuban forces to guarantee the Marxist regimes.
Another timeless attribute of Soviet Third World
policy is the strict avoidance of situations which possibly
could draw Moscow into a direct confrontation with Washington.
As mentioned, "test" actions are a common mechanism for
guaging American response prior to the implementation of a
Evidenced in the limited contact between Cuban and South
African forces, the latter had better tactical-level leader-
ship and performed better in mobile combat.
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more bold and massive policy. In instances where Moscow
has already committed itself to a major initiative and Wash-
ington had delivered belated but credible threats, the Soviets
have been careful to allay American fears, and perhaps to
modify policy slightly to avoid a major Soviet/American crisis.
During the Korean War, Moscow made clear its policy of main-
taining only material support for the North [Ref. 59: pp.
136-137]. Carter's warnings over a conflict were reciprocated
with emphatic Soviet assurances, and a temporary cessation of
hostilities at the border.
As illustrated earlier, Washington often has
simplified Soviet calculations by announcing America's firm
position in the early stages of crisis. Angola and Ethiopia
offer obvious examples. Moscow could as well predict little
U.S. reaction to the offensives in Kampuchea and North Yemen:
Washington had shown only enmity for the Pol Pot regime, and
no precedent existed for a major American commitment to the
Yemeni conflict. Moscow's confidence in its ability to dis-
cern American interests was thus justified. Prior to the
Afghanistan invasion, the Soviets posted an impressive record
of successes in calculating and implementing Third World
policies
.
d. Applicability of the Afghanistan Case
It becomes evident in this study that the course
of Soviet policy in Afghanistan paralleled the development of
Moscow's approach to the Third World in general. The
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establishment of economic ties with Kabul was part of a
larger Soviet program to compete with American, and later
Red Chinese, influence in the Third World. Initial efforts
to induce Afghanistan were aimed at forestalling Kabul's
assimilation into the containment wall of the West by draw-
ing it into a closer Soviet orbit.
For most of the past three decades, Afghanistan
has played an exceedingly minor role in international poli-
tics
,
and Soviet aid programs to Kabul have suffered accord-
ingly. In the early 1960's, Afghan economic aid dropped by
30 percent as a result of concerted Soviet efforts to compete
with the PRC in Africa. Soviet assistance to Egypt and Viet-
nam at the end of that decade again came at the expense of
Afghan programs. Although military aid to Afghanistan rose
substantially in 1973-74, its priority in Moscow's overall
Third World aid program dropped.
Interestingly, the Afghan aid program appears in
retrospect to be one of a limited number of victories for
such Soviet efforts in the Third World. Of the top 15
recipients of Soviet military aid in the past quarter-century,
only Kabul and three others are presently alligned with Moscow,
Of the top 10 benefactors of Soviet economic assistance pro-
grams , Afghanistan alone has evolved into a Socialist state
[Ref. 60: pp. 18-20]. Moscow has paid $1 billion in military
aid, and $1.4 billion in economic aid for the "triumph of
communism" in Afghanistan [Ref. 61]; yet the Soviets have made
even greater sacrifices to maintain this achievement.
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It also is apparent that the Communist takeover
in Kabul is not reflective of Soviet designs or planning. As
covered earlier in this study, the Glorious April Revolution
was not the product of Soviet-orchestrated attempts at sub-
version, but was accomplished largely through the efforts of
local Communist leaders, Hafizollah Amin in particular. (It
must be added that Moscow's 22-year penetration of the Afghan
military was key to the success of the coup.) Tyrus Cobb
describes the coup as an unplanned, qualified victory for
Soviet foreign policy; "a local Communist takeover, carrying
with it implications for greater Soviet support and guarantees,
was suddenly dumped in Moscow's lap." This observation offers
with it the inference that even in early 1978, Afghanistan
held no exceptional import in Soviet policymaking.
Soviet military assistance for the new DRA govern-
ment had parallels in concurrent Soviet policies elsewhere in
the Third World. At the time, the Soviet military contingent
in Afghanistan was actually smaller than the group partici-
pating in Vietnamese operations in Kampuchea, and comparable
in size to the "advisory staff" directing the small South
Yemeni army in 1979. Soviet aircraft and artillery support
in operations against Afghan rebels also was seen in the
Yemeni and Ethiopian crises. Opposing the view that Moscow's
early military role in Afghanistan constituted "a harbinger
Cobb interview.
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of a bold new Soviet policy," Soviet assistance to Kabul
actually was unexceptional in the context of current Soviet
Third World policy.
Additionally, the Soviet decision to invade
Afghanistan can be explained in terms of current Soviet
modus operandi. In accordance with a fundamental dictum
in Soviet policymaking, the drastic Soviet initiative was
in response to a dire emergency. From all evidence, the
invasion was intended to be a quick and decisive solution
to rebel uprisings in the country. Amin's overthrow was
conceivably a contingency, providing for Amin's refusal to
"invite" Soviet forces to Afghanistan. This speculation pro-
ceeds from the theory .that the visit of Lieutenant General
Viktor Paputin to Kabul just prior to the invasion was an
attempt to pressure Amin into acquiescing. That such efforts
were continued up until the time of the coup may be evidenced
by the fact that Paputin apparently died in Kabul in the
early stages of that operation [Ref. 62: p. 93] . Moreover,
the Soviet media seems to have been primed for the eventuality
of winning the Afghan leader over, initially issuing falla-
cious accounts that Amin had requested Soviet military
assistance
.
In general, the invasion decision reflects Soviet
policy guaranteeing the safety of a client Marxist regime.
Pipes interview,
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Few dispute the fact that, had Soviet force levels not been
drastically increased, the DRA army and government would
have soon collapsed. The policy decision is reminiscent of
the Soviet dilemma in the early stages of the Angolan crisis
when choices were limited to expanding the Soviet commitment
or abandoning a Marxist ally. In view of the unprecedented
character of Moscow's Afghanistan solution, the policy mani-
fests an even greater willingness to use the Soviets' power
projection capability to meet this commitment.
Yet the invasion option no doubt appeared the
lowest-cost solution readily practicable. Invariably there
were few alternatives to direct Red Army involvement that
would have yielded satisfactory results. Here again, the
predicted ramifications of a Soviet political "defeat" in
Afghanistan, specifically the consequential damage to Soviet
credibility among clients and the West, and the implications
of accepting a very visible ideological setback, were deemed
of sufficient weight to warrant a radical and perhaps more
risky policy.
Conceivably Soviet calculations and preparations
prior to the invasion were even more thorough than those
paving the way for actions in Angola and Ethiopia. A size-
able Soviet in-country presence had been sustained for a
quarter-century. Moscow's early emphasis on the development
of strategically important projects (the construction of the
main highway connecting Kabul to the Soviet Union is a graphic
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illustration)
, and the frequent dispatching of geographic
survey teams into the Afghan countryside proved instrumental
in the success of the invasion operation. Furthermore, the
Soviets could be confident in their estimate that the DRA
military would not oppose the intervention. After two decades
of close association, and with added insurance provided by
last-minute sabotage operations, the Afghan Army was, in fact,
completely neutralized. Finally, the Yepishev and Pavlovskii
missions provided current high level analyses of the situation,
a procedure followed in the planning of every major military
initiative since Angola.
Afghanistan surely appeared to Soviet policymakers
as an area far divorced from American interests and concerns.
Throughout the postwar period, the U.S. had shown little
interest in improving its position in Afghanistan, essentially
in deference to Pakistani views on regional issues. Follow-
ing the Glorious April Revolution and the Dubs murder, and
in view of the escalating conflict in the countryside, America
began to withdraw its small presence in Afghanistan. Just
prior to the invasion, American involvement was at its lowest
point since World War II. In the Soviet view, this develop-
ment was merely the predictable outcome of an American regional
policy which tacitly accepted that Afghanistan laid within the
Soviet sphere of control for the past 20 years.
Cobb and Matlock contest the notion that the U.S. recog-
nized Soviet preeminence in Afghanistan. Rather it is stressed
that Washington historically has lacked the capacity to pursue
"American security concerns" in Afghanistan.
Washington gave no indication of genuine concern
during the final preparations for the invasion. It should be
remembered that only four private warnings (all of which
Carter later admitted were "tempered with caution") preceded
the invasion. In light of the concurrent American crisis in
Iran, Washington sought an ally in Moscow, not an adversary.
The only public warning came after the invasion operation
essentially had already begun. This message, too, proffered
a mild warning, expressing "concern" over current indications
Jack Matlock adds that an American capacity to
contest such a Soviet move directly was also visibly absent.
Beyond historically dubious political admonishments, the U.S.
could do little more than "make some noise with naval forces
in the Persian Gulf, 500 miles away."
The fact that Moscow used massive, uncollaborated
force in its Afghanistan solution is cited routinely as a
major precedent in its dealings with the Third World. While
this view is fundamentally correct, the unique character of
the policy can be portrayed as an extension of other Soviet
policy patterns, tailored to the unique situation in Afghan-
istan. While Soviet forces were committed to direct ground
combat roles for the first time in the Third World, the pro-
genitor for such a policy is seen in Soviet involvements in
Ethiopia, Kampuchea, and North Yemen. The role of the Red
Army contingents in each of these episodes transcended the
passive support role seen in earlier Soviet initiatives.
Matlock interview
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The use of proxies in Afghanistan was understand-
ably discounted, if for no other reason than the distance to
such assets, and the nonavailability of access routes outside
of Soviet territory. The staging of Cuban or East European
invasion forces across the Soviet border would be a ludi-
crously transparent move, and the ramifications and implica-
tions would be little different from action by Soviet troops.
This issue will be examined further in the following pages.
Two additional precedents have been widely attri-
buted to the intervention. The episode included the overthrow
of an established Marxist government, and the commitment of
major forces to the region without the approval of Kabul.
These are rather shallow observations; as mentioned earlier,
the coup probably was a late, shunned option, and the lack
of genuine justification for the invasion was likely the
result of a miscue between the invasion forces and those
working to procure legitimacy for the action. The true
significance of the episode may lie in the basic fact that
Moscow chose to abandon its traditional low profile in Third
World operations, and exhibited a new willingness to use
direct force in a unique and carefully prepared situation.
A final precedent which has been offered by Hosmer
involves the text of the 1978 Soviet/Afghan treaty. Article
IV of that agreement vaguely prescirbes "appropriate measures
to ensure the security, independence, and territorial
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integrity of the two countries," was unique among similar
accords within the Third World, and was not coincidentally
the basis for Moscow's legal justification for the invasion.
Hosmer attributes much importance to the specific wording
of such agreements, and speculates that future treaties may
evidence the extent of Soviet interests and ambitions in a
specific region [Ref. 63: p. 261].
In summary, many characteristics of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan can be found in earlier Soviet military initia-
tives in the Third World, including the fundamental goals,
interests, and strategies involved. Furthermore, the precedent
implicated in Moscow's decision to invade can be portrayed as
an extension of earlier Third World policy trends. In many
ways, Moscow's Afghanistan solution is applicable to the
conduct of Soviet Third World politics as a whole. The true
significance of the Soviet invasion decision lies in the
uninhibited use of Soviet military power as a solution to
Third World conflicts: nevertheless, this conclusion must
be provisioned with an articulation of the unique circum-
stances present in the Afghanistan scenario.
FBIS , Daily Report, The Soviet Union (6 Dec 1978)
, p.
J-ll. Hosmer places significance in the fact that the Soviet/
Afghan treaty was uncharacteristically vague as to precondi-
tions warranting intervention. Earlier treaties stipulated
action would follow a "threat to peace" or a "breach of the
peace"; the Afghan agreement merely mentioned "appropriate




Reflections on Soviet Periphery Politics
Survival is the most fundamental objective of any
polity. Historically, national security has been the single
inexorable interest of all governments. Traditional, cultural
and ideological adherences ultimately have been jettisoned
in the interest of perpetuating the ruling elite and the
nation-state. Such a conclusion no doubt prompted a 19th
century Italian nationalist to offer the theory that the
machinations of kings and ministers were fleeting, and that
only nations and people are eternal.
Among the many facets of national security, the most
primal is tangible, physical safety— security "within the
vision of thine own eyes". Accordingly, polities histori-
cally have subscribed to the principle attributed to Otto
von Bismark that the stability of one's borders is the most
essential of all national goals. In the age of global power
projection and intercontinental nuclear strike poetntial,
this philosophy still holds true.
Soviet political history has exhibited both a funda-
mental interest in survival and a preeminent concern for
border security. As the product of a turbulent past, the
Russian culture traditionally has been attributed with xeno-
phobia and regard for national security bordering on neurosis.
The ascent of a movement espousing class unity which trans-
cends national borders and cultural barriers has done little
to reform this fear and prejudice. During Lenin's lifetime,
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the simple realization was made that survival of the state
was synonymous with survival of the regime, and thereafter,
the "Bolshevist zeal" of Moscow has been tempered in practice
with the practical needs of the state. The latter became the
major force behind Soviet politics in the Stalin years, with
the subordination of ideological pursuits to efforts to nor-
malize the U.S.S.R. within the bourgeoisie state system.
Russians and Soviets historically have equated the
survival of the state with the stability and subordination
of peripheral actors. (Henry Kissinger aptly offers: "Abso-
lute security for Russia has meant infinite insecurity for
all of its neighbors" [Ref. 64: p. 118].) In the postwar
years, this vital national interest has taken form in a system
of allied and subjugated border states, facilitated by the
maintenance of client Marxist regimes. The current cordon
sanitaire constitutes not only a military, but a psycholo-
gical and ideological buffer to insulate the U.S.S.R. from
contaminating bourgeoisie and nationalist influences.
Joseph Stalin, the system's architect, has been
accused of vision extending no farther than his artillery
range; his preoccupation with regional politics (specifi-
cally European affairs) has acknowledgeably come at the
expense of Soviet extraregional interests. Yet the importance
of Moscow's eastern buffer has remained preeminent in Stalin's
aftermath. As observed by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, the Soviet
Union's transition from a regional to a global actor apparently
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has not diminished the primacy of peripheral security, but
only opened the door to new, extraregional commitments of
secondary importance.
Recent history supports this notion. The Soviets
have demonstrated that they are highly reactive to shows of
instability or disloyalty along their border. The limit of
Soviet tolerance has been shown in two episodes of direct
military intervention prior to 1979, and in several instances
where such a definitive solution was threatened. Whereas
Moscow's Third World policy has vacillated in an escalating
pattern of expansion and consolidation, the Kremlin's interest
in maintaining control of its buffer system has been constant.
The applicability of Afghanistan to Moscow's peri-
pheral security system has been the subject of heated, though
somewhat imbalanced debate. Sonnenfeldt [Ref 65: p. 18] has
spoken for the majority of academia in submitting that peri-
pheral interests were a "dominant consideration" for Soviet
decisionmakers in the episode. In a May 1983 interview with
Per Spiegel , Yuriy Andropov supported this view by addressing
the Afghanistan issue in the context of mutual spheres of
influence
:
...Far from being a matter of indifference to us
[is] what is happening directly on our southern bor-
der. Washington even goes as far as arrogating for
itself the right to judge what government must be
there in Nicaragua, since this affects U.S. vital
interests. But Nicaragua is over 1,000 kilometers
away from the U.S.A., and we have a rather long com-
mon border with Afghanistan [Ref. 66]
.
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The Afghanistan case is clearly portrayed here as a product
of vital Soviet border concerns and interest.
Dr. Valenta [Ref 67: pp. 86-87] and others, approach
this generalization more cautiously. Although admitting that
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is comparable to interven-
tions in Eastern Europe , two anomolies are apparent. First the
Soviets have not proved convincingly that the priority placed
on peripheral interest has, in practice, extended beyond Eastern
Europe. While Moscow's approach to this region has been largely
nonnegotiable , the Soviets have, for example, failed to press
postwar claims against Turkey and Iran. Moreover, the Soviets
only recently have shown concern for stability within Afghan-
istan. As seen earlier, Soviet/Afghan relations traditionally
have been more representative of Moscow's Third World policies
than the Soviet conduct of "periphery politics" seen in Eastern
Europe.
The balance of this analysis ultimately will conclude
how the Afghanistan case fits into Moscow's peripheral security
scheme, and will speculate on the patterns of, and the prece-
dent for, military intervention in the conduct of Soviet peri-
phery politics. This area of the study will briefly review
three earlier examples of Soviet decisionmaking where border
security was perceived to be jeopardized. In two cases a policy
of intervention was decided upon; in a third case the option was
considered, but discounted. Comparative analysis will deter-
mine what role Afghanistan's geographic setting may have played
in the Soviet decision to invade.
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a. Hungary 1956: The Challenge from Without
The 1956 Hungarian episode witnessed one of the
most blatant challenges to Soviet regional hegemony since the
establishment of East European cordon sanitaire . Soviet
policymakers faced a threat from outside the party apparatus,
espousing anti-Communist and anti-Soviet rhetoric, and endan-
gering the stability of the newly-formed Warsaw Treaty Organ-
ization (WTO)
.
The Hungarian invasion appears in its historical
setting as a prominent departure from current Soviet policy
trends prescribing greater political tolerance. In the years
following Stalin's death, the Soviet Union had come to equi-
table terms with Greece, Turkey, and Iran over a host of
postwar disputes. Additionally, in 1954, Nikita Khrushchev
headed efforts to mend relations with Tito's Yugoslavia (a
policy that would later become a casualty of Moscow's Hun-
garian initiative). This new policy outlook, pursuing mili-
tary, economic, and political ties in place of crude Stalinist
control mechanisms, was interpreted wrongly by various
regional factions as a recession of Soviet claims in Eastern
Europe.
The easing of political repression in the region
sparked a series of revolts in Poland in June 1956. A popu-
lar uprising within the Polish labor force ostensibly yielded
concessions from Warsaw and Moscow. Pro-Soviet elements
within the Polish United Worker's Party (PUWP) were summarily
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ousted, and Wladislaw Goinulka (who earlier had been imprisoned
for pro-Titoist tendencies) was allowed to accept the post of
Polish Party Secretary. Concurrently, Polish labor was pro-
mised a greater voice in the planning of state economic goals.
In addition to political and economic concessions , Khrushchev
also agreed to the removal of General Polossovsky as head of
the Polish People's Army, and to the reduction of in-country
Soviet military personnel.
Also in June, Matayas Rakosi (an avowed Stalinist
and long-time leader of the Hungarian Communist Party) was
deposed, amid growing support for a Hungarian "revisionist"
movement. His successor, Enr5 Gero, proved no more effective
in quelling the growing rebellion. On 23 October, the situa-
tion became a crisis when an anti-Communist revolt erupted
in Budapest. Unlike the recent Polish episode, Hungarian
reformists demanded full national independence, prescribing
the dissolution of the HCP and Hungary's withdrawal from
the Warsaw Pact.
For more than a week, the Kremlin groped for a
political solution to the confrontation. Soviet interests
in Poland had been salvaged largely by manipulating and
pressuring the Warsaw regime; the Hungarian reform movement
under the new Prime Minister Imre Nagy showed no such mal-
leability. Ultimately a decisive "show move" was decided
upon, intended to demonstrate dramatically the boundaries of
Soviet patience and tolerance, and consequently to reverse a
perceptible trend toward challenging Soviet hegemony.
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On 4 November 1956, a quarter of a million Soviet
troops spearheaded by nearly 5,000 tanks entered the country,
The Hungarian military (which earlier had given indications
that such a move would be opposed) had been cleverly dis-
persed through the efforts of in-country Soviet advisors.
The invasion also took full advantage of a truce between
Soviet and Hungarian forces , making possible the capture of
key Hungarian military leaders and their staffs [Ref. 68:
p. 77] .
The operation had been planned to minimize
international repercussions in regard to this unprecedented
action. The concurrent Suez Canal crisis had already
cleaved deep divisions within NATO (which, ironically, found
the U.S. and the Soviet Union in close accord on the issue)
and was instrumental in diluting Western reaction.
The decision to invade was influenced, no doubt,
by repeated American assurances that the United States would
not intervene in the area, Radio Free Europe (RFE) broad-
casts notwithstanding. Speaking specifically in regard
to the Soviets' handling of the Polish crisis, but holding
clear implications for Hungary as well, John Foster Dulles
publically stated that a NATO military option would not
Radio Free Europe broadcasts are credited by some
with fueling the Hungarian revolt with empty promises
of American support and assistance. No evidence can be




be considered. Not coincidentally , the announcement pre-
ceded the invasion decision by a matter of days. As
later recounted by President Eisenhower, at that time,
Washington took seriously the possibility that Moscow
would resort to nuclear war to defend its hold on Eastern
Europe [Ref. 69: p. 88]. In the words of Dulles, it was
feared that American military intervention would "preci-
pitate a full-scale nuclear war [in which] all these
people [Eastern Europeans] would be wiped out" [Ref. 70].
Nevertheless, the Soviet invasion had signi-
ficant political ramifications throughout the world
community, although the true costs of the policy were not
immediately apparent. Soon after the crisis, a complacent
Pravda scoffed at "anemic attempts" of the United Nations
to rally opposition to the move. However, subsequently
Moscow discovered it had lost significant support among
the intelligensia of Europe— a sector that earlier had
expressed a measure of sympathy and support for Soviet
interests [Ref. 71: p. 78]. Although a united opposition
failed to materialize, the event served to establish the
foundation for an anti-Soviet consensus in the West.
Moscow also noticed some uneasiness among
Soviet allies over the episode. The Kremlin had justified
its actions to the Communist community by identifying
"American designs" in maverick Hungary. In his own
inimitable style, Khrushchev [Ref. 72] ventured: "The
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saliva of the imperialists was running in their mouths at
the prospect of Hungary's leaving the Soviet camp." Some
negative reaction was evident among Moscow's clients, how-
ever. The most vocal rebuff came from the Soviets' African
and Asian allies, who took pause from condemning the West's
role in the Suez debacle to express "deep concern" over
Moscow's methods.
Obvious efforts to close ranks were made in
November 1957, on the 40th anniversary of the Great October
Revolution. The celebrations produced a "declaration of
unity", recognizing Moscow's ideological and political lead,
and denouncing all forms of "revisionism".
A prominent Soviet lesson taken from the Hungarian
episode identified the continued need for "Red Army diplomacy"
Military force, not ideology, bonded the Eastern alliance.
Soviet decisionmakers also came away from the event with a
new appreciation for the forces of nationalism in Eastern
Europe, even within the Communist leadership. In the interest
of retaining the loyalty of Moscow's East European clients,
WTO regimes subsequently were allowed a degree of freedom
in conducting domestic politics. Soviet toleration of Janos
Radar's extensive economic reforms in Hungary stands as a
case in point.
Perhaps the most important outcome of the Hun-
garian crisis was the tacit acceptance by the West that
Moscow can, and will, act as it sees necessary in Eastern
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Europe. The recognition of Soviet peripheral interests
convinced Moscow that the use of military force within the
region was a viable option in the future.
b. Czechoslovakia 1968: The Challenge from Within
In contrast to the Hungarian episode 12 years
earlier, Czechoslovakia in 1968 presented a challenge to
the Soviet security scheme from within the very mechanism
of Soviet control. Efforts of the Czech Communist Party
at socioeconomic revisionism portended a less direct, but
prospectively more serious threat to Soviet national secur-
ity. The Prague Spring was seen as the first symptom of an
unobtrusive cancer, slowly and passively undermining the
Marxist brotherhood within East Europe by testing the limits
of the "many roads to socialism" doctrine.
Warning signs within the region surfaced a year
before the Prague Spring at a meeting of European Communist
Parties at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in April 1967.
General Secretary Brezhnev apparently intended to use this
forum to build a regional consensus supporting action against
internal threats to the Warsaw alliance. According to one
Polish source, the Soviet ovation met with "unrestrained
opposition" from several allies. During the October cele-
brations later that year, the Kremlin made preparations to
reinstate Soviet preeminence by scheduling an 18-Party
meeting to be held in Budapest in three months— the first
such gathering in eight years.
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The immediate chain of events leading to the
invasion began in January 1968 with the ousting of Soviet
puppet Antonin Novotny from the post of General Secretary
of the Czech Communist Party, and the rise to power of
Alexander Dubcek. As Dr. Valenta [Ref. 73: p. 168] points
out, this development appeared at first to be only a clash
of personalities; the revisionist implications of the change
would not become apparent until the early spring. But in
effect, the first preparation for a Soviet invasion option
(in particular, the establishment of an extensive logistics
cadre outside Czechoslovakia) was visible as early as mid-
February.
Moscow now faced a threat strikingly different
from that seen in Nagy's Hungary. With the coalescing of
a strong Dubcek base of support, proposals were heard to
establish a parliamentary government "free of party control",
to eliminate censorship, and to de-Stalinize the Prague regime
Novotny later was bumped from national power with the ascent
of Ludvik Svoboda to the office of President, and soon Dubcek
factions gained control of the Czech Central Committee.
As yet, Dubcek 's Czechoslovakia offered no overt
challenge to Soviet hegemony. Prague never seriously ques-
tioned the Czech position in the Warsaw Pact or COMECON.
Communism and the Communist Party would remain national insti-
tutions, though in the hands of revisionist elements, and no
shift in Czechoslovakia's foreign policy orientation was
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envisioned. As a firsthand witness to the episode later
recounted, Dubcek ' s regime was by no means against the
Soviets or communism, but was for progress. Our efforts
were for the benefit of the party and the alliance.
Soviet concern over events was made manifest in
menacing Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Czechoslovakia in June and
July. Units involved in this exercise were afterwards in-
structed to remain in-country until 20 September [Ref. 74:
p. 174]. Additionally, a meeting of Soviet and Czech leaders
was held at Cienna-on-Tisa; all but two of the Soviet polit-
buro attended, evidencing the gravity with which Moscow
viewed the situation. The conference ended with a verbal
agreement between the parties to move bilaterally to diffuse
the escalating crisis.
Ostensibly the Dubcek regime reached accord with
the rest of the regional community at the Bratislava meeting
of the Warsaw Pact (minus Rumania) on 3 August. The product
of the conference—the vaguely worded "Bratislava Declara-
tion"--called for the withdrawal of WTO forces staged across
the Czech border (although units within the country were not
addressed) . The agreement was hailed publically as a deci-
sive political victory for Dubcek, which inevitably prodded
Moscow toward a less appeasing, more definitive solution to
the crisis.
In the early morning hours of 21 August, 17 days
after the promulgation of the Bratislava Declaration, the
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forces of five Warsaw Pact nations moved to end the Prague
Spring violently. The action was tactically similar to the
1956 Hungarian operation, utilizing in-country assets to
prevent organized resistance, and using deception and deceit
(as apparent in the flagrant violation of the Bratislava
convention) to achieve complete surprise. Once again the
use of overwhelming force minimized the possibility of the
move becoming a protracted conflict. The participation of
East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops (most
of which played an indecisive role in the operation) was
unquestionably a politically astute and expedient move to
convey the image of a "united front" against the excesses
of Prague.
Valenta concludes that although an invasion con-
tingency evidently was prepared by mid-summer, the actual
decision probably preceded the action by a matter of weeks.
Soviet decisionmakers were divided on the issue according
to their respective bureaucratic interests; members of the
pro-invasion faction generally were responsible for internal
Soviet affairs, and those against the invasion inevitably
would have to deal with the policy's international
ramifications.
Apart from the ideological challenges implicated
in the Prague Spring, those supporting invasion cited an
alarming rise in nationalism in Czechoslovakia, spreading
to neighboring areas. This proved a particular concern to
party apparachiks in the Ukraine, a region culturally similar
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to Czechoslovakia, and historically susceptible to such move-
ments. Additionally, Czechoslovakia's neighbors expressed
anxiety over the issue; both the GDR's Ulbrecht and Poland's
Gomulka allegedly petitioned for direct intervention. Spill-
over had been evidenced in worker dissent in several East
German cities, and in student demonstrations in Warsaw.
Particularly, in Gomulka 's case, there also was a measure
of personal jealousy for Dubcek's broad popular support.
Of Czechoslovakia's neighbors, only Hungary's
Kadar was probably against the decision, seeing the Czech
reforms as unquestionably making his own move toward revi-
sionism harder. By all evidence, Kadar remained silent
during the debate, and agreed to token support of the opera-
tion to avoid Moscow's disfavor. Kadar was engaged in
bilateral negotiations with Dubcek to find a political solu-
tion at the time the final preparations for the invasion
were put into motion.
The decision to invade also was supported by the
Soviet KGB. During the late spring, the Dubcek regime began
expelling Soviet intelligence personnel from the country.
This affront to the institution, supplemented by the practi-
cal problems of collecting intelligence with limited resources
no doubt galvanized the KGB position. Soviet intelligence
later aided the pro-invasion movement by finding American
arms caches hidden along the Federal Republic of Germany's
(FRG) border. It escaped notice that the weapons were wrapped
in Soviet-made bags [Ref . 75] .
102
The Soviet military was divided on the issue,
with perhaps a general consensus tending toward invasion.
As possibly evidenced by the resignation of the Soviet Chief
of Staff for Soviet Decisionmaking of the WTO, General M. I.
Karakhov, a faction within the army saw the invasion of a
traditionally loyal Soviet ally as detrimental to alliance
cohesiveness. However, the strategic importance of the nation
as a buffer for Soviet border security, made relevant to the
crisis by Prague's new reluctance to station Soviet troops
in-country, outweighed such reasoning. No doubt this opinion
compelled Soviet General A. A. Yepishev [Ref. 76: p. 170] to
announce early in the crisis a willingness to lend military
assistance to Prague "to safeguard socialism".
The Soviet foreign service predicted high costs
for the invasion within its sphere of responsibility. Having
no Suez Crisis to detract Western attention and dilute world
reaction, outrage over the invasion could be expected to be
unprecedented. In particular jeopardy was the pending Soviet/
American agreement on strategic delivery systems. Alexi
Kosygin , a noninterventionist , attempted to limit the poli-
tical damage by agreeing to a summit meeting and an October
start for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) the day before
the operation was put into motion.
Additionally, the election of Richard Nixon, a
leader then seen as ardently anti-Soviet and an advocate of
"superiority", undoubtedly would be aided by the move.
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Possibly a push toward closer U.S./PRC relations would also
result? Finally, the reaction among Soviet clients could
be expected to have negative facets again, which could be
accorded a forum at the upcoming World Communist Conference
in November.
A deadline for the decision was established for
9 September, coinciding with the convening of the 14th Extra-
ordinary Party Congress in Czechoslovakia. (Not coinciden-
tally, WTO troops within Czechoslovakia were scheduled to
end their deployment on the last day of this conference.)
It was predicted that during these proceedings the purging
of pro-Soviet elements in the Prague regime would be completed,
and the reformist movement would legitimize its hold on the
government. Legal justification for an invasion would pose
a major problem thereafter.
A pro-invasion consensus in the Kremlin was reached
probably in early August, impelled by three factors. First,
as a result of the closure of information avenues between
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, the KGB and the Czechs 1
pro-interventionist neighbors monopolized the Kremlin's intel-
ligence flow. An especially dark picture of developments in
Prague consequently was provided. Inflated reports of
nationalism within the Ukraine also surfaced, and Warsaw and
East Berlin resounded their tribulations from reformist spillover
Secondly, the Soviet military brass was united in
its opinion that a military solution could be accomplished
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quickly and effectively, with no opposition from the Czech
Army. The Czech military had earned a reputation as some-
thing less than a formidable force; one Soviet commander ven-
tured that the speed of advance will depend only on the top
speed of our tanks. Lending credence to this was the removal
of General V. Prchlik, a popular Czech leader who had supported
resistance to a Soviet invasion. Dubcek had requested his
dismissal, in part to appease anti-reformists within his
government. Additionally, the product of fact-finding missions
by Yepishev and Pavlovskii (the latter of whom would lead the
invasion force), both avowed pro-interventionists, buttressed
the notion that a massive invasion could be completed with
minimal direct cost.
Thirdly, a major Soviet consideration once again
was America's interests in the region. And, once again,
Washington helped Moscow solve its dilemma. In July 1968,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk inferred that American interest
in SALT transcended the evolving crisis. (It should be noted
that the invasion would cause a one-year delay in the talks.)
Also that month, U.S. Forces in West Germany were instructed
to avoid activities near the Czech border, which could be
construed as supporting events in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets
additionally noted that the U.S. held a degree of animosity
toward Prague; Czechoslovakia was third only to the Soviet
Union and the PRC in arms deliveries to North Vietnam.
Soviet caution over the American reaction would
play a part in policy planning. On the day before the
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invasion, Washington received a cryptic note stating: "We
proceed from the fact that the current events should not
harm Soviet/American relations, to the development of which
the Soviet Government, as before, attaches great importance"
[Ref. 77: p. 86]. Moreover, the Soviet invasion forces made
obvious efforts to stay away from the FRG border, thus mini-
mizing the chance of direct confrontation.
Reportedly, the institutionalized procedure of
Soviet consensus-building had run its course by 18 August.
General Secretary Brezhnev, the kingpin of the process, had
adroitly detached himself from the debate until the consensus
waxed toward intervention. Then he cast his lot on the win-
ning side. Brezhnev probably was a degree disappinted in
Dubcek— a figure Moscow earlier had expressed "the utmost
confidence" in.
The Soviet interpretation of events published
during the invasion claimed that anti-revisionst forces , with
the full support of the Czech people, had overthrown the
Dubcek regime and requested Soviet fraternal assistance
[Ref 78: p. 82], In an episode which would be repeated in
Afghanistan, the Soviet military performed its task flawlessly
while efforts to prepare political justification were bungled.
Unlike Afghanistan, Moscow was fixed to its account when
Dubcek and Svoboda publically stated that Prague, in fact,
never requested assistance.
An attempt at ex post facto justification came
five days after the invasion in an official statement in
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Pravda. Christened the Brezhnev Doctrine, Moscow here claimed
a right to intervene within the Socialist world to save social-
ism. Although the doctrine of "many roads to socialism" was
reaffirmed, the Kremlin identified a responsibility:
. . . for the fundamental interests of other Socialist
countries, and of the entire working class movement
which is striving for socialism. This means that
each Communist Party is responsible, not only to
its own people,
, but also to all the Socialist
countries, and to the entire Communist movement.
[Ref. 79: pp. 82-88]
Herein, Moscow relegated itself to the position of sole judge,
jury, and enforcer in the Communist community.
In the years since the Czech invasion, Moscow has
endeavored to use existing regional Communist forums , such as
COMECON and the WTO, to keep members within the Soviet fold.
The Soviets have skillfully utilized consensus-building tactics
in creating peer pressure against maverick policies. Soviet
control of such evolutions is ensured by the increasing depen-
dence of Eastern Europe on Soviet supply of raw materials, and
by the adept use of traditional prejudices in the region.
Additionally, the development of a WTO "army of intervention"
under Moscow's direction, and the presence of 30 Soviet divi-
sions in Eastern Europe have guaranteed Soviet interests there.
Ironically, ideology— the perennial justification for such
intervention--remains the weakest bond in the Eastern alliance.
An excellent analysis of traditional prejudices in East
Europe, and its effect on inter-bloc politics is given in Dale
R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes , "Political Reliability in the
Eastern European Warsaw Pact Armies," Armed Forces and Society ,
May 1980.
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Many Soviet policy "constants" are seen in the
Czech invasion. The decision was based on the fear that the
Soviet security system would be undermined, in this instance
by the ideological corruption and nationalistic tendencies.
Alternatives that were acceptable to Moscow had been exhausted;
moreover, the value of another "show" move was not overlooked.
The operation was dramatic in character, yet was carefully
estimated, analyzed, and prepared. Local, regional, and inter-
national considerations were factored into the policy. The
use of surprise, deception, and overwhelming numbers afforded
an expeditious end to the operation.
The true significance of the episode lies perhaps
in its applicability to such dictums of Soviet policy. It
also presents another dimension to the attributes of Soviet
periphery politics, implying that ideological, in addition
to political, excesses warrant drastic measures. In its
essence, the Czech invasion stands as yet another example of
the limits of Soviet tolerance when national security is
perceived to be endangered, and of the inexorability of
Moscow's control over its security mechanism.
c. Poland 1980-81: The Limits of Soviet Risk-Taking
The lesson to be taken from the Polish episode of
1980-81 can as well be drawn from earlier crises in that
nation. The special case of Poland represents a high risk
and cost gamble that Moscow did not take. Its significance
is compounded by the fact that Poland of 1980 comprised
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perhaps a greater threat to the Soviet security system than
any earlier peripheral episode.
The 1980-81 Polish crisis can be seen as the con-
volusion of 1,000 years of Polish/Russian animosities, and
four decades of hard-eyed Soviet policy in the region. A
wedge between the Polish Government and people was driven in
1948 by Warsaw's open dealing with, and espoused allegiance
to, an historical enemy. Under Moscow's scrutinizing eye, the
Polish regime was neither able to take effective action against
the dissent, nor to introduce reforms to alleviate the for-
midable economic problems. The lesson of Czechoslovakia was
too clear; unilateral action in either regard ultimately would
bring Moscow's fraternal assistance to Warsaw's doorstep.
What resulted was a Polish domestic policy well short of
either solution, which (in the words of Tyrus Cobb) "lets the
Polish workers yell, but won't help them out."
The true significance of the rise of the Soli-
darity Trade Union lies in the fact that it incarnated a
nationwide movement; the Polish people had already united,
at least in spirit, against a regime they saw as a "lackey
at Moscow's beckoning". The movement historically has re-
ceived a measure of support from every sector of Polish
society—most importantly, from the church. Officially the
Catholic church has stayed neutral on the subject, however,
its identification with, and sympathy for, the plight of the
Cobb interview,
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the Polish people has helped galvanize the movement. Soli-
darity was, by proclamation, the embodiment of all grievances
and aspirations of the Poles. In its short life it provided
the vehicle for perhaps the first "people's uprising", pull-
ing intellectuals in its wake, and drawing broad support from
a large public base.
Government officials predicted that by its very
nature, Solidarity would shortly collapse in a morass of
personal bids for power and factional infighting. To Warsaw's
lament, the union was an immediate and unqualified success. In
its first two years of existance, membership grew to 10 million
(nine times as great as the government-sponsored Polish Worker's
Party) [Ref. 80: p. 37]. A May 1980 poll showed that 90 per-
cent of all Polish workers voiced support for Solidarity, while
only 32 percent expressed confidence in the PUWP [Ref. 90].
In face of massive public support for the union,
the Polish regime had little choice but to deal with Solidaritv.
In the summer of 1980, the PUWP announced its willingness to
allow Solidarity members in its ranks; Vernon Aspaturian has
suggested that this evidences a policy pursuing "control
As prescribed by the Solidarity congressional declara-
tion, the union was representative of no set philosophy
beyond the general welfare of the Polish people. It was
a union of purely complementary interests. Understandably,
it was believed that the union's charismatic leadership,
as typified in Lech Walesa, was the primary bond of these
disparate factions.
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through assimilation." A Solidarity official was later
appointed to a prestigious, though ineffectual, position
in the Worker's Party. By fall, Polish First Secretary
Stanislaw Kania adopted a new outlook in favor of open bar-
gaining with the union (in an attempt to moderate its plat-
form through negotiation), under the label of "socialist
renewal". By late 1980, union leaders found everything
coming their way. Boasted an organizer in Danzig, "we no
longer work under the government, but with the government."
Predictably, Warsaw's new soft-line attitude
appalled policymakers in Moscow. Special envoys from the
Kremlin pressed Kania for a tougher stand against a situation
the Soviets defined as a "massed and organized uprising"
[Ref. 82: p. 39]. Using the Soviet-directed Polish secret
police, Moscow meanwhile attempted to incite a confrontation
with the union. On 20 May 1981, two days after Poland was
given an excellent view of the "Soyuze '81" WTO exercise, a
worker's rally was violently dispersed. In the ensuing riot
three Solidarity members and one bystander were shot and
killed. Moscow and the new Prime Minister, General Wojciech
Jaruzelski, pushed for the imposition of martial law. Fear-
ing a de facto rebellion, Kania balked at the request.
This episode may have proved to be the last
straw for Moscow, which now viewed Kania as a weak and
Dr. Vernon Aspaturian, "Poland and Soviet Peripheral
Interests," a lecture given at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, 20 September 1984.
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ineffectual leader. Soviet support for him began to be with-
drawn, culminating in a 13 June Pravda article accusing him
of "succumbing to counterrevolutionary pressures" [Ref. 83:
pp. 108-09]
.
Following the " Zapad '81" wargames in September,
featuring the largest naval maneuvers in the Baltic since
the Second World War, Warsaw came under renewed pressure to
crack down on Solidarity. Kania is said to have received a
personal letter from the Kremlin, threatening to implement
a "Soviet solution" to the unrest. Under the fear of Soviet
invasion, Kania began half-heartedly to purge a limited
number of revisionist elements in Warsaw.
Here Solidarity exhibited a lack of perception
and political savvy that inevitably would spell its doom.
Interpreting Kania' s moves as the first step toward restor-
ation of total government control, union leaders called for
even more concessions. The same month, the Solidarity Congress
adopted a radical reform program, calling for the ejection
of the PUWP from Polish industry; the union demanded that
the "worker's party" be taken out of the work. This "Septem-
ber declaration" , submitting an unmistakable challenge to
the regime's authority, sealed the fate of the Union and
the Polish experiment in socialist renewal.
Moscow immediately began preparations to replace
Kania. On 30 September, the poignantly named "Committee of
National Salvation" was formed under General Jaruzelski's
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leadership. Systematically the committee began to usurp
the responsibilities of the Kania government. On 18 October,
the coup was complete, with Jaruzelski's "election" as First
Secretary of the Polish Worker's Party.
For nearly two months, all union efforts to bribe,
beckon, and blackmail the Jaruzelski regime to the bargaining
table were stonewalled. Finally the crisis came to a head on
13 December when, after 16 months of steadily building ten-
sions in the region, martial law was instituted. Within a
week the military government purged the Solidarity leader-
ship, the reform element within the Communist Party itself,
and other "liberalizing elements" at large in Polish society.
The policy of renewal was officially at an end.
Evidence indicated that the action was not a
response to any immediate provocation by Solidarity. As
shown in the degree of coordination and efficiency exhibited
in implementing the policy, the decision surely was made
months earlier—possibly during Jaruzelski's meeting with
Soviet officials just prior to his "election" . Planning the
action for December, the coldest month of the year, purport-
edly would minimize public backlash.
Furthermore, the policy clearly was the product
of thorough analysis and planning. In the belief that the
disparate factions in Solidarity were held together by the
union's charismatic leadership, a strategy of "political
decapitation" was used. Being very careful to avoid creat-
ing martyrs the government arrested and isolated Walesa and
113
his lieutenants while the power structure of Solidarity could
be dismantled. Similarly, reform elements within the regime
were quickly and quietly removed. All activities were accom-
plished by the highly respected Polish military, adding legit-
imacy to the policy. Although it is known that Soviet
"advisors" were prevalent in Warsaw at the time of the crack-
down, the appearance of the operation as a totally "internal"
affair was carefully cultivated by Warsaw and Moscow.
In terms of immediate objectives, the policy
was unquestionably a success. Nevertheless, the enormity
of the task, the complete subjugation of a national movement,
and the restoration of authoritarian rule could scarcely be
accomplished in a week-long operation. The upper echelons
of Solidarity still free went underground to form the "All
Polish Resistance Committee". Throughout the winter, leaflet-
passing was common in every major city, and in the spring,
Radio Solidarity came into existence, instigating anti-
government rallies and strikes. Still, the 13 December action
proved to be fairly effective in undercutting the movement's
ability to organize, and in general, to influence the policies
of the regime.
It can be argued convincingly that the situation
in Poland in 1980-81 presented a far greater danger to Soviet
security interests than any episode since the conclusion of
World War II. First, the economic crisis in Poland was far
greater (with the exception of the situation in Afghanistan,
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which was hardly consequential to the conduct of the Commu-
nist market)
. The Polish workers' revolt threatened to
exacerbate an economic morass that already had dragged the
entire CMEA membership into recession.
The Polish crisis also comprised the largest organ-
ized uprising experienced by a Soviet ally. The 10 million-
member independent workers union not only boldly defied the
political authority of a Soviet-installed Marxist regime, but
also presented a challenge to the ideological precepts of
Soviet communism. In stark contrast to the Hungarian and
Czechoslovakian episodes, where change was inspired by a high
stratum of the intellectual elite, the Polish crisis repre-
sented a true "revolution from below". In Poland, the Soviets
faced Opposition from nationally-organized workers, consis-
tently able to mobilize massive forces in protest of govern-
ment policies. One union leader even ventured that Moscow
should find more in common with the movement (ideologically
speaking) than in contrast with it.
More than even Hungary or Czechoslovakia, the
Polish crisis threatened to spread throughout Moscow's western
dominions. In 1980, Solidarity attempted to organize indepen-
dent trade unions in Czechoslovakia, with limited success,
and in Hungary, where such reforms were viewed "with mi,(d
In addition to a multitude of other problems, the Polish
crisis required that Moscow channel funds slated for the rest
of the Eastern bloc into the Polish economy. In 1980, Poland




interest" [Ref. 84: p. 39]. Additionally, the Polish exper-
ience may have buttressed the defiant polities of Rumania's
Ceausescu, and unquestionably triggered a harsh crackdown on
workers in the GDR. The greatest reaction may have occurred
in the U.S.S.R. itself. In the late 1970's, internal security
forces violently suppressed attempts to form independent trade
unions in the Ukraine [Ref. 85: p. 40].
Moscow's apprehension over developments in Poland
was shared by Soviet allies in the region. Purportedly, East
Berlin and Prague initiated requests for direct intervention
in the crisis, fearing inevitable spillover. Mirroring the
Czech episode, Soviet ideologues and bureaucrats concerned
with internal affairs no doubt supported this position. Appar-
ently Soviet economic planners also looked favorably on the
intervention option, seeing a definitive solution to the
Polish uprising as requisite to the stabilization of the
Polish economy. That Soviet decisionmakers opted against
such a policy is attributable to a pragmatic appraisal of the
current situation in Poland and the world, and an understand-
ing of the unique character of the Polish people.
The Soviets appear to have learned during the
1956 Polish crisis the powderkeg upon which the Polish Commu-
nist regime rests. Moscow has since shown a capacity unique
among its relations in the region, to tolerate a large measure
of open dissent in Poland. As seen in the 1970 and 1976
uprisings, Moscow ostensibly has limited its involvement to
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proffering Warsaw "support and advice" in dealing with the
crises. Additionally, according to Dr. Valenta and others,
the Polish Government has been allowed an unprecedented degree
of freedom in implementing reforms. In the special case of
Poland, military intervention historically lies low on the
menu of Soviet policy options.
Despite the critical nature of the developing
situation in Poland in 1980-81, Moscow discounted the military
option for three general reasons. First, a Soviet invasion was
predicted to produce only negative results in the Polish econ-
omy. If resistance was encountered (as expected) it would be
likely that industrial facilities would be damaged. Addition-
ally, Polish workers openly warned that forced labor would be
countered with sabotage and passive resistance. Lech Walesa
allegedly commented in 1981, "the Soviets can occupy us, but
they can't make us work" [Ref. 86: p. 62] . Thus in the post-
invasion scenario, Moscow would assume responsibility for a
Polish economy on the brink of collapse, and much worse off
than if Kania's policy of appeasement had been allowed to
continue. This argument found its greatest voice, incident-
ally, among Warsaw economists.
There also was reason to believe that the Polish
military would react adversely to invasion by massive Soviet
ground forces. Invariably Moscow had faced such a possibi-
lity in every Polish crisis since the end of the war. In
1956 and 1970, the Soviets heard rumors of "prepared defenses"
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along the eastern border of Poland, in a region garrisoned
by units of the autonomous Territorial Army. Most analysts
also agree that had the Red Army crossed the border during
the 1976 crisis, it would have been opposed by major Polish
forces [Ref. 87: pp. 278-279]. In 1980 and 1981, the Soviet
military was largely against an invasion option, speculating
that a monumentous effort would be needed to overcome the
quarter of a million-man Polish Army, and meet with results
as seen in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
This is not to say that an invasion option was not
prepared, however. The establishment of a logistics framework,
perennially the first step in a military buildup, was noted
within the Soviet border in early 1980. Moreover, the Soyuze
'81 and Zapad '81 exercises conducted in and around Poland
unquestionably were used to reconnoiter the situation and to
invest the Polish defense system. It has been offered that
the completion dates of these exercises constituted deadlines
for invasion contingencies. The fact that Moscow initiated
new efforts to pressure Warsaw immediately following both
maneuvers may signify that twice the intervention option was
considered, but decided against.
Finally, the Polish episode may represent a rare
occasion where Washington took effective preemptive action
to forestall such a policy. American interests in Poland
clearly surpassed those in either Hungary or Czechoslovakia,
based largely on the constituency of seven million Polish
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Americans, and to a lesser extent, on America's $2 billion
investment in that nation. Early in the crisis, Washington's
concern in the Polish issue was made obvious. In 19 80 the
U.S. and its European allies met to discuss possible sanction
options should Moscow decide on military intervention. During
the height of the crisis, Carter spoke publically of "the
most negative consequences" of such an action, and reportedly
sent Brezhnev a personal message threatening to transfer
advanced weaponry to Red China. Following his election,
President Reagan continued to pressure Moscow, tying Soviet
restraints to arms talks and economic aid to Poland [Ref. 88:
p. 94].
From this universe of influences and inputs, it
was determined that a policy utilizing martial law was the
most appropriate and cost-effective option. The decision
not to invade does not signify a Soviet concession to external
pressures, but only indicates a shift to a longer-term solu-
tion using "indirect intervention—utilizing the Polish
military.
Although Moscow made a conscientious effort to
downplay any Soviet presence in Poland prior to and during
martial law, it is likely that the Soviets were instrumental
in its planning. Following Jaruzelski's election in October,
all overt pressures on Warsaw (such as the menacing WTO
maneuvers in the region) immediately ceased. At the same
time, Poles noted the appearance of Soviet "surveillance
teams" around the country, ostensibly left behind after the
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spring military exercises. In November there began an influx
of Soviet advisors and diplomatic staff, culminating in an
unofficial visit by Marshal Victor Kulikov just prior to the
imposition of martial law. Moreover, the 13 December crack-
down made extensive use of the Polish secret polict--an
organization created, trained, and currently directed by the-
Soviet KGB.
From the beginning, Moscow has demonstrated con-
fidence in General Jaruzelski's ability to handle the crisis
and aftermath. According to one analyst, the Soviets have
allowed the Polish leader to "garner more power to himself
than any man since Josef Stalin" [Ref. 89: p. 356] — a con-
vincing tribute from a nation perennially fearful of "Bona-
partism". It also demonstrates pragmatism at the base of
Moscow's policy in Poland; exceptional cases require excep-
tional measures.
d. Conclusions on Soviet Periphery Politics
Before speculation can be offered on Afghanistan's
role in the Soviet border security scheme it is first neces-
sary to define Soviet periphery politics, as seen in its
practical application. Looking at these three examples, an
impulse is to affix Soviet border interests to a purely
regional dimension: invariably, the demonstrated "extremes"
of Soviet policymaking (i.e., the consideration of an inva-
sion option) suggests that peripheral politics simply equates
Moscow's outlook toward Eastern Europe. This region has
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traditionally been far more central to Soviet politics and
security than any other border area. It is supportable
that, by virtue of its geopolitical setting alone, the area
is perceived to warrant a unique approach in Soviet decision-
making.
Yet a closer analysis reveals similarities that
can as well be applied to Soviet policymaking elsewhere on
the Soviet periphery. Specifically, the Hungarian, Czecho-
slovakian, and Polish crises all represent scenarios where
the Soviet security mechanism was perceived to be in jeopardy.
Far from "spreading communism at the point of bayonets",
these actions were essentially defensive in nature, intent
on salvaging Moscow's security holdings.
The fact that such "defensive" policies have been
reserved for Marxist regimes is relevant in two respects. As
addressed earlier, the maintenance of a supplicant Marxist
clientele has served as a means to pursue security interests,
by guaranteeing a measure of direct "control-ability" and
influence in the internal affairs of these nations. As
seen in the Angolan and Ethiopian episodes, this operational
code need not be limited to peripheral scenarios. Secondly,
restricting the intervention option to scenarios within the
recognized Soviet sphere of influence, as delineated by
ideological alignment, ensures that American interests
there are few. The recent Polish crisis (a notable exception
to this rule) not coincidentally represents a case where the
intervention option was decided against.
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Thus Soviet periphery politics may well apply
outside of Eastern Europe, however policy restrictions have
forbade the active pursuit of such interests. More suc-
cinctly, Moscow places great importance on continued stabi-
lity along its borders, but refrains from forcefully ensuring
this unless an ideo-political justification is clearly present.
A graphic example of a case where Soviet vital
interests were implicated, yet the intervention option appar-
ently was not seriously considered is seen in revolutionary
Iran. Soviet anxiety over the spread of Islamic fundamenta-
lism into the U.S.S.R. (population-wise the fourth largest
Muslem state in the world) led to the deployment of major
Soviet forces near Azerbaijan and west of the Amu Darya.
U.S. intelligence sources, nevertheless, claim that the size
and structure of this force did not imply an army of inter-
vention. For example, the construction of a logistics frame-
work suitable for supporting an invasion, which was seen
early in the Hungarian, Czechoslovakian , and Polish crises,
never materialized. It has been offered that this deployment
was intended as an "iron buffer", to prevent the export of
the Iranian revolution to the Soviets 1 Islamic southern
provinces
.
This philosophy finds ready application in the
dictums of the Russian political culture. As Dr. Robert
Bathurst expounds, Soviet strategy seeks "not a force-on-force
confrontation, but pursues national interests by means of
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deceit and manipulation. Only when all facets of a situation
are in total control, and success is certain, will the Soviets
unleash the full potential of their policy apparatus."
The principles governing Soviet peripheral poli-
tics will now be elucidated, by identifying decisionmaking
patterns evidenced in these three examples. Analysis will
be conducted in four general areas: the nature of the threat,
Soviet operational code in decisionmaking, implementation, and
justification.
(1) The Nature of the Threat . Reviewing these
cases, initially there appear to be more disparities in the
nature of the crises than similarities. Hungary of 1956 posed
a direct political challenge to Moscow, with obvious ideological
implications. The Nagy regime sought to cast off ideological
and political ties with the Soviets; Soviet concessions would
only encourage similar shows of disloyalty in the region. In
the 1968 Czech crisis, Moscow saw the rise of nationalism and
the decay of Communist fundamentalism (or rather, Moscow's
interpretation of it) in a regime espousing continued allegiance
The continuing Polish episode involved a Moscow-loyal govern-
ment dealing with the political and ideological challenge of
a jacquerie .
The lowest common denominator in each of these
cases is a perceived danger to the Soviet security system,
Robert Bathurst, "Operational Code of the Politburo,"
a lecture given at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, 12 November 1983.
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through either a blatant challenge to Soviet authority or
ideological corruption. In each episode there was the fear
that the cohesiveness of the WTO would fail ultimately,
primarily as a result of the spread of nationalism. This
presents an even greater threat to Soviet internal affairs,
as demonstrated by dissent within the Ukraine in 196 8 and the
late 1970's.
In short, the grounds for a policy of interven-
tion appear to be based on a direct or implied threat to Soviet
national security. As mentioned earlier, Moscow equates its
own vital security interests with stability and controllability
of its periphery. This interest, however, is tempered with
practical caution, which stipulates that decisive and overt
action must be confined to the accepted Soviet sphere of
influence
.
(2) Soviet Operational Code in Decisionmaking .
Identifiable in each episode are the timeless precepts govern-
ing Soviet political conduct. It is apparent that Moscow
approached each problem with an eye toward cost minimization.
Central to this is the consideration given the predicted U.S.
and world response to a radical Soviet policy. In the Hungar-
ian case, the Suez Canal crisis provided a diversion and a
means by which united Western opposition could be prevented.
The case for intervention undoubtedly was helped when Secretary
of State Dulles made clear that America would not intervene
in the "recognized" Soviet sphere of influence. Similar
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assurances were provided by Washington during the Czech crisis.
U.S. interests here were visibly less: Washington withheld its
support of the Prague Spring largely because "Czech arms are
today killing Americans in Southeast Asia" [Ref . 90] . In con-
trast, the U.S. has consistently declared its interest in, and
concern for, events in Poland, and Washington has succeeded in
maintaining world focus on the region. Dr. Valenta [Ref. 91]
identifies a veiled "American victory" in the Polish episode,
attributing continuing Soviet restraint to such American efforts
Attributes of risk avoidance and caution also
are visible. Despite the dramatic nature of Soviet interven-
tion solutions, the decision to invade was addressed with the
utmost care, taking into account a spectrum of inputs and
implications. In the Hungarian and Czech episodes, it can be
argued that direct intervention was a final alternative after
political solutions had been exhausted. Accordingly, Poland
represents a scenario where the costs and risks were perceived
to be high; the Soviet objective of regaining stability was
achieved by less decisive, more long-term means. An image
of caution in Soviet policymaking is supported by the fact
that the invasion decision routinely has been delayed until
the last possible moment, allegedly preceding the invasion by
three weeks in Hungary's case, and three days in the case of
Czechoslovakia.
(3) Implementation . Consistent with attributes
of caution and attentiveness in Soviet policymaking, the
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Hungarian and Czech invasions were bold, but extremely safe
operations. The Soviets were thoroughly familiar with both
nations' geography (Moscow has offered the use of Soviet
surveying teams to almost every Soviet ally) , and both national
armies. Abundant in-country personnel provided near real-time
intelligence, and also carried out covert missions in prepara-
tion for the invasion. Deceit also was a favored tool; both
invasion episodes witnessed the flagrant violation of recently
signed military accords to achieve surprise and prevent organ-
ized resistance.
The invasion operation itself left nothing to
chance. Soviet and allied forces were used in numbers that
guaranteed an expeditious victory. In 1956, the Red Army out-
numbered operational Hungarian forces eight to one; in Czecho-
slovakia, the WTO advantage exceeded nine to one. The size
and speed of operations were not only intended as a "show move"
but also to ensure that the initiative remained short-term.
Conforming to operational principles prescribing cost and risk
minimization, a quick and successful invasion stymied Western
backlash, and lessened the chance of intervention by a third
party.
(4) Justification . The so-called Brezhnev Doc-
trine has been portrayed as a carte blanche for Soviet inter-
vention within the Socialist world. Promulgated as an ex
post facto justification for the Czech invasion, this pro-
clamation only resounded the demonstrated Soviet philosophy
on intervention.
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Moscow provided ideological justification
for both the Hungarian and Czech invasions, identifying a
self-appointed responsibility to safeguard socialism. The
Soviets have, nevertheless, attempted to find legal and
rational justifications, with dubious success. A prime exam-
ple is the Soviet claim that intervention into Czechoslovakia
resulted from urgent requests from within Prague. Hyper-
typically, Moscow deftly maintained this interpretation even
in the face of obvious evidence to the contrary.
In general, these three episodes evidence
Moscow's continued willingness to use unmitigated force in
pursuit of national interests. Invariably, Soviet policy-
making is restrained only by Moscow's calculation of what it
can accomplish with low costs and risks.
e. Applicability of the Afghanistan Case
The conclusion that Soviet periphery politics is
motivated essentially by statist security concerns brings to
question the applicability of the Afghanistan case. The Soviets
themselves have made obvious attempts to establish such a link-
age. In 1983, Georgi Arbatov offered Moscow's interest in
border stability as the preeminent reason for intervention:
"Our border with Afghanistan is 2,500 kilometers long. It
was a very friendly and quiet border for several decades"
[Ref. 92: p. 193]. Yet if this was truly the Soviet motiva-
tion, it represents an unprecedented shift in Moscow's outlook
toward the region. In the last century, Afghanistan has
experienced more years of war and revolution than peace.
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Moscow showed little concern when the pro-Soviet Daud was
forced to resign in 1963 amid public unrest. During the
turbulent latter half of the 1960 's, the Soviets exhibited
no alarm over the political upheavals in Kabul. Inevitably,
Moscow's concern for stability on its southern border first
appeared soon after the country had found its way "to a
glorious Socialist future".
It can be offered that prior to the Glorious April
Revolution, Moscow had no effective means to pursue stability
in the region. The founding of the DRA provided the Soviets
with yet another mechanism of control, analogous to Moscow's
relationships within Eastern Europe. This view holds that
Soviet vital interests always have been attached to Afghan-
istan, however, Moscow's cautious and incremental approach
to such objectives forbade a bold move to subjugate a non-
Communist regime. As will be addressed in the following pages,
this interpretation tends to fit more evenly into the frame-
work of modern Soviet political thought.
Analogies also can be made with other general
attributes of Soviet periphery politics. First, the nature
of the perceived threat in Afghanistan was similar to the
basic motivation for intervention policies in Europe. Here
the danger to Soviet security appeared to be the spillover
of Islamic fundamentalism across the Soviet border. The
Kremlin evidently perceived that the popular uprising in
Afghanistan following the April 1978 coud was propelled by
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events in neighboring Iran. Whereas Moscow was hamstrung in
taking action against the Iranian rebellion, the Marxist
regime in Afghanistan afforded a means and justification for
intervention.
Soviet policymaking patterns evident in Eastern
Europe are also visible in the formulation of the "Afghan-
istan solution". Moscow, in fact, had exhausted less drastic
answers to the conflict in Afghanistan, including the export
of advanced weaponry, and tripling the size of Soviet advisory
staff in-country. Yet the DRA Army continued to disintegrate,
and the Soviets found themselves playing an increasingly more
central role in the war. As shown in the background and resume
of events, a political solution also was pursued. On numerous
occasions, Moscow attempted to modify the hard-line policies
of Amin. With the benefit of hindsight, the intervention
option appeared to be the logical, and only decisive remedy
to the situation.
There were reasons for Moscow to speculate that
Washington had neither the inclination nor the capacity to
contest a Soviet intervention policy. Since 1960, America
had shown little interest in Afghanistan. Following the
Glorious April Revolution, U.S. presence there was insigni-
ficant. Moreover, America's track record in substantively
opposing recent Soviet moves in Angola and Ethiopia was
dismal. Finally, the Carter Administration had failed to
show genuine concern over the danger signals pointing to
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a Soviet invasion. Until mid-December, Washington limited
overtures to discreet personal notes to the Kremlin, while
attempting to rally Soviet support in the ongoing Iranian
crisis. These inputs tend to add credibility to Moscow's
professed confusion and outrage over Washington's harsh
reaction to the invasion.
The Afghanistan invasion operation itself is
amazingly similar to intervention plans used in Europe. The
details of the operation allegedly were taken from an invasion
contingency prepared in 1941. However, the strategy and tac-
tics used mirrored closely the Czech operation. The utiliza-
tion of in-country personnel for sabotage operations, and
overwhelming force finds ready application. The operation
was, in fact, another show move. Evidence exists that the
invasion and occupation was planned to take no longer than
six months; the move reportedly was intended to "shock the
rebels into submission. .. by virtue of the sheer magnitude of
the operation." It is relevant to note that General Pavlov-
skii
,
planner of the Czech intervention, had a major input
in preparations for the Afghanistan action.
The use of deception in the Afghanistan operation
also is comparable to efforts made prior to actions in Eastern
Europe. As illustrated earlier, Moscow maintained cordial
relations with the Amin government until the day of the inva-
sion. In dark irony, Soviet-staged celebrations commemorating
"the fraternal ties with the DRA" were used to begin the coup.
Matlock interview
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Soviet justification for the act paralleled the
interpretation initially attempted in Czechoslovakia. This
time, however, Moscow entrusted the "internal coup" only to
an elite Soviet death squad. The overthrow of a legitimate
Marxist government by the Soviets occasionally is identified
as a foreboding precedent, heralding an era in which Moscow
will endeavor to make political opportunities. Nevertheless,
it must be remembered that the action probably was a last-
minute amendment to the intervention plans. The mission of
Lieutenant General Paputin conceivably sought to obtain Amin's
invitation to invade. Amin's refusal necessitated his removal,
and an account crediting "revolutionary forces" with the coup
and assistance request was constructed. The initial confusion
within the Soviet media concerning these events supports the
notion that the overthrow was a late addition to the operation.
In view of the failure of local forces in carrying out a coup
in Prague, it is understandable that the Kremlin should assign
its own assets to such a mission.
Herein lies the true significance of the Afghan-
istan invasion in the contest of periphery politics. The
scenario presented a rare opportunity in which the Soviets
could control all facets of the event. Evidenced in the Afghan-
istan episode is not a shift in Soviet policy outlook, but a
glimpse of what Moscow can, and will, do in pursuit of secur-
ity interests— if the chance presents itself.
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The following discussion will review the attributes of
historical Soviet policy in the Third World, and in the
U.S.S.R.'s periphery. Conclusions will be reached as to
the applicability of the Afghanistan case to each of these
areas of Soviet decisionmaking. The product of this analysis
will speculate on the significance and implications of Moscow's
decision to implement its Afghanistan solution.
C. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS/PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
1. Comparative Patterns in Soviet Decisionmaking
A necessary first step in appraising Afghanistan's
role in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, the attributes
of Moscow's Third World and periphery policies will be com-
pared. First addressed will be the universe of similarities
between these approaches. Apparent in both studies is a con-
tinuity in Soviet behavior evidencing, perhaps, a fundamental
operational code governing the Kremlin's policymaking.
Invariably these general inclinations and prejudices reflect
not only the ideological modus operandi bequeathed by Lenin
,
but find roots in the timeless tenets of the Russian poli-
tical culture.
The Soviet decisionmaking process has in practice
adhered to the three interrelated "c's" of Moscow's political
philosophy: caution, calculation, and control. Despite an
An excellent study of the Russian political culture is




apparent Soviet willingness to implement bold intervention
policies worldwide, policy formulation has exhibited care
and a cold reckoning that has minimized the inherent risks
and costs in such initiatives.
As seen in the conduct of both Soviet periphery and
Third World policy, Moscow has tempered its pursuit of national
interests abroad with requisites of caution. This is no more
apparent than in the careful consideration given to American
interests implicated in a given crisis situation. Moscow
has identified Washington as the challenger and nemesis of
Soviet ambitions , and has gone to great lengths to ensure
that America's will and ability to contest Soviet moves are
minimized.
U.S. reaction historically has been the critical
input to intervention decisions. As seen in the Hungarian,
Czechoslovakian, Angolan, and Ethiopian episodes, Washington's
public assurances of American restraint have coincided closely
with the initiation of Soviet intervention policies. The
Polish crisis of 1980-81, a single case where the U.S. articu-
lated its interests and concern over developments, and where
warnings were issued early in the episode, not coincidentally
saw the implementation of a Soviet policy short of a "defini-
tive" solution.
It can be argued that Washington first officially comment-
ed on the Angolan crisis three weeks after the Cuban airlift
had commenced. However, at that time Cuban force size numbered
no more than two battalions; the body of the invasion did not
arrive until after the U.S. announcement. In Ethiopia the
major airlift/sealif t effort waited until after U.S. assurances,
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An obvious lesson here cites a necessity to assert
actively American interests in all global crises, even when
a high risk of direct Soviet/American confrontation is present
The Angolan and Ethiopian episodes show that Moscow is adept
at playing on American fears of a superpower conflict. As
in the Angolan crisis, where the Soviets expressed concern
over a Soviet/American "crisis where U.S. interests are not
involved" [Ref. 93] , a U.S. commitment not to intervene has
often been obtained.
Soviet foreign policy accordingly has been the product
of careful calculation, taking into account local, regional,
and international factors to minimize the costs and risks of
a Soviet solution. A most relevant testimony to this is the
general success of Soviet intervention policies, especially
in isolating foreign interests from the crises. The only
shortfalls have come from miscalculating local factors, where
a patented "Hungarian solution" has satisfied the immediate
objective of buttressing the local client regime, but has
failed to achieve the long-term goal of stability. In oar-
ticular, this points out Moscow's inability to deal with
popular-based insurgency movements in client states. Ready
examples are seen in the continuing conflicts in Angola,
Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.
Another facet of Soviet policymaking pervading caution
is the requirement that an intervention policy be consumately
controllable. This orescribes first the isolation of outside
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influences from the local crisis. When possible, this is
accomplished by exploiting events outside the immediate area
of concern, such as Moscow's use of the Suez crisis in the
Hungarian episode, and the Iranian crisis in the Afghanistan
case. The intervention operation itself also is planned to
ensure that the Soviet initiative is not relinquished by
utilizing massive forces in a surprise blitzkrieg- type oper-
ation. A short-term action consequently minimizes the possi-
bility of third-party intervention, and of the conflict
escalating out of Moscow's total control.
The fundamental objectives of Soviet interventions
in the Third World and periphery also have been similar.
In all cases, the operation can be portrayed as essentially
a defensive action, attempting to salvage Soviet holdings
and interests in the area. Soviet long-term objectives
notwithstanding, these policies do not imply an obtrusive
expansion of Soviet interests worldwide. As seen in the
rise of the MPLA in Angola, the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia,
and the evolution of communism in repatriated Eastern Europe,
Moscow has used the establishment of a client status as
justification for intervention. This has been facilitated
by the ideological alignment of the client state, which
Moscow has interpreted as sufficient grounds to warrant the
gamut of Soviet policy options. It can be argued that the
decision to implement a military solution historically has
been a last resort, when the use of direct force appeared
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to be the only way to save a client regime and protect Soviet
interests there.
Finally, in evidence is a strategic and tactical model
for Soviet intervention policies. In every invasion scenario,
Soviets, or Soviet proxies, have repeated a process of early
logistics buildup, then the introduction of elite mission-
oriented units, followed by massive invasion by heavily armed
forces. Invariably, each operation in the Third World and
the periphery appear derivatives of a basic strategy, tailored
to the unique local and international situation. The reliance
on a basic plan of action is commonly attributed to the
limited spectrum of Soviet power projection assets; Moscow
lacks the ability to respond to a danger short of full-scale
military commitment. However, also apparent is the often-
written inflexibility of Soviet military doctrine, counting
on a tried-and-true means of forceful intervention. As seen
2today in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, this has not
always proven to be the definitive answer.
It also can be submitted that Moscow places great value
on a massive show-of-force that small-scale surgical opera-
tions will not provide, but it is evident that in every Soviet
military initiative to date, the Red Army was geared for an
European-style conflict, reminiscent of the Great Patriotic
War.
2 Since the summer of 1980, the Soviets have made several
admirable attempts at small-scale, combined forces counter-
insurgency operations. However, according to a U.S. military
intelligence source, the dubious success of such operations
(apparently due to lack, of experience) has prompted a shift
back to more armor-intensive tactics.
136
The significance of the Afghanistan episode rests
in the difference between the Soviet approaches to the Third
World and the periphery. This inevitably settles into a
question of national priorities. Although the Soviets have
demonstrated a common strategy in their intervention policies,
the willingness to use this solution ultimately has been a
function of the proximity of each case to Soviet vital
interests. The debate over whether Afghanistan is looked
upon as a Third World, or a peripheral interest, now becomes
expedient. The identification of "vital" Soviet concerns in
the Afghanistan episode (a connection the Soviets have long
endeavored to make) would imply less of a precedent in the
invasion, and less of an immediate threat to the West.
As discussed earlier, Helmut Sonnenfeldt [Ref. 94:
pp. 1-2] concludes that Soviet border security is a primal,
constant national interest, while Moscow's pursuit of interests
in the Third World largely have been subordinated. Invariably,
Moscow has only to fear costs of international prestige and
credibility as a result of the loss of a Third World client
(although this is demonstrably a weighty Soviet concern) . In
Eastern Europe, Moscow additionally faces a formidable chal-
lenge to its internal security and its external security
system.
The limited number of intervention cases provides
little proof of such prioritizing in Soviet policymaking.
However, offered as an indication is Moscow's common use
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of policy "tests" prior to the implementation of a military
solution. Nearly every Soviet initiative in the Third World
has been preceded by this tactic. As evidenced in Egypt in
1970, Angola in 1977, and Ethiopia in 1978, this usually
takes the form of a small combat contingent, arriving as
much as six months prior to the intervention operation. If
no substantive U.S. or world reaction is encountered, the
force is augmented to support the invasion. At some point
thereafter, the test phase ends, and the policy becomes
irreversible.
It is relevant to note that Moscow has reserved use
of this tactic for Third World operations, yet no such action
can be discerned in the Hungarian, Czechoslovakian , or Polish
episodes. Although world reaction is obviously a major
concern, and in-country personnel have filled the same military
mission as the "test" contingent, this apparent "testing of the
waters" for invasion has not materialized. The absence of a
perceived need to fathom outside reaction conceivably supports
Dr. Valenta's observation [Ref. 95: p. 98] that "Soviet
interests [in the periphery] are largely nonnegotiable .
"
Additionally, Hosmer cites the Soviet use of Cuban
forces in the Third World as evidence of the secondary impor-
tance affixed to such initiatives. The obvious tailoring of
the intervention model in deference to predicted U.S. and
world reaction constitutes, in the words of Hosmer, a mere
"change of cast". Cuban troops, supplemented as needed by
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Soviet assets, were deemed the least obtrusive solution that
would achieve policy goals.
No such compromise is evident in the implementation
of intervention policies on the periphery. Disregarding the
transparent effort at showing a united front in the Czech
episode, which intended only to demonstrate that it was a
WTO action and not a singularly Soviet solution, Moscow has
entrusted its border security interests to the Red Army alone.
The median between Soviet Third World and peripheral
policies is thus determined by the boundaries of the Soviet
sphere of influence. Paraphrasing what Raymond Aron has called
the "unwritten law of the atomic age", Moscow will pursue its
own interests, by its own means, in the universally recognized
area of Soviet dominance [Ref. 96: p. 77] . The question then
follows as to the applicability of the 1979 Afghanistan case
to this principle.
2 . The Significance of Afghanistan in Soviet Policymaking
The true significance of the decision to invade Afghan-
istan draws from the conclusions of both Hosmer and Sonnen-
feldt. It is undeniable that Moscow historically has shown
little interest in implicating itself with Kabul beyond the
context of Soviet Third World relations. The fact that no
special relationship existed, or more precisely that Moscow
failed actively to pursue vital interests in Kabul resulting
from Afghanistan's peripheral location, has little bearing
on the region's importance in Soviet policymaking. Equating
inaction with disinterest is an error.
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The Hosmer observation does not contest the general
view that Afghanistan was, in fact, a proximity issue, but
serves to illustrate a major principle governing Soviet
periphery politics. Moscow identifies vital national inter-
ests in all its border areas, for obvious internal security
reasons. Soviet initiatives in pursuit of these interests
are, nonetheless, limited to a finite number of scenarios,
each of which presents a politico-ideological justification
for intervention. Such pretext historically has been a
necessary precondition, even when vital security interests
are involved.
More specifically, the founding of a Marxist client
regime in Kabul, and the subsequent signing of the Soviet/
Afghan friendship treaty, provided Moscow with a means now
to guarantee Soviet interests there. Moreover, action could
be taken against a formidable threat to Soviet internal secur-
ity in the form of Islamic nationalism. In comparing once
again the Afghan and Iranian crises, the nature of the threat
was essentially the same (although some will argue that Iran
offered more of a danger as an exporter of revolution) . In
the Iranian scenario, which involved no Marxist alliance
and hence no pretext for invasion, Moscow simmered, but did
not boil. In Afghanistan, a decisive and radical solution
was implemented with little apparent hesitancy.
Soviet caution in decisionmaking when justification
is not present is evident in Moscow's limited participation
140
in the Glorious April Revolution. The episode exemplifies
Soviet reluctance to pursue overtly Moscow's interests, vital
or not, in non-Communist nations- A clear precedent for such
an action has yet to be established. Axiomatic of Soviet
political style in general, Moscow traditionally has remained
a distant accomplice to Communist bids for power within the
non-Communist world, but has resolutely staked a large claim
on any nation that ventures into the Soviet camp. And as
Tyrus Cobb observes, "the gate into the Soviet camp has proven
one-way.
"
Soviet restraint is invariably tied to the perceived
interests and predicted response of the U.S. and the world.
As Hosmer has suggested, the steady growth of Soviet power
projection capabilities in the face of waning American resolve
to challenge Soviet moves may engender a less restricted
operational code. As will be discussed, the Afghanistan case
may find applicability here.
The conclusion that Moscow's decision to invade Afghan-
istan was primarily a defensive action by design (i.e. , to
save its prestige and its regional interests) does not dis-
miss the offensive implications of the move. Predictably,
and undoubtedly bearing a measure of truth, the Soviets have
steadfastly discounted the strategic potential of their posi-
tion in Afghanistan, while citing vital security interests
for the move. As Arbatov has offered:
Cobb interview,
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Both the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean are
already close to the Soviet Union. And had we
planned to get closer, we would have never chosen
Afghanistan, with its very difficult terrain, as a
springboard. As an American friend of mine put it,
it would be like California attacking Oregon through
Nevada... The push toward warm water seas... would
invite World War III. Contrary to American propa-
ganda, nobody is going to see Soviet tanks or sol-
diers on the shores of the Persian Gulf or other
warm seas [Ref. 97: p. 193].
American strategists agree that it makes little mili-
tary sense to chose Afghanistan, over perhaps Iran, to gain
a strategic advantage in the region. Moreover, at current
40th Army Force levels, which provide little more than the
protection of vital lines of communication between the U.S.S.R.
and the DRA, Moscow is ill-prepared to exploit such an advan-
tage. Yet, Soviet political "style" must be considered here.
Although the Red Army presently fills a limited, defensive
mission, Moscow surely recognizes the future opportunities
proffered by its presence in Afghanistan.
Additionally, as offered by Matlock, Afghanistan may
have appeared a safe , controllable opportunity to expand
south. A similar venture into Iran obviously would involve
enormously greater risks and costs.
In short, the fundamental consideration in the deci-
sion to invade Afghanistan probably was defensive, to regain
stability on the Afghan border, and to salvage a Marxist
client. However, the strategic value of the Soviet presence
there is appreciated, and may in some future scenario find
Moscow attempting to exploit this advantage. In the least,
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the Soviets will (in the words of Cobb) "apply direct pres-
sure on Pakistan and Iran, and achieve an unprecedented
measure of influence in South Asia and the Persian Gulf
region." According to Cobb and others, the extent to which
the Soviets will pursue this advantage is a function of
America's willingness to assert its own interests in the
region. This thesis will be addressed more fully.
3. Implications for Future Soviet Initiatives
Studies of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan commonly
cite four general precedents implicated in Moscow's decision
to intervene. First is the fact that the Kremlin chose to
implement a direct military option in a nation that only 20
months earlier had professed, somewhat legitimately, political
nonalignment . Moreover, a solution normally reserved for the
universally recognized Soviet sphere of influence was chosen
for a region where Soviet hegemony is historically unprece-
dented, and world interests are, in the least, vague. Accord-
ingly, a new, bolder Soviet policy outlook is identified.
Such a conclusion must, nevertheless, be tempered
with two points. Soviet peripheral interests are basic and
timeless; the fact that the Soviet/Afghan treaty was only a
year old offers no precedent in Soviet policymaking. Inevi
-
tably, the Hungarian invasion came within a year of the sign-
ing of the Warsaw Treaty. Additionally, Moscow has shown
itself willing to pursue secondary interests outside its
Cobb interview.
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recognized areas of control, in Angola and Ethiopia. Once
again the common denominator apparently is not so much the
accepted Soviet sphere of influence (although this has
demonstrably determined the Soviet means to pursue interests)
as an evaluation that, at the time, the U.S. has not the
ability or the desire to contest the move. Intervention is
a viable option wherever America allows it to be.
A second precedent focuses on the fact that Moscow
planned and executed the overthrow of an allied Marxist regime,
and the intervention of major Soviet forces without genuine
justification. Both points bear truth, however their signi-
ficance is questionable. Amin's overthrow is unique only in
the violent means by which it was carried out. Moscow saw
fit to intervene in client regimes in Hungary and Czechoslo-
vakia. Moreover, the coup appears a secondary option in
attempting to gain legal justification for Soviet intervention.
The fact that the invasion was carried out without this justi-
fication is attributable to a miscue in operations, where the
puppet Karmal regime was established and intervention requested
ten hours after Soviet units crossed the border.
Thirdly, sources have attached significance to the
policy in that it prescribed "the commitment of major Soviet
forces to a prolonged conf lict . . . the first such action since
World War II." Again this can be attributed to miscalcula-
tion in Soviet policymaking. The Afghanistan solution is,
Pipes interview.
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in fact, typical of Soviet intervention policies (especially
comparable to other peripheral actions) that in this case
proved vastly inadequate to the tasks assigned. This point
will be discussed at length later.
Finally, Hosmer places importance on the fact that
Moscow has abandoned its inclination to maintain a low pro-
file in its initiatives abroad. Although this view must be
provisioned by the unplanned circumstances of the policy
noted above, the identification of a new Soviet willingness
to use military power is both valid and relevant to the
Afghanistan case. The recent growth in Soviet power projec-
tion potential has allowed Moscow to consider an intervention
option more seriously in its global policymaking. Recent
Soviet initiatives in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan have
made extensive use of this new capability. Undeniable is the
fact that the potential for a new era of Soviet military diplo-
macy is present.
In summary, the immediate political implications of
the decision to invade Afghanistan do not bespeak a signifi-
cant precedent. The purpose of the invasion was tied to
internal security concerns, and the policy itself can be
paralleled with similar interventions along the periphery.
However, the fact that the invasion was the third Soviet
military initiative in a period of three years must not be
overlooked.
Admittedly this brief period of militarism coincided
the nadir of American resolve to contest Soviet global
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ambitions, and the U.S. today stands as more of a threat to
Soviet machinations. The Afghanistan episode provides a
glimpse of Soviet ambitions and uninhibited political con-
duct, in the absence of an American challenge. The correla-
tion of forces equation, factoring Soviet and American will
and capabilities, will provide a major input into when a
future "Afghanistan solution" will be decided upon.
Focusing on the decision to invade Afghanistan, a
projection of future Soviet policy initiatives predicts that
Moscow will view intervention as a more viable option. Soviet
policymaking will, nevertheless, adhere to a philosophy of
caution, shunning a direct Soviet/American confrontation.
Future sections of this thesis will address how developments
since the Afghanistan invasion (both local and international)
have affected this prediction.
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III. POLICY OUTCOME
From today's perspective, the decision to invade Afghan-
istan appears a classic case of miscalculation in Moscow's
decisionmaking, attributable, perhaps, to a measure of Soviet
overconfidence engendered by the general success of earlier
such policies. Here the intervention solution has proven
both inadequate and inappropriate to the intended task. The
situation has been complicated further by international pres-
sures and the professed irreversibility of the policy, which
have precluded the implementation of a more definitive answer.
As Richard Pipes stated, the Soviets have "fallen into a tiger
pit of their own making."
If the invasion decision represents the culmination of a
trend toward "Red Army diplomacy", the policy outcome may
serve to arrest, or perhaps even reverse this tendency. This
final part of the study attempts to ascertain what lessons the
Soviets can take from the Afghanistan case, and how this may
reflect on future Soviet decisionmaking.
First the nature of the current Soviet dilemma in Afghan-
istan will be reviewed, followed by an analysis of the costs
of the policy, both local and international, tangible and
intangible. The conclusion will speculate on the impact of




A. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN SOLUTION
1. Events in Post-Invasion Afghanistan
During the first month of Soviet occupation, the
unexpected level of Western outrage was counterposed by the
overwhelming success of the initial military operation.
Although sporadic guerrilla attacks were reported in the
northeastern provinces, Afghanistan as a whole was in quiet
shock. A tribute to the efficiency and decisiveness of the
operation, the invasion plan was complete in eight days,
with the 40th Red Army sustaining less than 50 casualties.
The feeling of confidence was apparent in the Soviet
press. Within a week after the invasion, reports from Kabul
doubled in size and frequency. ' In response to Western reports
of fighting in the capital, Pravda (no doubt truthfully) pro-
claimed that the streets of Kabul were peaceful, and life was
returning to normal. The apparent acceptance of the new
regime by the people was noted in Moscow's Islamic News Service,
broadcast throughout South Asia and the Middle East. The
problem of contradictory Western reporting was solved by the
expulsion of all foreign news correspondents, "under orders
of the Afghan people's government", on 3 and 18 January [Ref.
98: p. A- 8]
.
Casualty estimates have ranged from the 3,000 claimed
by rebel sources to the "several dozen" speculated by a French
correspondent. It appears the invasion army suffered few, if
any casualties in operations to the north, however forces in-
volved in the Kabul coup are known to have suffered some killed
The figure of 50, submitted by American correspondent Gary
Bennet, has been quoted by several authors as "credible".
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With the puppet regime of Babrak Karmal evidently
secure, Moscow began steps to gain international acceptance
of the new Afghan leadership. First, beginning on 3 January,
the presence of Soviet troops in the streets of Kabul was
significantly reduced, while DRA units reassumed peacekeep-
ing duties in the capital. Concurrently, the Soviet press
began a reporting campaign stressing the "operationally
limited role" of the 40th Army. The obvious intention was
to promote an image of stability in the nation and the govern-
ment, and to bolster Soviet claims that, in the words of Viktor
Glazunov [Ref. 99] , "the event was a purely internal affair...
with the Soviet Union providing limited amounts of aid and
support .
"
A second step was taken at a Soviet-organized press
conference on 12 January, in which selected Western journa-
lists were introduced to Karmal. Later a French reporter
humorously recounted how uniformed Soviet personnel could be
seen dodging and hiding from the foreign media throughout
the royal palace.
During January, the Soviet press received its greatest
challenge from political, rather than military developments.
By early February, over 400,000 refugees had fled across
the Afghan border into Pakistan and China [Ref. 100: p. A-12].
Deprived of in-country sources, the international media pro-
vided extensive coverage of the Afghan plight, complete with
graphic refugee accounts of Soviet operations and atrocities.
1-19
Moscow initially denied reports of the magnitude of
the emigration, conceivably out of genuine disbelief. When
the dimensions of the problem were verified, the Soviet press
chose to ignore the issue rather than admit a setback in the
"Afghan Socialist program". At the same time, Soviet armored
columns were dispatched to the Pakistani border to stem the
exodus. Although such forces remain to date, the tactic has
proven totally ineffective.
Soviet problems compounded in the first week of Feb-
ruary with a perceptible rise in rebel resistance. By the
11th, two towns in Budakahan Province garrisoned by DRA troops
were overrun, and the regional capital of Fauzabad came under
siege. Four days later, under the cover of a heavy snowfall,
the Mujahadeen cut 30 miles of the only major highway between
the capital and the city of Jalalabad.
Characteristically, the Soviet media was first silent
to these developments until the situation, and the official
interpretation were clarified. The first reference to a new
military challenge came in a 17 February domestic broadcast,
reporting that the April Revolution was now going through a
period of difficulties. Counterrevolutionary marauders and
riff-raff were reported to be conducting attacks primarily
In the summer of 1980, the Soviet press began a series
of reports announcing the return of Afghan refugees, "which
had been disillusioned by imperialist propaganda," in groups
of 500 to 1,000. Even if such reports were true, the number
returning has made little impression on the steady current of
refugees leaving. By late 1983, refugees in Pakistan and China
totalled 3.5 million.
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against the peaceful citizenry; villages allegedly were burned
and abominable acts committed. It was promised that DRA forces
were nevertheless "making gains" against the enemy, and popular
support for Kabul was on the rise. As was normal media pro-
cedure, no mention of Soviet troops was made.
The realization that the conflict in Afghanistan was
far from over necessitated a new approach to the subject of
insurgency. Treatment of the disjointed rebel efforts in
January had been depicted as "the feeble work of mercenaries"
,
in support of official Soviet claims that foreign interven-
tion perpetuated the war. However, in view of this new and
potent threat, a more serious portrayal was deemed in order.
Periodic reporting of Mujahadeen atrocities began in March,
and essentially has continued to the present. Most accounts
concern attacks on the local peasantry and militia, and favor-
ite themes include the murder of teachers, assaults on women
students, and the abduction and execution of Islamic clergy-
men. Such reports have been almost totally devoted to the
Soviet domestic and Islamic audiences.
Several attacks have, in fact, been verified by rebel
groups, such as the attack on the Afghan field hockey team
returning from the Moscow Olympics on 15 July 1980. The
report of the murder of Islamic official Ulema Ahad Shah
Masud on 2 3 November 1982 "while praying at home" is also
admitted to by the rebels. Recounting the event, Pravda
failed to mention that the Ulema was a leading spokesman
for the puppet National Fatherland Front. See "Killing of
Senior Afghan Clergyman Reported," Moscow International




War came to Kabul soon after the rebels' February
offensive. On 21 February, a general strike was declared
in the capital, and the following morning anti-Soviet riot-
ing swept the city. Premature Western reoorts of tank battles
in the streets were harshly (and validly) refuted by Pravda
as "a fantasy". While some dissidence and protesting was
indirectly acknowledged, it was stressed that DRA forces
were in firm control of the city. The intensity of rioting
increased however, and by the third day, the Kabul regime
was compelled to begin massive arrests. Finally on 25 Febru-
ary, allegedly in response to repeated personal requests by
Babrak, Soviet armor was called into the capital. Moscow
would later admit to "several casualties" in the ensuing
battle, however Western estimates have ranged from 300 to
3,000 Afghan civilians killed and wounded.
Moscow first informed the Soviet public and the
world of the episode the next day. A short statement assured
its audience that Kabul was returning to normal. Later that
day a longer report was issued, listing reforms to be insti-
tuted by Kabul—notably in the area of increased religious
tolerance. The contention that only "outside agents" insti-
gated the conflict was abandoned, largely as a result of a
oreponderance of Western evidence to the contrary. Instead
For example, the first mention of unrest found merely
that DRA units in Kabul were taking action against "local
hooligans" on the second day of the revolt.
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[It was admitted that] rebel grouos were able to
involve a certain confused section of the oonula-
tion in the adventure ... the enlisted declassed
elements and criminals among them [Ref. 101: p. 5].
Typically neither report mentioned the Soviets' major contri-
bution in quelling the uprising.
The pacification of Kabul lasted less than a month.
On 8 march, amid rumors of renewed strikes, Soviet armored
units conducted an impressive show-of-force throughout the
city. Beginning on 29 March, several minor strikes were organ-
ized, and each time Soviet tanks were called in immediately.
Violence at Kabul University on 2 Hay, in which helicoptor
gunships (reportedly flown by Soviet pilots) were involved,
resulting in 32 students dead and 80 wounded [Ref. 102]
.
In the face of such events, Moscow daily attacked
Western reports of unrest as "a lie .. .wishful thinking", and
denied a sizeable Soviet nresence in the caoital. The exis-
tence of a 2200-0400 curfew was likewise denied by Pravda in
late March, however the next day the newspaper announced a
reduction of the present Kabul curfew by one hour [Ref. 103]
.
The Soviets' liberal use of force in suppressing
public dissent prompted rebels to initiate a terrorist cam-
paign in downtown Kabul, which continues to date. Although
infrequent reports in the Soviet media have mentioned only
attacks on schools (a December 1981 article claimed that 60
percent of all schools in the city have been destroved)
,
Soviet soldiers and Afghan political figures apparently are
primary targets. An indication of the continuing tension
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in the capital was given in February 1981 when Kabul's chief
of police was shot mistakenly by Soviet soldiers when it was
noted that he carried a pistol.
The first major Soviet offensive since the invasion
began on 3 March 1980 with operations in the Kunar Valley.
Using tactics reminiscent of the late stages of World War II,-
massed armor columns encircled the valley in four days, leav-
ing pockets of resistance to be eliminated by infantry attack.
By the end of the month, Moscow claimed that both Kunar and
Badakistan Provinces were secure.
Although the Soviet forces unquestionably carried
the weight of the operation, their role was downplayed once
again by Kabul and Moscow. Babrak publically supported this
perception on 3 April calling the Soviet troops "reserve forces"
and contending that the DRA army had accomplished the bulk of
the fighting. Such treatment contributed to low morale and
general discontent at all levels of the Soviet military.
Throughout April and May the victory in Kunar was
repeated in Ghazni
,
Qondoz , and Ghowr Provinces. In late May,
Moscow estimated that three-quarters of the countryside was
pacified. However, Soviet strategists soon noted an alarming
pattern. Having secured an area, Soviet forces would with-
draw to the capital, leaving DRA garrisons behind. Within a
matter of days, the Afghan troops would come under fierce
organized attack, requiring the return of Soviet armor to
conduct "repatriation operations". As seen in the fighting
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for Jalalabad, this evolution would be repeated several times
a year. For the first time in 50 years, the Red Army was
introduced to large-scale guerrilla warfare.
By early June no area outside the capital could be
called secure. On 8 June it was reported that Mujahadeen
forces were massing only 20 miles north of Kabul, and Soviet
and DRA forces braced for the expected offensive. Two days
later, the 40th Army conducted a ruthless preemptive attack,
reportedly destroying 50 villages around the capital and
killing thousands of civilians. Typically, the Soviet media
carried no reports of the fighting until its successful
conclusion.
Following the June offensive, the strategic situa-
tion settled into a stalemate. The now wiser Soviet/DRA
command understood that at current force levels, Communist
forces could do little more than maintain control of the cities,
major highways, and lines of communication back to the Soviet
Union, with occasional strikes on Mujahadeen strongholds in
the countryside. Rebel groups freely roamed the rural areas,
and frequently organized hit-and-run operations deep within
the Soviet zone of control. In spite of a major readdressal
of military doctrine and mounting of large-scale counter-
insurgency operations in future months, this equilibrium
remains up to the present.
A revision of Soviet military doctrine was encour-
aged by the effectiveness of Mujahadeen guerrilla tactics,
but necessitated by the political restrictions placed on
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Moscow's Afghanistan policy. In line with efforts to minimize
military involvement, a ceiling was established on forces
committed to the conflict. By May of 1980 it became apparent
that the 98,000 man force was grossly inadequate for the task
at hand. The DRA army had proven wholly unreliable, and the
Soviets lacked the manpower to conduct infantry sweeps through-
out the countryside and also repress dissent in the cities.
Additionally, the 40th Army's increasing role in the conflict
and the use of outmoded and inappropriate tactics produced
Soviet casualties on a level not sustained since the Second
World War.
The choice became whether to expand the Soviet role
in the war (The U.S. Defense Department [Ref. 104: p. 50] has
speculated that four times the manpower would be required) , or
to adopt less soldier-intensive tactics. In the face of world-
wide condemnation of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the
latter was chosen. In early July, a force of 15,000 Soviet
troops, specially trained in counterinsurgency warfare, arrived
in Kabul. The event coincided with the widely publicized with-
drawal of a Soviet armored division from Afghanistan, a move
heralded in the Soviet press as "an important step aimed at
2promoting a political solution... a concrete step."
Several sources offer that Soviet casualties in the first
half-year of the war numbered 5,000-7,000, or about one-quarter
of all casualties sustained to date.
2 See "Afghan Peace Proposals Cannot be Ignored," Moscow





By mid-July, a change in Soviet strategy became
visible. Direct contact with the rebels was now minimized.
Ineffective armored assaults and costly infantry sweeps were
replaced with tactics stressing the use of firepower and air
support. As seen in the continuing conflicts in Angola and
Ethiopia, Soviet forces apparently intend to wear down the
Mujahadeen's will to fight with an unrelenting policy of
repression.
Soviet tactics now resembled those used by the Amin
regime a year earlier, which at the time had been condemned
by the Kremlin. Between 10 and 15 July, over 50 Mujahadeen
villages were reported being bombed and strafed, inflicting
heavy civilian casualties. Napalm was also used on farming
communities in outlying provinces, implementing a scorched
earth policy. In an event reminiscent of the Kerala episode
15 months earlier, Soviet units surrounded and shelled the
pro-rebel town of Jaldak for three days, killing most of the
700 residents.
(Cont'd) The original withdrawal announcement came on 22 June,
within hours of a meeting of Western foreign ministers in
Venice. The agenda at that meeting was known to include sanc-
tion proposals. Although many countries discounted the with-
drawal report as being "extremely vague" , no substantive
measures came out of the conference. Moscow originally criti-
cized Western optimism over the Soviet report (Carter is said
to have speculated that "a political solution is now possible")
however within a week, the Soviet press lauded the move "done
in the name of peace". A 3 July New York Times article put an
end to the speculation by reporting that only 5,000 of the
promised 11,000 had actually been removed, and these forces
had been replaced by larger counterinsurgency units, bringing
the Soviet force level in Afghanistan to a new high.
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Offensive ground tactics have been limited to small-
scale operations by highly specialized combined forces, heavily
supported by air and artillery. Air assault brigades also have
been organized to react quickly to Mujahadeen buildups. Such
operations exhibit a degree of flexibility and initiative
unprecedented in Soviet military doctrine.
In spite of such efforts, the situation remains at
best a stalemate, with the Mujahadeen making some modest gains.
The majority of Soviet/DRA operations have attempted to pro-
tect the tenuous hold on the cities and lines of communica-
tion, with varying degrees of success. The Soviets have
suffered major setbacks in efforts to neutralize the Panjashir
Valley, 11 miles north of Kabul, and running along the vital
Kabul-Qonduz highway. After several earlier attempts, Soviet
Special Forces mounted a major offensive up the valley in June
1982. Three weeks after the commencement of the operation,
Moscow announced a major victory; Soviet forces began to be
withdrawn soon thereafter. On 15 August it was, nevertheless,
reported that the valley was in rebel hands again, and Soviet
convoys again were coming under organized attack.
To date, the Soviets have conducted seven campaigns
to eliminate the Panjashir stronghold. In the most recent
(August 1984), strategic bombers were used against Mujahadeen
positions up the valley. However, the area remains indispu-
tably in the hands of the bushmen.
Additionally, the Soviets have had to resort to
extreme measures to maintain control of the cities. As
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recently as May 1984, part of the city of Herat was captured
by iMujahadeen forces; major Red Army units took two weeks to
restore control. Rebel sources report that 5,000 residents
were killed in the struggle. The Old Quarter of Kandahar,
Afghanistan's second largest city, has erupted in revolt on
four occasions. During the last, Soviet artillery and air-
strikes destroyed one-third of the city.
Perhaps most alarming, guerrilla activity has
increased significantly in the capital. Rocket attacks on
Soviet and DRA bases, police patrol ambushes, and the assas-
sination of Soviet and Afghan officials are daily occurrences
in and around Kabul. In the spring of 1984, the headquarters
building of the KGB and Afghan intelligence personnel was
destroyed by a Mujahadeen bomb. The Soviets responded to
this new wave of terrorism by instituting a dusk-to-dawn cur-
few, and issuing shoot-on-sight orders for citizens exhibit-
ing "suspicious conduct".
In Soviet efforts to achieve a degree of
stability and control in Afghanistan, the DRA army has proven
a questionable asset. Following the invasion, the Soviets
directed a concerted attempt to rebuild Afghan security
forces as well as the military— apparently with the expecta-
tion of passing the burden of fighting to national forces.
A government "recruiting drive" in the winter of 1980 boosted
the DRA army roster to over 90,000. The Soviets assisted in
training the new recruits, sending almost 20,000 to camps
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within the U.S.S.R. It has been reported that East German
advisors have directed the development of the KHAD , the
Afghan secret police.
The new Afghan Army has proved little better than
its progenitor. During the winter and spring of 1980, DRA
static defenses were constantly overrun by qualitatively
inferior rebel bands. The Afghan Army's participation in
the Soviet spring offensive consequently was limited to mop-
up operations. Even in this capacity, Red Army units needed
to maintain close contact; an infantry sweep by DRA forces
in the Kunar Valley in May 1980 bolted in retreat upon en-
countering a much smaller Mujahadeen unit.
Disaffection with Kabul and the Soviets has caused
desertion to be even more prevalent than during the Teraki
and Amin periods. By the summer of 1981, the DRA army was
reduced to 30 percent of its listed strength. During the
fall of 1981 the government began forced conscription of
males 16 to 42 within the cities. Unit revolts also have
increased significantly. Garrisons in Jalalabad and Herat
have murdered their Soviet and DRA leaders and switched
sides en masse. Perhaps most distressing is the revolt within
units deemed to be the elite among DRA forces. During October
1980, the Afghan 4th and 15th Armored Brigades at Puli-Charki
engaged in a firefight with Soviet tanks, following a Soviet
advisor's refusal to come to the aid of a beleaguered Afghan
unit four miles away. After this event, the Soviets reportedly
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took command of all heavy weapons units, especially antitank,
antiair, and rocket forces within the DRA army [Ref. 105].
Fear of disloyalty within DRA forces may also have impelled
the Soviets to shift most tactical (and all strategic) air-
craft squadrons to bases across the Soviet border in Decem-
ber 1982.
Also coming to light is a host of problems within
the Red Army itself. Soon after the invasion operation,
Soviet officials became alarmed at instances of fraterniza-
tion between Soviet troops and the local populace. The
invasion army carried a large percentage of Central Asians,
in part as a "show" move to blunt the impact of a foreign
invasion. They also constituted an available manpower re-
source at a time when Slavic elements were unable to fill
the ranks of the invasion force. By March 1980, the problem
of desertion among such troops became so large that the Soviet
40th Army was transformed into a totally Slavic force within
three months.
Discipline problems have become an increasing con-
cern. With alcohol a limited commodity in the Moslem state,
troops have resorted to the prolific drug market. The bar-
tering of weapons for hashish has become a source of weapons
supply for the Mujahadeen. Defection to Pakistan also is
An excellent study of this evolution, and Soviet racial
policies within the 40th Army is given in S. Enders Wimbush
and Alex Alexiev, Soviet Central Asian Soldiers in Afghan -
istan, N-1634-NA (Santa Monica: Rand, 1981).
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reported on the rise. A confidential source holds that
deserters crossing the border have averaged 40 per month
by mid-1984. The Mujahadeen have initiated a policy of
amnesty for defectors which apparently has been effective
in encouraging the exodus.
Finally, dissonance has appeared on the homefront.
Until the spring of 1983, the Kremlin went to great lengths
to keep the extent of Soviet involvement in the conflict
from Soviet public notice. In the media, the 40th Army was
never mentioned by name, but referred to as a "limited mili-
tary contingent". Mounting casualties were handled by con-
structing "care units" in remote areas of south-central
U.S.S.R., and by sending wounded to East European hospitals.
Returning coffins were unmarked, or stamped with "Died for
International Duty" (instead of the customary "Died in
Defense of the Motherland"). Funerals were kept discreet,
with infrequent mention in the press.
However, as early as 1982, signs of unrest within
the U.S.S.R. became evident. Several domestic publications
received a wave of letters from indignant and distressed
mothers and girlfriends demanding an explanation for the
rising death toll. A Soviet radio commentator denounced
the occupation as "outrageous imperialism" in three broadcasts
Cobb interview
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before he was silenced. Red Army troops leaving for the
war were reportedly denounced or entreated to desert.
In response to this trend, and possibly as a con-
sequence of pressure from the military to receive more credit
in the press for its efforts, Moscow embarked on a new tack
in March 1983. Coverage given the conflict was greatly
increased, and for the first time accounts of battles and
casualties were given. Although reporting loyally extolls
the virtues of Soviet involvement in the conflict, the tactic
apparently has failed to prevent the antiwar movement from
gaining strength.
In recent years, the conflict in Afghanistan has
become increasingly costly to the Soviets , however the present
situation does not demand an expedient solution. Soviet
forces maintain control of the major highways and urban areas,
and although the tempo of operations has decreased since 1982,
the 40th Army retains the ability to strike at will at Muja-
hadeen buildups in the country. At current Soviet force
levels, the Kremlin could not hope for more.
The high costs of the war, both in human (an esti-
mated 25,000 casualties) and economic ($3 billion, 1980-83)
3terms, is deemed by American policymakers as "affordable".
Interview with Volodya Krasnow, Soviet defector and
former director of Soviet propaganda, in Monterey, California,




Immediate benefits include the opportunity to battle test
weaponry, including chemical agents, and to train a cadre
of combat-tested Red Army officers.
The costs are even more palatable in view of the
foreboding alternatives. It is universally agreed that
should Soviet troops pull out of the present conflict, the
regime of Babrak Karmal certainly will fall. S. Enders Wim-
bush speculates that the record size of current Mujahadeen
forces results from the transformation of a local civil war
(one of countless such conflicts in Afghan history) to a holy
war, with the intervention of Soviet ground troops. The DRA
army, traditionally the key to power in Afghanistan, remains
an ineffectual tool of Kabul. The withdrawal of the 40th Army
would pit the DRA army against an ardent Mujahadeen force twice
its size.
On 21 January 1980, an official U.S. Government release
claimed that the Soviets had been using chemical warfare against
insurgents since the Teraki regime. The announcement referenced
refugee accounts that nerve gas had been used soon after the
invasion in the northeastern provinces bordering the Soviet
Union. For reference, see "U.S. Offers Report to Show Soviet
Use of Chemical Weapons," New York Times , 23 March 1982, p. A-l.
For months the Soviet press refused to make an official comment
on the U.S. accusation. Finally on 10 April Moscow launched
its own verbal attack, contending that American-made gas gre-
nades were being supplied to the rebels. Containers allegedly
captured after a 25 March rebel attack were found to be labeled
"Made at Federal Laboratories, Salisbury, PA".
The Soviet press has infrequently addressed the subject in
recent years. The presence of the Army Chemical Service in
Afghanistan was finally acknowledged in August 1983. A jour-
nalist's report then explained to the domestic reader the mili-
tary value of "smoke screens" provided by the service. See
"Soviet Chemical Troops in DRA," Krasnaya Zvezda , 19 August
1983, p. 1.
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There also are immense international implications.
The apparently unexpected reaction to the invasion within the
Communist and non-Communist world has invariably shaped the
development of Moscow's Afghanistan policy. Whereas events
in the region have deliniated the requirements for a Soviet
victory, external forces have placed restrictions on how
Moscow is to pursue its policy objectives.
2
.
International Ramifications and Costs
Soviet policymakers, in deciding to intervene in
Afghanistan, either can be faulted with a costly miscalcula-
tion of world reaction to the event, or having embarked on
the initiative willing to accept universal scorn and condemn-
ation. Although validity can be found in both arguments, the
truth no doubt lies closer to the former.
Moscow itself unabashedly has professed surprise
and confusion over the level of international opposition. The
Soviet press continues to resound a theme initiated in the
first days of the invasion, attacking efforts of the Carter
Administration to whip up a war hysteria, and trumping up
events in Afghanistan far out of proportion to their true
significance. American policymakers tend to believe that
this rebuttal is not simply an effort to debate the signifi-
cance of the event, but reflects genuine bewilderment over
world reaction. Tyrus Cobb's conclusion that the inva-
sion was the costly product of a misinterpretation of world




...a policy created without regard for internation-
al reaction would [represent] a bold departure from
a Soviet outlook emphasizing caution and calcula-
tion. It would also signify the abandonment of
Soviet hopes for reinstituting detente... [a policy
which] Moscow was then trying to salvage.
1
It also can be argued that, although Moscow may have
underestimated world response, Soviet policymakers were will-
ing to accept a measure of reproof, and "pick up the pieces
of detente later" [Ref. 106: p. 31]. The disjointed and
transitory attempts at opposing Soviet policies in Angola
and Ethiopia may have convinced Moscow that reaction to Afghan-
istan would be equally ineffective. As a Pravda commentator
concluded in 1979, American-instigated sanctions, especially
economic sanctions, have historically failed in their mission
to coerce the Soviet Union, and soon collapsed in despair.
The view that the U.S.S.R. could weather whatever opposition
it encountered surely had an input into the invasion decision.
United and effective opposition to the Afghanistan
solution was immediately evident, however. On 14 January 1980,
less than two weeks after the invasion operation was com-
pleted, Moscow suffered its worst defeat in a United Nations
General Assembly vote since the Korean War. Of 104 ballots
cast on a declaration for "immediate, unconditional, and
complete withdrawal", only 18 went against the measure. A
dozen of these represented the Soviet bloc, and the remainder
(Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, Grenada, Mozambique, and
Matlock interview,
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South Yemen) consisted of clients heavily dependent on
Moscow's munificence. Among 18 abstentions from the vote
were several nations traditionally sympathetic to Soviet
interests including India, Syria, and Algeria, and the
socialist-oriented countries of Rumania, Libya, Nicaragua,
the Congo, Benin, Guinea, and Madagascar. The West, the
Islamic world, and the Communist nations of Yugoslavia,
Albania, Kampuchea, and the PRC were united in their unam-
biguous condemnation of the invasion.
Neither was the global backlash transitory, as
Moscow had hoped, and perhaps expected. Ramifications of
the Afghanistan solution invariably have dictated the course
of Soviet and world politics since the invasion. The remain-
der of this discussion will study the implications and costs
of the intervention in three major policy areas, analyzing




As earlier addressed, the Moscow press made
several attempts at minimizing the backlash from within the
Muslem world. Prior to the invasion, the Soviet media stressed
Moscow's admiration and respect for Islam, and during the
action articles recounted Soviet/DRA efforts to "ensure the
continued religious freedoms .. .of the Afghan people" [Ref.
107] . Kabul has since created a phalanx of Soviet-loyal
Afghan religious leaders who have made trips throughout
Islam, in addition to attempting to pacify local dissent.
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At the Islamic Conference at Islamabad on
27-29 January 1980, Moscow was informed of the unmitigated
failure of such efforts. The primary topic of the meeting
was the Soviet action occurring only 200 miles to the north,
and although Moscow surely petitioned its clients to boycott
the proceedings, only six of 42 member-states failed to
attend. The Karmal regime predictably was not represented
at the meeting, however several independent Mujahadeen groups
sent delegates. Among traditional Soviet allies in atten-
dance was Iraq— a nation linked to the Soviets through a
treaty of friendship and cooperation, and heavily dependent
on Soviet arms aid. Nevertheless, Iraq proved a major voice
denouncing the Soviet move and supporting the demand for an
end to Soviet involvement in the Afghan conflict.
The resulting resolution signed by all parti-
cipants prescribed the immediate and unconditional with-
drawal of all Soviet troops stationed on Afghan territory.
Additionally, Karmal 's Afghanistan was permanently ejected
from the organization, and a pledge was made by the member-
ship to refuse to recognize the new Kabul regime.
The first Soviet move to salvage relations in
the Islamic world was aimed at tempering regional opposition.
This took the form of a proposed agreement between Islamabad,
Teheran, and Kabul (and guaranteed by the U.S. and U . S . S . R)
,
which promised noninterference in Afghanistan's internal
affairs. A withdrawal of Soviet forces from the region would
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then ensue. In view of the intense conflict then raging in
the Afghan countryside, Moscow probably never intended to
fulfill such an offer; the intiative no doubt intended to
gain de jure recognition of the Kabul regime. For this
reason, among others, Pakistan and Iran refused the Soviet
proposal.
In the next meeting of the OIC in late May,
pro-Soviet members were in complete attendance. These dele-
gates made a united and very transparent attempt to focus
the conference on the unresolved Palestinian crisis. (Inter-
estingly, a Pravda article the same week claimed that America's
"inflated concern" over Afghanistan intended to take pressure
off of Israel over the "more pressing problem of Palestinian
refugees.") Soviet-orchestrated efforts to detract attention
from the Afghan crisis were aided by the failed American rescue
operation in Iran a month earlier. Islamic condemnation of
this episode needed no Soviet prompting. A Pravda editorial
cited the action, in the epitome of cynicism, as "proof of
America's disrespect and disregard for the Islamic world in
general." [Ref. 109: p. 3]
Yet the conference resolution proved only
moderately less vehement than its predecessor. The call for
a complete Soviet withdrawal was repeated verbatim, and over
$25 million was made available to Afghan resistance movements.
America's Iranian operation failed to dilute the fervor over
Afghanistan, but produced only a joint condemnation of
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Washington and Moscow. The only notable achievement of pro-
Soviet elements was to gain conference approval for OIC
negotiations with Kabul and Moscow, to exclude participation
by Afghan Mujahadeen delegates.
The anti-Soviet consensus within the Islamic
community has degraded since the summer of 19 80 however, due
primarily to two factors. First, the Afghan freedom fighters
have proven totally incapable of forming a united political
voice. As a consequence, the OIC membership has diversified
aid and support among the various Mujahadeen factions. The
lack of a coordinated, overall aid program, making use of
pooled resources and united political support has invariably
been detrimental to the rebel movement as a whole.
Additionally, the Islamic alignment over the
Afghanistan issue has decayed as a result of the outbreak
of the war between Iran and Iraq in September 1980. The
conflict has divided loyalties within the OIC membership,
as well as drawing political attention and material support
from the Afghan resistance effort.
A prominent rift in the anti-Soviet coalition
was seen in early January 1981, with a Pakistani offer to
engage in bilateral negotiations with the PDPA. While not
conceding on the recognition issue, and proposing little
beyond what had been agreed upon in principle at the May
1980 OIC Conference, the event was significant as the first
OlC-implicated overture to Kabul. According to Wolfgang
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Berner [Ref. 110: pp. 279-280], this initiative ended all
chance of joint OIC action against the Soviet policy in
Afghanistan.
The disintegration of Islamic unity on the
issue has since followed, propelled by interorganizational
disputes over Egypt's indiscretions with Israel, the war
between Iran and Iraq, and continuing confrontations in Yemen
and the western Sahara. The subject of Afghanistan has sur-
faced at most every Islamic conference, however united opinion
and action has been precluded by other national interests and
concerns
.
Nevertheless, Moscow faces a subliminal threat
from the Islamic community, with the potential to engender
major costs. Relations between Islam and the Soviets bear
permanent scars. Following the Afghan invasion, Anwar Sadat
ventured that the Arab world would forever see the Soviet
Union in a new light. With Arab opinion generally and con-
sistently biased against Moscow on the Afghanistan issue,
the evolution of Islamic unity in the future would undoubt-
edly mean greater political focus on the conflict, and
increased aid to the Mujahadeen.
b. The American Response
In his first press conference after the Afghan-
istan invasion, President Carter confided that his opinion of
the Soviets had changed more in the last week than at any
time earlier in his administration. Had Moscow been unsure
on how to interpret Carter's professed new attitude toward
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the Soviets, Washington made unmistakably clear its position
in the weeks to follow. The major costs of the Afghanistan
solution stemming from the American response follow:
(1) The Suspension of SALT . It is unlikely
that Moscow failed to recognize this cost in pre-invasion
calculations. The Soviets were aware that ratification of
the SALT treaty within the U.S. Congress was in jeopardy.
Only a month before the invasion an editorial in Novoye
Vremiya lamented Washington's distressing refusal to take
steps in the name of peace as would be manifested in the
approval of the strategic arms agreement by the U.S. Senate.
It has been suggested that Moscow was willing to accept the
demise of a treaty that had little chance of becoming opera-
tional. Moreover, by forcing Washington to suspend SALT,
the Soviets would be able to claim that the U.S. , and not
the U.S.S.R., was standing in the way of progress in the
nuclear arms limitation agreements.
(2
)
Scientific and Technological Exchange
Sanctions . The suspension of scientific and technical ex-
change programs had proven a preferred punitive measure in
earlier Soviet/American confrontations. Here too, Moscow
probably expected and accepted such a cost. As demonstrated
in other episodes, a third party within the West could
always be found to act as a middleman for the transfer of
American technology. Accordingly, such sanctions were his-
torically short-lived. Soviet espionage also could be
counted on to lessen temporary inconveniences.
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(3) The Wheat Embargo . As in the above sanc-
tions
,
Moscow undoubtedly estimated that such a measure was
a possible ramification, however the chances of Washington
holding firm to such a policy probably was seen as small.
The embargo was announced within two days of the beginning
of the U.S. Presidential campaign; among the first vital
primaries were many agricultural midwestern states. The
Soviets conceivably believed that Carter would not risk his
reelection with a measure costly to America's economy, and
of dubious effectiveness.
The embargo, nevertheless, proved much more
effective than anticipated. Surprisingly, Washington main-
tained the policy for more than a year, until the Reagan
Administration withdrew the measure in the spring of 1981.
Although the Soviets ultimately found other avenues to acquire
foreign wheat, the policy was reported to have had a major
impact on the Soviet economy during 1980. Key to this was
the dismal failure of the 1980 Soviet wheat harvest.
(4) The Olympic Boycott . It is likely that
the Soviets addressed but discounted this possibility for
a number of reasons. America had traditionally claimed that
the games transcended political gamesmanship; at no earlier
time of peace had such a sanction been seriously considered.
In "From Russia With Doves; A Final Research Report,"
West Point, New York, 1981. Tyrus Cobb recounts how he was
beseeched to end the wheat embargo "as your allies already
have done." Apparently at the time of Cobb's visit (fall of
1980) , the suspension of wheat shipments was paramount in the
minds of Soviet policymakers.
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Moreover, such a policy in sports-minded America, in the midst
of an election year, appeared to defy all reason and logic.
The effectiveness of the boycott is still
open to wide debate. The action admittedly deprived Moscow of
a very visual propaganda opportunity, and the American initia-
tive served to rally massive world support and attention on
the Afghanistan issue. In light of the fact that the policy
was invariably a preventive measure, forestalling Moscow's
efforts to reinstate itself in the world community, the absence
of a more tangible measure of effectiveness is quite
understandable
.
(5) Encouragement of a U.S./PRC Connection .
Had the Afghanistan policy gone as planned, and had a stable,
pro-Soviet DRA been achieved shortly after the invasion, a
Peking/Washington alignment would not have been as effective
or likely. The expansion of the intervention operation into
a long-term battle of attrition has afforded an opportunity
for each nation to contest the Soviet policy--for the mutual
benefit of both. Although the Mujahadeen aid programs of
both powers apparently are autonomous , Washington and Peking
have since found a new commonality of interests. Anthony
Arnold [Ref. Ill: p. 98] speculates that this connection may
comprise the most significant long-term ramification of the
invasion
.
(6) The 1980 U.S. Presidential Campaign .
Prior to Afghanistan, Moscow exhibited confusion and irrita-
tion over the policy vacillations of the Carter Administration,
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however Washington's inactivity during the Ethiopian and
Kampuchean episodes had been recognized and appreciated.
The Soviets' toleration of Carter ended with the promulga-
tion of the "Afghanistan sanctions" , in early and mid-January
1980. This development was viewed by Moscow "with astonish-
ment, and more than a little enmity."
Thereafter, the Soviet press assumed a
vehemently anti-Carter theme, which essentially would continue
until the last weeks of the campaign. Presidential candidate
Ronald Reagan, who initially had been viewed as a "right-wind
extremist", was, nevertheless, spared the level of animosity
heaped upon his opponent. Although Soviet effectiveness is
2
very questionable, by negation Moscow helped the election
of Reagan, a candidate embodying America's distrust of, and
hostility toward, Moscow in the wake of the Afghanistan inva-
sion. In this regard, the Afghanistan solution has put
Soviet influence in superpower relations at a net disadvantage;
Moscow faces an American administration wary of Soviet inten-
tions and motives.
The specific measures of the U.S. sanc-
tions policy have, in fact, proven transient and debatably
effective. The most significant results have involved more
long-term implications on alignments and policy trends within
Cobb interview.
2An excellent historical study of Soviet efforts to influ-
ence U.S. Presidential election processes is given in Valenta,
"Games Russians Play: The United States Presidential Elections,"
an unpublished manuscript, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 1984.
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the world community. The United States remains watchful and
wary of Soviet ambitions, and the Third World has identified
a common interest with the U.S. in preventing future Soviet
encroachments. The world as a whole now appraises Soviet
interests and intentions with a more careful, less sympathe-
tic eye.
c. Reaction and Consequences Within the Soviet Bloc
Although several members of the Soviet bloc had
made some sizeable investments in pre-invasion Afghanistan,
the Soviet intervention apparently was accomplished without
direct assistance from Moscow's allies. Moreover, little sub-
stantive evidence exists as to whether Soviet allies were even
informed of the planned invasion. However, if reaction within
the regional presses provides a valid indication, possibly
Czechoslovakia and the GDR—but no others—were privy to
Moscow's intentions.
Following the invasion, Moscow found its most
loyal support from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bul-
garia. Of all Soviet allies, Czechoslovakia held the great-
est stake in the Afghanistan conflict. At the time of inva-
sion, Prague had contributed nearly 28 percent of the $1
billion Soviet bloc economic aid program provided Kabul since
1955 [Ref. 112: p. 74 and 76]. Furthermore, the Czech pre-
sence in Afghanistan was second only to that of the Soviets;
allegedly, over 500 Czech workers and economic planners
assisted efforts to "build socialism in Afghanistan"
.
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Although Czechoslovakia evidently played no role in the
intervention operation, Prague was the first ally to announce
support for the action, only hours after Moscow informed the
world of its Afghanistan policy. In general, Czech report-
ing on events in the region exhibited a timeliness and accuracy
which suggests close complicity with Soviet news- and policy-
makers.
Interestingly, Poland was second among Moscow's
allies in assisting the Soviet aid program in Afghanistan.
Although no Polish presence could be discerned within the
region, Warsaw provided needed agricultural goods through the
CMEA scheme. And like Prague, Warsaw espoused loyally the
Soviet line of legal and ideological justification for the
invasion.
However, unlike Czechoslovakia, the Polish
media appeared quite unready for the sudden rush of events in
Afghanistan. The initial invasion announcement in Poland
came nearly 14 hours after the Soviet account. Polish report-
ing reverberated the Soviet text verbatim, following the Soviet
media blindly into the pitfalls of trying to find an acceptable
interpretation of the invasion. In general, the slow and unin-
formed nature of Polish news coverage supports the view that
Warsaw was taken by surprise by the Soviet action.
Similar conclusions can be reached concerning
Hungary and Bulgaria. Reports typically followed Soviet
announcements by as much as a day, and could add nothing more
to the Soviet accounts. The fact that neither of these nations
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identified national interest (in the form of economic invest-
ments) in the region adds to the conclusion that addressal of
the issue was largely lip-service paid to Moscow. In this
light, a Soviet decision not to inform these allies of the
impending operation is somewhat justifiable.
East Germany and Rumania present interesting
cases where the Soviet line was toed, however not without
visible signs of discord with Moscow over the issue. The
GDR, which was third among WTO nations in economic assistance
to Kabul, and which played a small part in implementing the
Afghanistan policy, provides the most perplexing case. The
East Berlin media gave all indications of being forewarned
of the invasion; East Germany was behind only Czechoslovakia
in announcing its steadfast support of the Soviet initiative,
and reporting generally was more concise and timely than that
seen in Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria. Throughout the episode,
the Honecker government consistently voiced the spirit, if not
the word of Moscow's official interpretation.
Nevertheless, surprisingly, the East Berlin
press let it be known that all East Germans were not firmly
behind the Soviet position. Between late January and mid-
February 1980, the East German domestic service published
three articles describing incidents of public outrage over
According to Cobb, the GDR was instrumental in train-
ing the DRA secret police. It is believed that a small GDR
contingent is still present in Kabul.
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the invasion. In the streets of Leipzig and Dresden, anti-
Soviet leaflets were reported handed out. In the capital,
a small demonstration by students and workers was noted. A
sign was alleged to have been painted across a downtown wall
exclaiming: "Why are the Soviets in Afghanistan? We want
coal, not tanks!"
Although official accounts of these incidents
could not be called sympathetic, they were plainly and unchar-
acteristically devoid of editorial comment. It is likely
that East Berlin intended to send a subtle message to Moscow
in such coverage. The Afghanistan invasion had recently
necessitated a 20 percent drop in Soviet raw material supply
to the GDR; the reporting of anti-Soviet activities (an obvious
embarrassment to Moscow) made the Soviets well-aware of the
Honecker regime's dissatisfaction over recent trade develop-
ments. The final reference to public dissent coincided within
days a visit by the GDR foreign minister to the Soviet Union,
supposedly at Moscow's summoning. Within a month, Soviet
deliveries to the GDR were perceived to be on the rise (despite
the increasing costs of the Afghan war) , and a similar episode
in the East German media has not been noted since.
Nicoale Ceausescu's Rumania predictably proved
the least sympathetic and acquiescent to Moscow's justifica-
tion and interpretation of the invasion episode. The initial
Rumanian report of the event, coming nearly a day after the
first Soviet announcement, contained such careful assertions
as "Moscow alleges", and "according to Soviet sources".
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Although Bucharest adroitly avoided reporting that could be
construed as challenging the Soviet account of events, such
a reluctance to accept Moscow's version was unique among
regional presses.
In the summer of 1980, the Rumanian Ambassador
to Morocco brought Bucharest a bold new tack in stating that
"Moscow must reconsider its policy in Afghanistan" [Ref . 113]
.
During the next two years Ceausescu met with British and
French diplomats, and publically supported the Western Euro-
pean view that "the continuing conflict in Afghanistan can
only serve to heighten tensions between East and West" [Ref.
114]. Although Bucharest's outspoken criticism of the Afghan-
stan solution dropped noticeably following a series of quiet
visits by Soviet emissaries , Rumania has remained a solitary
voice of opposition on the issue within the WTO.
Other Soviet clients and acquaintences have
been less considerate in their criticism of the Soviet pre-
sence in Afghanistan. Yugoslavia labeled the invasion as a
"dangerous and militaristic action" , only four days after
Moscow announced its decision to lend fraternal assistance.
Red China called the act a blatant and unlawful attack on a
sovereign nation and people. Many Soviet-leaning Third World
countries joined this chorus. Of the top ten recipients of
Soviet economic aid at the time of the invasion, only Karmal's
Afghanistan (number six) publically supported the action.
Compare Berner, p. 276, and Hosmer , p. 74 and p. 76
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Among the top 15 benefactors of Soviet military assistance,
Ethiopia (number seven) , Afghanistan (number eight) , Angola
(number twelve) , and South Yemen (number fifteen) sided with
Moscow, while seven others opposed the Soviet intervention.
Major Soviet clients, such as India, Syria, and Libya have
generally chosen to step out of the way of universal condemn-
nation, rather than commit themselves to the beleaguered
Soviet position on the issue.
In summary, Moscow suffered perhaps the worst
political defeat and humiliation as a result of the Afghanis-
tan invasion in nearly three decades. The true costs of the
episode cannot be measured in terms of immediate economic or
political implications. Its significance- lies in what Richard
Pipes calls "the shift in global perceptions of Moscow."
Although the action ostensibly was justified in the Soviet
mind, the invasion has sensitized the world community, includ-
ing Soviet friends and foes alike, to the underlying ambitions
and potential of Moscow's political philosophy.
It warrants note that the magnitude of world
reaction to the invasion has been enhanced considerably by
the Soviets' inability to close the chapter on the Afhanistan
episode. The failure of efforts to pacify the Afghan people,
creditable to the sheer tenacity and determination of the Muja-
hadeen, has placed the Soviets in the role of oppressor. The
valiant freedom fighters have earned the admiration and sympa-
thy of the world community. The miscalculation of world
Pipes interview,
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reaction, and of the perseverance of the independent-minded
Afghans , has created the political morass in which Moscow
now stands.
The final analysis will speculate on Soviet political
options for Moscow's Afghanistan policy, and on the most
desirable course of action for American policymakers. The
final conclusions will offer judgment on how developments
in post-invasion Afghanistan have changed the course of Soviet
policy trends
.
B. CONCLUSIONS/IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE SOVIET POLICYMAKING
1. Soviet and American Options for the Afghanistan Crisis
The Soviet Union presently has several options avail-
able to extricate itself from the predicament in Afghanistan,
all of which carry high risks and costs. As recently as Aug-
ust 1984, Moscow has denounced the idea of withdrawal; this
would surely have ramifications throughout the Soviet sphere
of influence. In 1983, by which time the Soviets had expended
$3 billion, and had suffered 15,000 casualties in the conflict,
Yuriy Andropov [Ref. 115J declared resolutely that the Soviet
presence in the region would remain "until the reasons for
their being there disappear." The issue has transcended the
immediate political and economic interests that led to the
invasion decision, and has become a matter of credibility and
honor.
The Soviets know well that under the current Soviet
policy, the problems in Afghanistan will never "disappear".
182
There is evidence that a faction within the Soviet military
have pressed for a significantly greater presence in the
region, "to bring the issue to a quick and violent close."
The Kremlin, however, has shunned such an option. At a time
when Western unity is perceived to be on the rise, and when
85 percent of the international community has spoken out
against the war, the political costs of escalation could be
expected to be immense. It also has been offered that increas-
ing the size and tempo of Soviet operations may precipitate
expansion of the war beyond Afghanistan's borders. Since the
invasion, the Soviets have carefully handled the issue of
border raids and the training of guerrillas in China and
Pakistan. DRA forces have largely been tasked with maintain-
ing border security, and preemptive air strikes into Pakistan
(accomplished in aircraft with DRA markings) have been small
and infrequent. The implementation of a more definitive
solution to the conflict would necessitate a more serious
addressal of the problem. Taking the war beyond Afghanistan's
borders would directly challenge the interests of the U.S.,
the PRC , and the Islamic world in the region.
Additionally, a final, massive effort would pro-
duce greatly increased Soviet casualties , and would not
guarantee that stability would, in fact, return. The Soviets
then must address more vital internal security concerns; anti-
war sentiments have been noted within the U.S.S.R. since 1982.
1 Cobb interview.
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Invariably, the least costly and risky option
entails a continuation of the present long-term solution.
Moscow has decided to weather the storm, estimating that iron-
willed Soviet resolve and overwhelming firepower superiority
inevitably will wear down the Mujahadeen's will to fight. As
a Soviet defector recently commented, the Soviets "intend to
cling to their holdings until the Mujahadeen come in from the
fields with their rifles over their heads, willing now to
embrace communism."
Moscow likely recognizes the absurdity of this expec-
tation, however in view of the monumental costs of a more
decisive answer to the current situation, the present policy
appears affordable. Lately efforts have been made to decrease
the direct costs of the war, evidencing what Matlock has called
Moscow's desire to make the best of a bad situation. The
operational tempo of the 40th Army slowed perceptibly during
1983, and DRA forces have been accorded a more direct (but not
autonomous) role in combat. As a consequence, Soviet casual-
ties were reported in 1983 to be the lowest since the first
2
months of the war; DRA losses may be at a new high.
Krasnow interview.
2 Bennett and other sources have noted that static defenses
have been manned almost exclusively by DRA forces, while the
Soviets have worked from autonomous bases well within the
Soviet/DRA zone of control. DRA garrisons on the periphery
of that zone have sustained heavy casualties from rebel attacks;
additionally, such forces are used as fast-reaction assets for
counterof fensive operations. With the decreased tempo of Soviet
operations, the DRA army has sustained the majority of Communist
casualties in the conflict.
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Nevertheless, operations in 1984 tend to point toward yet
another shift in Soviet strategy prescribing a more active
role for the Red Army in the conflict.
The Soviets also have attempted to derive as many
advantages as possible from the situation. Afghanistan has
become a testing ground for the latest battlefield weaponry
and tactics. Even more important, a cadre of combat-tested
junior and middle-ranked officers have developed within the
Red Army.
If America identifies its interests in forcing the
Soviets out of their tolerable position in Afghanistan, the
course of action is obvious. The U.S. must ensure that Moscow's
Afghanistan policy becomes unaf fordable , to a level where the
costs of escalation and withdrawal appear more palatable.
This can be accomplished by increasing American aid to the
Mujahadeen, to include sorely needed weaponry such as anti-
tank rockets, and surface-to-air missiles. Currently the
rebels obtain 85 percent of their weapons from defectors, or
through capture. Sources contend that the PRC provides
almost half of all outside aid, with the U.S., Britain, and
several Islamic nations contributing the rest. According to
Jiri Valenta [Ref. 116: p. 12] , Washington's reluctance to
play a more substantive role in the conflict extends from a
tacit recognition of Soviet peripheral interests. In light
of recent Soviet arms deliveries in Central America, a less
conciliatory outlook appears to be in order.
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Concurrently the U.S. should attempt to create a
diplomatic avenue for a political solution to the conflict,
to make that option appear less costly than escalation. Cobb
offers that Moscow has shunned the idea of negotiations in
the past because the price of the conflict was deemed accept-
able, and because no outside power had sufficient leverage in
the region to force the issue. Accordingly, direct American
aid to the Mujahadeen may engender a Soviet outlook more
receptive to a political solution. Such American efforts
would thus pressure Moscow into a policy decision on the Afghan-
istan dilemma, while providing an "escape route" to influence
Soviet policymaking in the direction of American interests.
The expectations of such a policy must be tempered.
Even with a Soviet military withdrawal, the return of Afghan-
istan to a truly nonaligned status is hardly likely. Such an
evolution would present too visible a defeat for Soviet foreign
policy, and the security problems which motivated the Soviet
invasion would remain unsolved. The most practical goal for
Washington is to achieve a "Finlandisized" status for Afghan-
istan. Moscow would be allowed a measure of influence in
the foreign affairs of Kabul, without being accorded the
opportunity to exploit strategic advantages inherent in Afghan-
istan's geopolitical setting.
Admittedly this policy has prominent weaknesses. Such
a political solution would entail dialogue between Kabul/
Moscow, and the insurgents—an event that would be unprece-
dented in Soviet political history. Moreover, an equitable
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agreement requires that the Mujahadeen speak with a common
voice. This, too, would be an historic first. Under present
circumstances, such an American policy appears, at best, a
long-term answer.
Yet, America has little to lose from pursuing such a
course of action. In terms of purely American interests,
Washington can only profit. A Soviet withdrawal would close
an avenue of strategic potential in the region. Soviet esca-
lation would foster a worldwide anti-Soviet coalition, and
other unpredictable foreign policy costs— and might well not
prove a decisive solution to the conflict. (Volodya Krasnow
speculates that Soviet control will inevitably be achieved
over "an empty, peopleless nation.")
The decision to maintain a limited Soviet presence
there, despite increasing costs produced by growing American
arms aid, would tie down more Soviet resources, and would
provide no solution at all. America's pursuit of a diplo-
matic answer would promote an image of Washington as a peace-
maker, and would further serve to rally international opposi-
tion to Moscow's policies. Without doubt, increased American
political and material involvement in the Afghanistan conflict
would promise significant Soviet costs, at a minimum risk to
American interests.
2 . Implications for Future Soviet Policymaking
As concluded earlier, the decision to invade Afhanistan
is unexceptional in the motivation, style, and stragegy
Krasnow interview.
187
involved in the policy, yet bears significance as the culmin-
ation of a recent trend toward militarism in Soviet foreign
policy. Specifically, the precedent to be identified here is
not in the military solution itself, but in Moscow's new will-
ingness to use it. Following his 1980 trip to Moscow, Tyrus
Cobb came to a similar conclusion, observing that:
there is no indication that the Soviets saw [the
invasion] as a 'progression of international com-
munism behind the bayonets of the Red Army '... They
argue that Moscow's Afghanistan policy is the pro-
duct of constant security interests. Whereas we
saw it as a military progression warranting sanc-
tions, they perceive it in the immediate context;
the Soviets do not perceive the significance of a
trend toward more liberal use of military force.
^
Yet, the unsettling outcome of the Afghanistan solution
has very conceivably had a major impact on Soviet policymaking
patterns. The Afghanistan invasion represents a case where
tried-and-true methods of pursuing security interests tried
and failed. Understandably, Moscow has taken a step back to
reappraise its policy outlook. What has resulted is a half-
decade hiatus on Soviet intervention policies, during which
Moscow has exhibited a measure of restraint and caution absent
from Soviet policymaking for more than a decade. However,
unlike those earlier times, Moscow today holds a formidable
power projection potential capable of resuming a policy of
"Red Army diplomacy" at any time.
This is a new period of Soviet restraint—inexorably
linked to a rejuvenated American confidence and will to contest
Cobb interview.
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Soviet moves abroad. As seen in Lebanon and Grenada, the U.S.
has indicated that the use of "military diplomacy" is no longer
a spurned policy option, even when the risk of superpower con-
frontation exists. Consistent with earlier Soviet policymak-
ing patterns, Moscow consequently has given more weight to
American interest and the predicted American response in sub-
sequent policy decisions.
Thomas Wolfe and others view recent Soviet policy
trends as more than the product of an "American Stigma"
.
The correlation of forces equation is seen as even more funda-
mental to Soviet policymaking, and the advantage that Moscow
perceives it holds in this calculation will determine whether
American interests and response remain a primal consideration.
Here too, the U.S. appears to be on the right track. Coinci-
dent with Washington's new willingness to challenge Soviet
initiatives, the American potential to do so is increasing.
The Soviet propensity for safe and controllable ventures dic-
tates that an overwhelming Soviet advantage precedes a possible
superpower confrontation. The recent American emphasis on
military potency has accordingly forestalled the change of a
2Soviet/American conflict.
This term is creditable to Krasnow, who offers that the
Soviets have historically prejudiced policymaking with feel-
ings of inferiority to the U.S.
2
An opposing argument holds that the increased military
potential of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. only increases
the chance of an accidental engagement becoming a major super-
power conflict. Such a view correlates the growth of military
capabilities with an increased willingness to use such assets.
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It appears that Soviet policy will proceed from the
Afghanistan episode on one of several paths. According to
Cobb, the military option no longer will be viewed as favor-
able, however Moscow will continue its expansion into the
Third World via less overt means. The political environ-
ment permitting the unchallenged use of force in Soviet
foreign policy has changed in the wake of the Afghanistan
invasion. Conceivably, Moscow will shift policy emphasis
to utilize espionage, subversion, and indirect forms of
intervention to pursue national interests and ambitions
.
A second view predicts a period of Soviet inactivity
beyond Moscow's present position in the world, during which
the Soviets will consolidate the gains of the past decade.
As observed by Hosmer, Soviet policy has in the past exhibited
a pattern of expansion, and then consolidation: lulls in the
pursuit of Soviet interests abroad can be discerned in the
late 1950' s and mid-1960' s. It can be offered that the latest
series of Soviet initiatives, culminating in the Afghanistan
invasion and occupation, has depleted Moscow's policy resources,
As seen in the late 1960's, a period may follow where Moscow
2
will attempt to make its new holdings more cost-effective.
Accordingly, the continuing crises in Angola, Ethiopia, and
In Hosmer, pp. 30-33, the point is made that Moscow's
commitments in the Middle East and Vietnam in 1967 required
temporary sidetracking. A similar, though less prominent






Afghanistan must be resolved, or at least be made less
costly, prior to Moscow embarking on new commitments abroad.
In the final analysis, the Afghanistan episode appears
to be the apex of a Soviet trend toward militarism in exploit-
ing international opportunites , and protecting interests--
as provided by a highly favorable correlation of forces. The
decay of the Soviet material and spiritual advantage , and the
unexpected, continuing costs of the Afghanistan conflict,
have brought this era to a close. Before the "Afghanistan
solution" again becomes a primary policy option, the politi-
cal and economic burden of current commitments must be lighten-
ed, and the gap between the superpowers' military potential
and political resolve must widen considerably.
A fundamental lesson for us to take from the Afghan-
istan episode is the necessity to assert and support U.S.
interests in every corner of the globe. Demonstrably,
America has recognized its responsibility in the bipolar
world system to prevent the expansion of the Soviet sphere
of influence. Washington must hence consistently prove its
determination to contest Soviet initiatives when and where
they occur. Key to the success of such efforts is obviously
a timely and accurate assessment of Soviet aspirations and
capabilities
.
Additionally, the Soviet use of military force must
be recognized for its true significance. "Red Army diplo-
macy" is historically the most expedient and decisive means
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to solve political problems or exploit opportunities. Mos-
cow's withdrawal from a doctrine favorably viewing military
intervention does not imply that the Soviets have abandoned,
even temporarily, their global ambitions. As poignantly
demonstrated in the 1981 Polish episode, Moscow is capable
of less overt, more long-term solutions for the same ends.
U.S. policymakers must assume that the shark has not gone
away, but merely has gone deeper underwater. Perceptiveness
and care are the watchwords for dealing with Soviet expan-
sionism in the future.
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